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STATE OF IDAHO 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., 
an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-CROSS RESPONDENT, 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, 
an Idaho limited liability partnership, 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT. 
-- - - 
Appeoiedfrom the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial 
Disrricl ofthe Stale ofIdaho. in and for ADA County 
Hon MICHAEL MCLAUGHLLN, District Judge 
--- 
JACK S. GJORDING 
Attorney for Appellant 
THOMAS A. BANDUCCI 
Attorney for Respondent 
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GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho ) 
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record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chartered, and provides this 
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Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
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MRIA'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of MRI 
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRI 
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, 
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an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 1 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
COMES NOW Defendant/CounterClaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP, 
by and through its attorneys of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., and moves to strike 
the Expert Report of Gregory S. Vistnes dated April 30,2007. This Motion is based upon IRE 
702 and supported by simultaneously-filed Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Gregory 
S. Vistnes, an Affidavit of Ed Whitelaw, and an Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon. 
4 
DATED this .7 day of June, 2007. 
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Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), by 
and through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s ("SARMC") 
Motion for Summary Judgment on MRIA's Antitrust Claims (the "~otion").' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consistent with their efforts to move for summary judgment on nearly every claim 
asserted against them, SARMC and Third-Party Defendants seek summary judgment on MRIA's 
antitrust claims. Claiming that MRW (1) does not have standing, (2) has not proven the 
elements of its antitrust claim, and (3) has not been damaged, SARMC argues that MRL4's 
antitrust claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. SARMC's desperate arguments are 
misguided for the following reasons: 
1. SARMC claims that MRIA's antitrust claims are a reaction to good old-fashioned 
competition within the magnetic resonance imaging field - not anticompetitive conduct on either 
SARMC's or IMI's behalf. SARMC is wrong. IMI receives higher prices for comparable goods 
and services. These higher prices constitute harm to competition - not just harm to MRIA itself. 
This harm to competition confers standing in MRIA to bring its antitrust claims against SARMC 
and IMI. 
2. Despite its increasing market share over time, combined with its increasing prices 
received over that same time, SARMC argues that IMI does not have monopoly power. Doing 
so, however, disregards the historical data outlining IMI's conduct over the past six years in the 
relevant market. It is because IMI was able to consistently increase its market share, even while 
simultaneously receiving higher prices for comparable services and goods, that IMI exhibited the 
1 On May 18,2007, Third-Party Defendants joined in SARMC's Motion. This Opposition, therefore 
operates to counter both SARMC's and Third-Party Defendants' challenge to MRIA's antitntst claims. 
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monopoly power supporting MRIA's claims. This archived data evidences that any entry in the 
market was inadequate at disciplining and/or eliminating IMI's combination of increasing market 
share and higher prices. 
3. SARMC argues that its assistance to MRIA's competitor, MI ,  while still a 
partner in MRIA followed by its wrongful dissociation from MRIA to join up with M I ,  comer 
the market, and receive higher prices for the same goodslservices, are all pro-competitive actions 
conducted with a legitimate business purpose in mind. This conduct, however, is anticompetitive 
in that it ultimately foreclosed conlpetition in the market for the sole benefit of SARMC and MI .  
Hiding behind the laws designed to prohibit such behavior is disingenuous and should not 
warrant the entry of summary judgment here. 
4. SARMC claims that MRIA has not been damaged, despite having received 
damages estimated from MRIA's experts in the tens of millions of dollars. These estimates are 
based upon recognized methodologies in the context of antitrust cases and indicate that, in fact, 
SARMC and IMI have damaged M U .  The exact amount of the damage, however, is a 
question of fact for a jury to determine. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment should not be granted unless "the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery 
documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,205,61 P.3d 557, 
562 (2002) (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). "In making this determination, all allegations of fact in the 
record and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion." Id. 'When a jury is to be the finder of fact, summary judgment 
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is not proper if conflicting inferences could be drawn from the record and reasonable people 
might reach different conclusions." Id. 
"The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. The 
adverse party, however, may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but 
must respond, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (citing I.R.C.P. 56(e)). A moving party is 
only entitled to summary judgment if the "nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531,887 P.2d 
1034,1038 (1994) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323 (1986)). 
B. MRIA HAS STANDING TO PURSUE ITS ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
As in all cases, plaintiffs must have standing to bring an action. In the context of antitrust 
cases, standing involves more than satisfying the usual "case or controversy" requirement. 
Antitrust standing involves a two-prong test: (1) the plaintiff has asserted an antitrust injury, and 
(2) the plaintiff is a proper party to assert the antitrust laws' application to a particular 
circumstance. See Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793,797 n. 9 (2nd Cir. 1994). While SARMC 
does not question MRIA's status as an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws, it argues that 
MRIA has not suffered an antitrust injury and, therefore, does not have standing. SARMC is 
mistaken; MRIA has suffered an antitrust injury sufficient to confer standing. 
In order to establish an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must show that it has sustained an 
antitrust injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. Daniel v. Amer, Bd. of 
Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408,438 (2nd Cir. 2005) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl- 
0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489,97 S.Ct. 690,50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). Because antitrust laws 
were designed to protect competition, antitrust plaintiffs must show harm to competition as a 
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whole in order to confer standing. See New York Medscan LLC v. Nav York Univ. Sch. of Med., 
430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk 
Valley Med. Assocs., Znc., 996 F.2d 537,545 (2nd Cir. 1993)). A plaintiff shows harm to 
competition by alleging adverse effects on the price, quality, or output of the relevant good or 
service. See New York Medscan, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (citing Aventis Envtl. Sci. USA LP v. 
Scotts Co., 383 F. Supp. 2d 488,503 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). MRIA has already shown harm to 
competition; specifically, MIUA has already shown that IMI's conduct in the market has harmed 
competition by virtue of higher prices for comparable goods/services. 
In his March 19,2007 "Economic Analysis of MRI Services in the Boise Area," MRIA's 
expert, Ed Whitelaw ("Whitelaw") outlined his analysis of harm to competition. Under the 
heading of that same name, Whitelaw discussed his harm to competition analysis, stating: 
One measure of harm to competition is the extent to which a dominant seller in a 
market receives higher prices for comparable goods or services. relative to other 
-. We tested this hypothesis for IMI by calculating the statistical 
relationship between the amounts paid by BCBS for MRI scans provided by IM1 
and all other providers in the BCBS data. 
(See Fact 1 (Emphasis added)). In other words, Whitelaw described the relationship between 
the prices of MRI scans paid to IMI and the prices paid to all other providers within the BCBS 
data. (See Id.) Results showed that BCBS payments to IMI exceed the average payments to 
other providers in the market in the following respect: 
I Year - I % locrease I 
MRIA hereby identifies the facts supporting its Opposition to SARMC7s Motion with the corresponding 
numbered paragraphs in its simultaneously-filed "Statement of Facts in Support of Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re: Antitrust Claims." 
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(See Id.) Whitelaw further concluded that there was no apparent service or quality-based reason 
why IMI receives greater-than-market averages for its MRI services. (See Fact 2.) As a result, 
Whitelaw concluded that IMI's higher payments are a symptom of IMI's market power in the 
relevant market. (See Id.) Again, increases in price across the market indicate harm to 
competition - a prerequisite for conferring standing.3 As indicated above, h4RN has presented 
evidence of MI'S increased prices for comparable goods, thus ensuring m ' s  standing to 
pursue its antitrust claims. SARMC neglects to address the "harm to competition" section within 
Whitelaw's report. 
3 Additionally, in New York Medscan, the court dismissed the identical "reshuffling" argument made in 
Movants' briefmg. (See Memo at 5, h. 3.) In relevant part, the court held: 
With the use of different imaging devices, the accuracy of comparisons of the scans decreases, 
thereby adversely affecting diagnosis and treatment. Further, by requiring patients to change 
facilities, the continuity of patient treatments disturbed, resulting in an adverse emotional impact 
on patients. . . . [Tlhis is not a situation where, "[flrom the consumers' point of view, nothing 
about the market has changed" as a result of defendants' conduct. Instead, the quality of 
diagnostic imaging services purportedly has decreased, and the courts have repeatedly held that a 
decline in quality is among the injuries that the antimst laws were designed to prevent. ... 
Indeed, in the context of the provision of health care services for cancer patients, the sualitv of 
care is likelv to be at least as important to patients as the price. 
New York Medscan, 430 F. Supp. 2d 140, 147-148 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Internal citations omitted (Emphasis added)). 
With MRIA's continued exclusion from the market, the dominant market participant, IMI, has increased its prices. 
This should not be mistaken as SARMC's self-described "reshuffling" particularly because, in the context of the 
provision of magnetic resonance imaging services, increased prices for comparable goodslservices is important to 
patients. Id. Therefore, SARMC's "reshuffling" argument in this same respect should he rejected. 
4 However, it is clear that SARMC's counsel was aware of this component to Whitelaw's analysis, given 
this exchange at Whitelaw's deposition: 
Q: In the fourth bullet you refer to an analysis of harm to competition; correct? 
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C. IMI HAS MONOPOLY POWER 
SARMC adopts MRIA's market definition (relevant product and relevant geography). 
(See Memo at 8,  fn. 6.) However, SARMC disputes that IMI maintains monopoly power within 
that market. Monopoly power is the "power to control prices or exclude competition" in the 
relevant market. United States v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391,76 S.Ct. 
994, 1005, 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956). IMI's increasing trends over time in both market share and 
pricing suggest, as explained by Whitelaw, that IM1 has achieved, or will soon achieve a 
monopoly share of the market. (See Fact 3.)* 
SARMC's primary argument against Whitelaw's monopoly power findings relate to 
MRIA's alleged "blind reliance on market share estimates" to establish its antitrust claims. (See 
Memo at 14.) SARMC not only mischaracterizes Whitelaw's approach in this respect, but also 
the relevant law on this issue. To be clear, Whitelaw does not rely upon his market share 
analysis alone to opine that IMI has monopoly power. (See Fact 4.) Instead, Whitelaw considers 
together IMI's increasing market share over time with IMI's consistent price disparity during 
that same period. (See Id.) The combination of these trends provides evidence supporting a 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you find that the JMI-SADC imaging partnership has harmed competition in the relevant 
market by receiving higher-than-market rates for taking MRI scans relative to what those scans 
would have been in the absence of such anticompetitive behavior? 
A: Yes 
(See Whitelaw Depo, at 50:14-23, attached as Ex. '?>" to Patrick Miller Aff. at 1[ 5.) 
Instead, SARMC focuses upon the testimony of MRIA's experts Bruce Budge ("Budge") and Charles 
Wilhoite ("Wilhoite"). (See Memo at 6-8.) Both Budge and Wilhoite examined MRIA's damages -in an historical 
lost profits and future lost profits context/analyses. While instructive on damages relating to MRIA as a result of 
SARMC's and IMl's wrongful, anticompetitive conduct, their opinions in this respect supplement the harm to 
competition analysis performed by Ed Whitelaw, referenced above. 
5 See Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (1 1" Cir. 1990) (finding evidence 
sufficient to support finding of dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power based upon expert's opinion on 
the relevant geographic and product markets, along with rival supplier's 39% market share of that market). 
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conclusion of monopoly power. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(when evidence shows that firm has in fact profitably raised prices above competitive level, 
monopoly power exists); Natsource LLC v. GFZ Group, Znc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 626,635 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) ("Market share is just a way of estimating market power, which is the ultimate 
consideration. When there are better ways to estimate market power, the court should use them. 
These ways include a contemporaneous rise in price with increased market share." (Internal 
citations omitted (Emphasis added))); American Council of Certifed Podiatric Physicians and 
Surgeons v. American Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Znc., 185 F.3d 606,623 (6" Cir. 1999) ("I& 
price difference, coupled with the larger market share, supports plaintiffs claim of monopoly 
power by Ithe defendantl." (Emphasis added)). 
1.  SARMC Does Not Disvute that IMI's Market Share is Increasing 
Whitelaw's market share computation focuses on non-hospital, MRI technical procedures 
covered by private insurance. (See Fact 5.) Using information fiom Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
("BCBS"), along with information directly fiom MI,  Whitelaw followed a four-step process for 
understanding IMI's market share. 
Step One - Determine BCBS' Share of the Market for Private Insurance: Through its 
subpoenas to Blue Cross and Blue Shield, MRIA secured the volume of BCBS claims for 
MRI technical services. It therefore needed to know BCBS' market share of the market 
for private insurance in order to then extrapolate the total number of MRI claims in the 
market. Following his research into the Idaho Department of Insurance Annual Reports, 
Whitelaw concluded that the claims submitted to BCBS for MRI technical services 
represent 75% of the market for these services covered by private insurance. (See Fact 
6(a)36 
Step Two - Calculate the Total Number of MRI Claims in the Market: Knowing the 
number of BCBS claims for technical services and the percentage of the total claims they 
represent (Step One), Whitelaw then calculated the total number of relevant MRI claims 
Whitelaw assumed that an individual provider such as 1M1, even one that has market power in a relevant 
market, has no influence over payments from government insurers. That is, MRI providers are price takers for 
services to patients covered by govement  insurance. (See Fact 6(a)(i).) 
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in the market. He did this by taking the yearly BCBS claim totals and dividing each 
year's total by .75 -arriving at that year's total claims in the market. These figures are 
represented in Table 2 to Whitelaw's report. (See Fact 6(b).) 
Step Three - Adjust IMI's Scan Information to Reflect the Relevant Procedures: As 
previously mentioned, the relevant procedures to be analyzed in the market are 
;epresentkd by non-hospital, MRI tichnical procedures. These procedures were naturally 
incorporated within MI'S scan volumes. However, to recover only those procedures, 
Whitelaw made two adjustments to IMI's scan vblume. First, he removed MRI scans 
performed on hospital patients. This represented all of IMIs scans taken on SARMC's 
campus and 13% of IMIs remaining scans.7 Second, he adjusted MI'S scans to remove 
patients not covered by private insurance, using Equation (2) within his report. Whitelaw 
ultimately concluded that 69% of IMI patients are covered by private insurance. (See 
Fact 6(c).) 
Step Four - Determine IMI's Market Share: Using each of the previous three steps, 
Whitelaw was then able to determine IMI's Market Share as is represented within Table 3 
of his report. First, he took the raw M I  data, subtracted out the hospital scans, and 
multiplied the remaining scans by .87 to capture only hospital patients (Step Three). 
Second, he multiplied this product by .69 to account for only those scans covered by 
private insurance (Step Three). Third, be divided the total number of IMI's non-hospital, 
privately-insured claims by the total number of private, non-hospital claims in the market 
(Steps One and Two). These steps combined to generate MI'S market share over the 
past six years.8 (See Fact 6(d).) 
In short, Whitelaw's market share analysis compared the number of relevant procedures 
performed at IMI against the rest of the market during 2001-2006. (See Fact 7.) Whitelaw's 
analysis revealed that MI'S market share steadily increased over time and will likely continue to 
increase. (See Id.) SARMC offers no argument disputing these findings; however, to the extent 
these findings are contested, they create an issue of fact that prevents summary judgment. 
' As reported in the "Imaging Strategic Plan," 13% of IMI scans in 2002-2004 were on hospital patients 
(inpatients, outpatients and emergency patients). (See Fact 6(c)(l).) 
As a check on these four steps, Whitelaw also calculated MI'S market share using only the BCBS data - 
without considering the scan volumes produced by IMI itself. (See Fact 6(d)(i).) To do this, Whitelaw simply 
divided the IMI claim within the BCBS data by the total number of claim within the BCBS data. (See Id.) Due to 
certain anomalies in the BCBS data as to St. Luke's 2003 and 2005 claims (See Id.), Whitelaw offered two different 
adjustments as to the St. Luke's data in order to triangulate IMI's market share. (See Id.) Regardless of the 
adjustment, IMI's percentage of the market increased from the low 20's in 2002 to the mid-40's or above by 2006. 
(See Id.) Importantly, neither Blue Cross, Blue Shield, nor St. Luke's could offer any explanation for the anomalies 
present within BCBS's data as to St. Luke's. 
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2. SARMC Fails to Consider MI 'S Increased Pricing for Comvarable Goods as a 
Factor Contributing to IMl's Monopoly Power 
"As an economic matter, [monopoly] power exists whenever prices can be raised above 
the levels that would be charged in a competitive market." See Jeffeon Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,27 n. 46, 104 S.Ct. 1551,80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984). Here, Whitelaw has 
provided evidence that M I  historically has received higher prices for comparable goods relative 
to other sellers in the understood market. (See supra at 3-5.) Importantly, these increases in 
price simultaneously track MI'S increases in market share over time. (See Fact 8.) According to 
Whitelaw, these factors combine to suggest that M I  maintains monopoly power in the relevant 
market. (See Id.) SARMC summarily dismisses these trends as, simply, unnecessary and 
unreliable. (See Memo at 19-2 1 .)9 
9 SARMC instead relies on Whitelaw's alleged failure to consider barriers to entry when considering IMl's 
monopoly power. SARMC's argument in this respect misses the point. Generally, entry into a market is relevant 
because, if entry is easy, even a fm holding a commanding percentage of the market cannot charge a price above 
the competitive price, for once it does, competitors will enter the market and undercut the f m ' s  price. See United 
States v. Syujji Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 667 (9" Cir. 1990) This is typically the concem when dealing with a 
prospective merger. (See Fact 9.) In other words, for an a ante evaluation of a proposed merger, investigating the 
prospects for sustained entry into a market may prove useful. (See Id.) However, an ex ante analysis is not 
germane to the instant action. (See Id.) In this case, the parties and the Court have an expost description of the 
relevant market, including IMI's increasing market share and its persistently higher prices for six years. (See Id.) 
Whatever net enby occurred during these six years and whatever excess capacity that may have existed during this 
time did not deter or counteract the competitive effect of concem. (See Id.) Said another way, whatever entry took 
place, it clearly failed to offer enough market discipline to eliminate IMI's combination of increasing share and 
higher prices. (See Id.) As noted in FTC reports that address this topic, entry must be timely and of sufficient 
magnitude and duration to have an impact on alleged anticompetitive behavior. (See Id.) Whatever entry took place 
in this market did not meet these criteria. (See Id.) Regardless, these effects, if any, raise questions of fact for a jury 
to decide. See Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 31 1 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 
1104 (D. Colo. 2004) ("Whether the brief entry and hurried exit of [market participants] demonstrates additional 
entq barriers or the opposite is a question of fact for the jury.") This reality disposes of SARMC's attempt to 
piggy-back on the summary judgment ruling in East Portlandlmaging Ctr., 2006 W L  752590 (D. Or. 2006). 
There, the court found that the absence of a forward-looking entry analysis to judge the anticompetitive 
effect of a joint venture between a hospital network and its radiologists failed to create an issue of fact to avoid 
snmmary judgment. Here, however, a fomd-looking entry analysis is not necessary or appropriate when actual, 
historical infonnation is available for both SARMC's and MRIA's experts to analyze. (See Fact 10.) That analysis 
-consisting ofhoth a market share analysis and a harm to competition analysis - necessarily incoporates the data of 
all entrants into the market and any excess capacity over the course of the relevant time period (2001-2006). (See 
Id.) Moreover, that analysis revealed that, in fact, entrants into the market and any excess capacity was not of 
sufficient magnitude or duration to counteract IMI's monopoly power. (See Id.) Specifically, despite these entries 
and the excess capacities that may exist in the market, IMI increased both its market share and pricing during that 
same time. (See Id.) An estimation of what may prospectively happened through a "barriers to entry" and 
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a. Whitelaw's Pricing Analysis is Instructive on the Issue of Harm to 
Competition and, Therefore, IMI's Monopoly Power 
As discussed, Whitelaw approached MI'S harm to competition by examining the extent 
it receives higher prices for comparable goods or services, relative to other MIU providers. 
SARMC, however, argues that this analysis "cannot . . . ultimately prove anvthing about IMI's 
ability to wield monopoly power or the broader issue of harm to competition. (See Memo at 19 
(Emphasis in original)). Yet, SARMC's own expert, Gregory Vistnes ("Vistnes"), acknowledges 
that such an analysis is appropriate to an opinion regarding harm to competition: 
Q: Now, do you disagree with Dr. Whitelaw's direction in this analysis in that 
seeking to determine whether M I  is paid more would be relevant to an 
opinion regarding any competitive impact? 
A: If one could properly determine whether or not M I  was paid more, 
could vroverlv control for all the determinants of price other than votential 
anticompetitive conduct, and if one could link the presumed higher prices 
to the anticomvetitive conduct and make sense of the full richness of the 
information, then it could be informative. 
(See Fact 11 (Emphasis added)). Therefore, contrary to SARMC's arguments, Vistnes agrees 
that a pricing analysis & informative toward determining harm to competition; however, he 
questions the conclusions reached by Whitelaw: 
Q: Okay. So I take it then that you don't disagree with Dr. Whitelaw's 
intention to analyze pricing as part of an overall evaluation o competition 
in the market? 
A: I disagree with how Dr. Whitelaw conducted his pricing analysis. I 
disagree with the context in which that analysis was done. Do I disagree 
with the notion that a pricing analysis could be informative if done 
groverlv, that's a lot of ifs, but if it could be done vroverlv and was 
properly linked, it could be informative. 
"capacity" analysis is no substitute for examining and analyzing what actually did happen. (See Id.) This is the 
information that Whiteiaw properly considered. 
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(See Id. (Emphasis added)).'' Those questions are disagreements between experts as to whether 
IMI harmed competition and, likewise, whether M I  maintained monopoly power. These 
questions raise issues of fact and preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
b. SARMC's Unfounded Criticisms of Whitelaw's Pricing Analysis are 
Without Merit 
SARMC argues that Whitelaw's pricing analysis is flawed because it fails to consider 
certain differentiating factors that may explain the differences in the higher prices IMI receives. 
(See Memo at 19-21.) These factors, according to SARMC, include (1) "non-price competitive" 
differences in the type of MRI service that is provided, and (2) differences with respect to the 
health plan reimbursement schedules. Id. Each of these arguments is misplaced. 
First, without offering any econometric analysis, SARMC implies that IMI's higher 
prices likely means that IMI provides more complex, thus more highly reimbursed, services than 
do many of the other MRI providers in the market. Id." However, SARMC has already 
stipulated that the product market is the market for MRI technical services. (See Fact 12.) The 
technical services market involves technicians taking MRT images. These services are distinct 
and separate from the professional services provided by physicians that interpret or read already- 
10 Vistnes had to admit that a pricing analysis goes hand-in-hand with a harm to competition analysis, 
having previously testified as an expert on behalf of a plaintiff bringing antitrust claims that a proposed merger 
would lead to anti-competitive price increases in violation of federal antitrust law. See U.S. v. Long Island Jewish 
Medical Ctr., 983 F.  Supp. I21 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
" SARMC's theory in this respect is compromised by the fact that neither it nor its expert understands what 
the market doesldoes not provide, having performed no market analysis on any other MRI provider in the area: 
Q: My question was simpler. It was since you were evaluating the quality of the radiology 
groups and technical component providers, what did you do to evaluate, for example, 
the quality of care and the quality of technical component service at Boise Orthopedic? 
A: There was no specific analysis to try to evaluate the aualitv of care. certainly no 
guantitative analysis in part because of the difficultv of evaluating auantitatively. 
(See Fact 12 (Emphasis added)). 
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taken images. If, as SARMC concedes, the product market is this technical component, it offers 
no differentiating factors within this acknowledged market that explain IMI's higher prices.'2 
Second, both M I  and MRIA are covered by all of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
insurance plans. (See Fact 14.) Therefore, there is no reason to expect that a choice in insurance 
plans affect the choice of MRI provider. (See Id.) Moreover, given the similarities in services 
(both from a technical and professional standpoint through 2004), there is no reason to expect 
that IMI should have attracted a disproportionate share of patients requiring more complex 
procedures. (See Id.) That is, during this time, refemng physicians had no incentive to 
systematically send patients needing more complicated procedures to IMI instead of M U .  (See 
Id.) Yet, Whitelaw is able to conclude that individuals from the same referring physician, 
requesting the same set of services between IMI and M U ,  are paying higher amounts for those 
services from IMI. (See Id.) Stated differently, this "differentiating factor," even when 
considered, still reveals the price differentiation that contributed to Whitelaw's opinions 
regarding harm to competition. If SARMC's theory was correct, this would not be the case. 
12 Still, on the topic of "differentiation" by including the professional component in the technical 
component market (which is duplicitous, given SARMC's stipulation on product market), SARMC has some other 
problems. First, even if the professional component (radiology groups) were added as a differentiating factor, how 
does an economist even begin to evaluate differences between radiology groups? Vistnes offers no insight as to how 
this differentiating factor (if it must be considered) is dealt with in order to eet an accurate comarison. In fact. - 
Vismes stated simply at hjs deposltlon: .'Islittine, here today. l l . h ~ ~ t  sure that I can off the top'ofmv head think 
such an ~pproach and lbsve not iqvelt a lot of itl~oughtl as to how it  co~rld b~dong."  (See Fact I3 (Emphasis 
added)). Moreover. SARMC's inmlication that IMl's radioloav erouD is a differcntiatlne factor is based solelv 
upon iimited, hand-picked doctor &erviews conducted at the behest o~sARMc's c o m e r  (See Id.) Finally, i6 
suggesting that IMI's radiology group ("GSR) accounts for the higher prices enjoyed by IMI, SARMC and Vistnes 
fail to consider that, up until early 2005, GSR provided the radiology services to both IMI and MRIA. As such, 
differences between IMI and MRIA in the amounts received for similar services should not reflect differences in the 
quality of the professional services (the radiologists) because there should not have been any differences in the 
quality of the radiology services provided to MRIA and IMI. 
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D. SARMC AND IMI PARTICIPATED IN ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
Anticompetitive conduct is "the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to 
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor." US. v. 
GrifJith, 334 U.S. 100, 107,68 S.Ct. 941,92 L.Ed. 1236 (1948), disapproved of on other grounds 
by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 
628 (1984). Here, SARMC argues generally that (1) its assistance toward IMI (a competitor of 
MRIA) while still a partner in MRIA, (2) its wrongful dissociation from MRlA to join IMI and 
compete with MRIA, and, ultimately, (3) IMI's increasing market share and increasing prices for 
comparable goods and services are all instances of pro-competitive activity, conducted for 
legitimate business purposes. (See Memo at 15-19.) SARMC is mistaken. SARMC's conduct 
in joining forces with IMI operated not only to aid SARMC and M I  in gaining a competitive 
advantage, it harmed competition and attempted to destroy MRIA. Such behavior is the epitome 
of anticompetitive conduct. See Twin Falls Farm & City Distributing, Inc. v. D & B Supply 
Company, Inc., 96 Idaho 351,528 P.2d 1286 (1974). 
In Twin Falls, the Idaho Supreme Court considered facts remarkably similar to those 
present here in concluding that a fiduciary's breach of loyalty, combined with a third-party's 
knowledge of and assistance in that breach, constituted anticompetitive conduct in violation of 
Idaho's antitrust laws. There, Robert Fries ("Fries") was the general manager of Twin Falls 
Farm & City Distributing, Inc. ("Twin Falls"), the plaintiff retail store. Id. at 352, 528 P.2d at 
1287. While still employed for Twin Falls, Fries pursued an opportunity to break away from the 
retail store to join with a competitor retail store, D & B Supply Company, Inc. ("D & B"), the 
defendant. Id. at 352-353,528 P.2d at 1287-1288. In doing so, Fries assisted D & B with 
respect to a lease opportunity, knowing that this would give D & B a competitive advantage over 
Twin Falls. Id. During this time, D & B knew that Fries was Twin Falls's manager. Id. at 356, 
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528 P.2d at 1291. After leaving Twin Falls, Fries and D & B worked together to take over Twin 
Falls's prime location. Id. at 353, 528 P.2d at 1288. Fries was also hired on as D & B's manager 
during this same time. Id. As a result of Eries's activities, D & B took over (1) Twin Falls's 
prime location, (2) presumably a portion of Twin Falls's customer base,I3 and (3) Twin Falls's 
former employees. Id. at 353-354, 528 P.2d at 1288-1289. Overturning the district court's 
summary judgment in favor of D & B, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that Fries breached 
his fiduciary duty to Twin Falls and that this breach, with D & B's knowledge and assistance, 
amounted to anticompetitive conduct in violation of Idaho's antitrust laws. Id. at 356-360,528 
P.2d at 1291-1295. 
Like Fries in Twin Falls, SARMC owed a fiduciary duty to M U .  Like D & B in Twin 
Falls, IMI knew that SARMC owed a fiduciary duty to MRTA. Like Fries and D & B in Twin 
Falls, SARMC and IMI worked together to create a competing entity in the magnetic resonance 
imaging business while disparaging M . C I ,  providing competitive advantages to IMI, 
and recruiting MRIA'sMRICI's employees. Consistent with the rationale outlined in Twin 
Falls, this conduct not only constitutes a breach of loyaltylfiduciary duty on SARMC's part, but 
also a violation of antitrust laws on both SARMC and IMI. 
In addition to the authority offered by Twin Falls and the similarities between that case 
and this matter, MRIA has additional evidence of SARMC's/IMI's anticompetitive conduct, 
including, but not limited to: 
l3 Fries, now working for D & B, also tore down Twin Falls's signs notifying the latter's customers that it 
had moved its business on two separate occasions. Id. at 359,528 P.2d at 1294. The Idaho Supreme Court 
considered such conduct both a trespass to Twin Falls's ownership and possessory rights in the sign, as well as a 
common law tort of interference with prospective advantage. Id. Also, the Idaho Supreme Court furfher remanded 
the action to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that Fries and D & B violated antitrust laws by 
giving direction or authority to act, i.e., the tearing down of the sign, for the purpose of driving Twin Falls out of 
business, and to determine the damages incurred by Twin Falls which, such as they may be, shall he tripled 
according to those same antitrust laws. Id. 
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Creating uncertainty among refemng physicians and MRI Center employees by 
disparaging MRI Center's services through confusing and misleading reports to the - - - - .  
referring physician community. (See Fa; 15.) 
Providing disparate levels of services as between IMI and MRICI when GSR operated as 
the radiologists for both imaging entities. (See Fact 16.) 
Threatening to terminate MRI Center's access to SARMC's PACSMS system, 
potentially jeopardizing the ability of MRICI to store and transmit its electronic images to 
the referring physician community. (See Fact 17.) 
Bringing a mobile magnet from IMI onto the SARMC campus for the purpose of 
competing directly against MRICI; this competition could not have existed but for the 
wrongfbl withdrawal of SARMC given that MRICI was afforded exclusive rights to the 
SARMC campus while SARMC was still a partner in M U .  (See Fact 18.) 
Receiving higher prices for comparable goods and services, relative to other sellers in the 
identified product and geographic market. (See Fact 19.) 
Directing hospital inpatient and outpatients to an imaging center, IMI, in which the 
SARMC had an interest in violation of STARK laws. (See Fact 20.) 
According to Whitelaw, this anticompetitive conduct, taken together,I4 likely contributed 
to the growth of IMI's market share, thus affecting its growing monopoly power. (See Fact 21.) 
This evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether SARMC's and 
IMI's conduct was the result of anticompetitive motivation and thereby constituted antitrust 
violations. That issue is for the trier-of-fact which, if it decides that SARMC'sIIMI's conduct 
was not consistent with any legitimate business purpose, will also fix the amount of any 
damages. 
14 Anticompetitive condnct need not be considered in isolation. Rather, it is enough that the incidents taken 
together as a whole create sufficient evidence of attempted monopolization. See Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. 
v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 31 1 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1109 (D. Colo. 2004) (Based on a review of the 
entire record of alleged anticompetitive condnct, taken as a whole, the conrt concludes [plaintiff] has demonstrated 
sufficient evidence of attempted monopolization that a reasonable jury could find in favor of [plaintiff]. 
Accordingly, summary judgment for [defendant] on this claim is inappropriate.") 
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E. MRIA IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANTITRUST DAMAGES 
SARMC claims that M U  fails to present any evidence of damages caused by 
anticompetitive behavior. (See Memo at 23.) In support of this, SARMC argues that no MRU 
expert was specifically assigned to calculate antitrust damages. Notwithstanding SARMC's 
resort to hyperbole, SARMC misunderstands the degree of certainty required to prove the 
amount of damages in an antitrust case. 
Courts have consistently maintained a distinction between proving "the fact of damages" 
and "the amount of damages" in antitrust litigation. For example, Story Parchment Co. v. 
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), ruled: 
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was 
none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure 
of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage 
and the measure of proof necessarv to enable the jurv to fix the amount. The rule 
which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the 
certain result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable 
to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount. 
Id. at 562 (Emphasis added). More recently, in denying a defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, the court in Industrial Burner Systems, Znc. v. Maxon Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 878 
(E.D. Micb. 2003) discussed the requirements for an antitrust plaintiff to "prove" damages: 
If the plaintiff has demonstrated some damage. the actual amount need not be 
proven to the same deaee of certainty. A plaintiff is not to be held to a rigid 
standard of proof regarding the amount of damages, since in such cases economic 
harm is frequently intangible and difficult to quantify. While the damages may 
not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence 
show lsicl the extent of the damages as a matter of iust and reasonable inference, 
althounh the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to 
complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that 
would be possible if the case, which he alone is reswonsible for making. were 
otherwise. 
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Id. at 891 (Emphasis added).15 Here, MRIA has offered evidence demonstrating that it, in fact, 
suffered some damage. This finding prevents the entry of summary judgment here. It is then for 
a jury to decide the actual amount of damages. 
1. MRIA Has Suffered Antitrust Damages 
Whether MRIA was damaged is a fact question for the jury. See Story Parchment, 282 
U.S. at 566 ("Whether the unlawful acts of respondent or conditions apart from them constituted 
the proximate cause of the depreciation in value was a question, upon the evidence in this record, 
for the jury, 'to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending it."') Here, 
MRIA has offered evidence, in the form of expert testimony, that it has been damaged as a result 
of SARMC's and MI'S wrongful acts. 
Bruce Budge ("Budge") expended considerable time and effort calculating damages for 
categories of claims, including: (1) unfair business practices, including breach of fiduciary 
duties; (2) business interference; (3) violation of the non-compete provisions in the partnership 
agreement; and (4) wrongful dissociation. (See Fact 22.) These different categories of claims 
encompass the individual causes of action, including antitrust claims, contained in the Second 
Amended Counterclaim and First Amended Third-Party Complaint. 
As reflected in the First and Second Amended Counterclaims, certain breaches of 
fiduciary duty committed by SARMC (in combination with ]MI) have had an anti-competitive 
Federal Jury Instructions minor case law on this issue: 
If you should find from a preponderance of the evidence in the case that damage to plaintiffs 
business, or property, such as a loss in the profits, was proximately caused by the defendants' 
illegal conduct complained of, then the circumstances that the precise amount of ulaintiffs 
damages mav be difficult to ascertain should not affect plaintiffs recovery. par&icularlv if the 
defendants' wronedoines have caused the difficultv in determining the precise amount. . . . An 
allowance for lost profits may be included in the damages awarded, only when there is some 
reasonable basis in the evidence in the case for determining that plaintiff has in fact suffered a loss 
of profits, even thoueh the amount of such loss is difficult of ascertainment. 
See 3A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. 5 150.90 (5" ed.) (Emphasis added) 
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impact, in that they have caused injury to competition. Such conduct has also caused MlUA to 
sustain damages in the form of lost profits. Budge has calculated these lost profits over different 
time periods through a number of alternate analyses, taking into account SARMC-campus scans, 
IMI downtown scans, and Meridian scans. (See Fact 23.)16 These lost profits are represented by 
Figure 1 within Budge's report as follows: 
- Total Method 
I I 




conduct through a comparison of MRIA's MRICI and IMI scan volume: 
2 
l6 SARMC attempts to disregard Budge's analysis in this important respect, arguing that MRIA's experts 
generally, and Budge's lost profits analysis specifically, do not provide any basis for calculating MRIA's antitrust 
damages. (See Memo at 22.) SARMC either misinterprets or misunderstands what constitutes anti-trust damages. 
In Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Co., Inc., 96 Idaho 351,528 P.2d 1286 1974), the Idaho Supreme 
Court acknowledged that "business losses, such as loss of customers, etc." may flow from antitrust violations, 
including breaches of fiduciary duty. See Id. at 359-360; 528 P.2d at 1294-1295. Other courts share this view too. 
See, e.g., Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1299 (9' Cir. 1983) ("in the absence of 
more precise proof, the factfiider may conclude as a matter ofjust and reasonable inference from the proof of 
defendants' wrongful acts and their tendencv to iniure plaintiffs' business. and from the evidence of the decline in 
prices, urofits and values, not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants' wrongful acts had caused 
damage to the plaintiffs." (Emphasis added)); Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass 'nv. Pacifc Lanes, Inc., 
356 F.2d 371,379 (9" Cir. 1966) ("Circumstantial evidence is valid, and a comparison of profits before and after is 
valid, and of some evidentiary value, though not conclusive.") This concept of proving antitrust damages via a lost 
profits analysis is further endorsed by federal jury instructions. See 3A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. $ 150.90 (5' ed.) 
("In arriving at the amount of the award, you should include any damages suffered by plaintiff because of lost 
profits; that is to say, profits that plaintiff would have made, but for the unlawful conduct of defendants."); See 3A 
Fed. Jnry Prac. & Instr. $ 150.91 (5' ed.) ("In considering the element of future profits in determining what 
damages, if any, were sustained by plaintiff, if, because of a violation of the antitrust laws, plaintiff was unable to 
earn net profits that would have accrued to it but for a violation of the antitrust laws, then plaintiff was in fact 
damaged.") 
99-06: MRIA-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian Referrals 
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$21,370,854 
7/01-06: MRIA-Affiliated Downtown Referrals Plus All Meridian Referrals $18,924,186 






-C MRIC Scan 
(See Id.) Finally, Budge contrasts MRICI's actual and but-for scan volumes for the period 
before and after SARMC's and IMI's anticompetitive conduct (1999-2006): 
i Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume 
(See 1d.)17 
" Despite consistently growing revenue trends from 1985 forward, and notwithstanding the fact that during 
this period, the population of M u ' s  senrice area was clearly growing, Budge posited actual declines in MRIA's 
revenues for all years after 2002. These projected declines are solely in recognition of the effects of competition 
from WII and others that would likely have occurred, even if SARMC had not improperly caused the diversion of 
MRIA business to IMI. However, it is the difference between the actual MRIC Scan Volume and the But-for Scan 
Volume that represents the damage caused by SARMC and IMI through their respective anticompetitive behavior. 
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If it can be shown that, as a consequence of SARMC's and IMI's harmful conduct in 
creating and supporting the success of M I ,  referrals shifted from MRICI to IMI, then the "fact of 
damages" arising from that wrongful conduct has been shown. Here, it cannot be reasonably 
argued otherwise since IMI's customer base consists largely of physicians who previously 
referred to MRICI. Indeed, this was the intended consequence in opening the M I  facility with 
MRI capability. Budge's analysis confirms as much and, as a result, must prevent the entry of 
summary judgment here.'' 
2. The Jury Decides the Acutal Amount of M U ' S  Antitrust Damages 
Once the "fact of damages" is shown, it is for a jury to decide the actual amount of those 
damages particular to MRIA's antitrust claims. SARMC argues that, because MRIA has not 
segregated out its antitrust damages, a finder-of-fact is precluded from calculating antitrust 
damages based on anything other than speculation. (See Memo at 23 & 24.). However, the 
precision demanded by SARMC with respect to MRIA's antitrust damages is contrary to the 
requirements imposed by the Idaho Supreme Court as to damages generally, as well as 
jurisprudence speaking to antitrust damages specifically. 
"A plaintiff need not prove that antitrust violations were the cause of its injury in order to recover 
damages under the antitrust laws; proof that a violation was a material cause is sufficient. See Los Angeles 
Memorial Coliseum Corn h v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9" Cir. 1986); see also Blanton v, 
Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9" Cir. 1983) ("antitrust violations need only be a material cause of a 
business decline.") The Nii Circuit further elaborated on this concept, while highlighting a burden-shifting 
component to the "fact of damages" inquiry in Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795,811 (9" Cir. 1976). 
There, the court stated: 
A plaintiff need not neeative all oossible alternative exnlanations for his decline in profits, but the 
defendants mav show that other events caused the iniury. The plaintiff must prove some damage, 
hut proving the fact of damage is satisfied by oroof of some damage flowing from the unlawful 
consuiracv: inauim bevond this minimum point goes onlv to the amount and not the fact of 
damage. 
See Id. (Emphasis added)) 
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In Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767,118 P.3d 99 (2002), the Idaho Supreme Court 
clarified that "[tlhe amount of damages need only be established to a reasonable degree of 
certainty." Id. at 774,118 P.3d at 106. "Reasonable certainty," the Court continued, "does not 
require mathematical exactitude, but only that the damages be taken out of the realm of 
speculation." Id. Thus, "[tlhe mere fact that it is difficult to arrive at exact amount of damages, 
where it is shown that damages resulted, does not mean that damages may not be awarded; it is 
for the trier-of-fact to fix the amount. In fixing that amount, it is for the trier-of-fact to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable 
inferences therefrom." 1d.I' 
Antitrust damage estimations follow the rationale articulated in Sells -they are likewise 
not held to a standard of mathematical certainty. See Washington State Bowling Proprietors 
Ass'n. v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 379 (9" Cir. 1966) ("As to amount, exact certainty or 
any precise formula is not required.") As articulated by the US Supreme Court: 
" s e e  also Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. Sun Tan Ranches, 102 Idaho 567,571,633 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1981). 
In Thomas, the district court granted a directed verdict to the defendant after concluding the plaintiffs damages 
could have been caused by numerous factors other than those attributable to the defendant. The Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed the district court, holding that the possibility, "or even probability" of other causes for the damages 
does not preclude recovery: "[Ilt is . . . the rule that 'the possibility, or even probability of another cause for damages 
than that alleged does not defeat recovery where plaintiff presents sufficient facts to justify a reasonable juror in 
concluding that the thing charged was the prime and moving cause." Id. at 570-571 (quoting Stillwell v. Aberdeen- 
Springfield Canal Co., 61 Idaho 357,360,102 P.2d 296,298 (1940). IN W e r  support of the conclusion that a 
plaintiff need not eliminate the possibility, or even probability, of other factors causing the alleged damage, the 
Idaho Supreme Court relied on its prior holding in Adams v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining Co., 12 Idaho 637,643, 
89 P. 624 (1906) (on rehearing). In Adams, the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he jury would be justified in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, although it be possible 
that the injury may have resulted form some other cause. There are very few things in human 
affairs, especially in litigation involving damages, that can be established to such an absolute 
certainty as to exclude the possibility or even some probability that another cause or reason may 
have been the true cause or reason for the damage rather than the one urged by plaintiff. But such 
possibility, or even probability, is not to be allowed to defeat the right of recovery where the 
plaintiff has presented to the jury sufficient facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence as 
to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime and moving cause. 
Adams, 89 P. at 628 
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While the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, 
be enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of iust and 
reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is 
not entitled to complaint that they cannot be measured with the exactness and 
precision that would be possible if the case. which he alone is re$ponsibIe for 
making. were otherwise. 
See Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563 (Emphasis added)). 
Like the "fact of damages," antitrust damages estimations also present fact questions for 
juries: 
It is true appellee's estimates of damages were disputed and vigorously attacked - - - 
by appellants on cross-examination. ... [The defkndant'sl ch&acter&ation [of 
plaintiffs damages estimates1 cannot wipe out the evidence; it merelv emphasizes 
that a factual question was presented to the iurv for its determination which we 
are without power to changg. Nor can we say the verdict is grossly excessive, or 
such as to shock our conscience. 
See Washington State Bowling Proprietors, 356 F.2d at 379 (Emphasis added))?' SARMC 
cannot, therefore, use the potential inexactitude of calculating antitrust damages as a basis for 
awarding summary judgment?' As described by both Idaho and federal courts intevreting 
antitrust damages, this is a question for the trier-of-fact after determining the credibility of expert 
20 The US Supreme Court also contributed to this discussion in Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 555-565, 
holding: 
Juries are allowed to act upon probable and inferential as well as direct and positive proof. And 
when. from the nature of the case. the amount of the damaees can not be estimated with certaintv. - . . 
or only a part of them can be so kstimated, we can see no obiection to placing before the iw all 
the facts and circumstances of the case, having any tendency to show damages, or their urobable 
amount: so as to enable them to make the most intelligible and urobable estimate which the nature 
of the case will uermit, 
Where from the nature of the case damages could not be measured with certainty by a fixed ~ l e ,  
the facts and circumstances tending to show the probable amount of such damages should be 
submitted to the iurv to enable them to form . . . such reasonable and urobable estimate, as in the 
exercise of eood sense and sound iudgment they shall think will uroduce adeauate comuensation. 
Id. at 563-565 (Emphasis added)). 
21 Indeed, the authority SARMC cites (see Memo at 24) relate to jury verdicts and directed verdicts, after 
the presentation of evidence, beyond the summary judgment stage. 
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testimony on the issue of damages, after resolving the inevitable conflicts in the evidence, and 
after drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. Disagreements among the parties as to the 
evidence contributing to these alleged damages necessarily create an issue of fact that precludes 
the entry of summary judgment there. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, h4lUA respectfully requests that SARMC's Motion be 
denied in its entirety. The issues presented therein raise conflicting perspectives between the 
parties and, therefore, are appropriate for the trier-of-fact's consideration, not summary 
judgment. 
I 
DATED this 3 day of June, 2007. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV 
Daniel J. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 1 
partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and lMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), by 
and through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., hereby submits this 
Statement of Facts in Support of its Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, Inc.'s ("SARMC") Motion for Summary Judgment on M W s  Antitrust Claims 
(the "Motion"). 
1. In his March 19,2007 "Economic Analysis of MRI Services in the Boise Area," 
MRlA's expert, Ed Whitelaw ("Whitelaw") outlined his analysis of harm to competition. There, 
Whitelaw discussed his harm to competition analysis, stating: 
One measure of harm to competition is the extent to which a dominant seller in a 
market receives higher prices for comparable goods or services, relative to other 
sellers. We tested this hypothesis for M I  by calculating the statistical 
relationship between the amounts paid by BCBS for MRI scans provided by IMI 
and all other providers in the BCBS data. 
(See Whitelaw Rpt. at 13, attached as Ex. "A" to Gordon Aff. at 7 2.) In doing so, Whitelaw 
described the functional relationship between the prices of MRI scans paid to IMI and the prices 
paid to all other providers within the BCBS data. (See Id. at 13 & 14.) Results showed that 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RE: ANTITRUST CLAIMS - Page 2 
(60838601 #208798) 01639 
BCBS payments to IMI exceed the average payments to other providers in the market in the 
following respect: 
(See Id.) 
2. There was no apparent service or quality-based reason why MI receives greater- 
than-market averages for its MRI services. (See Whitelaw Rpt. at 13, attached as Ex. "A" to 
Gordon Aff. at 7 2.) As a result, IMI's higher payments are a symptom of MI'S market power in 
the relevant market. (See Id.) 
3. MI'S increasing trends over time in both market share and pricing suggest that 
M I  has achieved, or will soon achieve a monopoly share of the market. (See Whitelaw Rpt. at 
13, attached as Ex. "A" to Gordon Aff. at 'fi 2.) 
4. Whitelaw did not rely upon his market share analysis alone to opine that M I  has 
monopoly power. (See Whitelaw Aff. at 7 2.) Instead, he considered MI'S increasing market 
share over time alongside IMI's consistent price disparity during that same period. (See Id.) 
Year 
2001 
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% Increase 
15% 
5 .  Whitelaw's market share computation focuses on non-hospital, MRI technical 
procedures covered by private insurance. (See Whitelaw Report at 6,  attached as Ex. A to 
Gordon Aff. at 7 2.) 
6 .  Using information from Blue Cross and Blue Shield ("BCBS"), along with 
information directly from M I ,  Whitelaw followed a four-step process for understanding MI'S 
market share: 
a. Step One - Determine BCBS' Share of the Market for Private Insurance: 
Through its subpoenas to Blue Cross and Blue Shield, MRIA secured the volume of BCBS 
claims for MRI technical services. It therefore needed to know BCBS' market share of the 
market for private insurance in order to then extrapolate the total number of MRI claims in the 
market. Following his research into the Idaho Department of Insurance Annual Reports, 
Whitelaw concluded that the claims submitted to BCBS for MRI technical services represent 
75% of the market for these services covered by private insurance. (See Whitelaw Rpt. at 7-8 ,  
attached as Ex. "A" to Gordon Aff. at 7 2.) 
1. Whitelaw assumed that an individual provider such as M I ,  even 
on that has market power in a relevant market, has no influence over payments from government 
insurers. That is, MRI providers are price takers for services to patients covered by government 
insurance. (See Id. at 8.) 
b. Step Two - Calculate the Total Number of MRI Claims in the Market: 
Knowing the number of BCBS claims for technical services and the percentage of the total 
claims they represent (Step One), Whitelaw then calculated the total number of relevant MRI 
claims in the market. He did this by taking the yearly BCBS claim totals and dividing each 
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year's total by .75 - aniving at that year's total claims in the market. These figures are 
represented in Table 2 to Whitelaw's report. (See Id.) 
c. Step Three - Adjust MI 'S  Scan Information to Reflect the Relevant 
Procedures: As previously mentioned, the relevant procedures to be analyzed in the market are 
represented by non-hospital, MRI technical procedures. These procedures were naturally 
incorporated within IMI's scan volumes. However, to recover only those procedures, Whitelaw 
made two adjustments to IMI's scan volume. First, he removed MRI scans performed on 
hospital patients. This represented all of IMIs scans taken on SARMC's campus and 13% of 
IMIs remaining scans. Second, he adjusted MI'S scans to remove patients not covered by 
private insurance, using Equation (2) within his report. Whitelaw ultimately concluded that 69% 
of IMI patients are covered by private insurance. (See Id. at 9.) 
i. As reported in the "Imaging Strategic Plan," 13% of M I  scans in 
2002-2004 were on hospital patients (inpatients, outpatients and emergency patients). (See Id. at 
9.) 
d. Step Four -Determine MI'S Market Share: Using each of the previous 
three steps, Whitelaw was then able to determine IMI's Market Share as is represented within 
Table 3 of his report. First, he took the raw IMI data, subtracted out the hospital scans, and 
multiplied the remaining scans by .87 to capture only hospital patients (Step Three). Second, he 
multiplied this product by .69 to account for only those scans covered by private insurance (Step 
Three). Third, he divided the total number of MI'S non-hospital, privately-insured claims by the 
total number of private, non-hospital claims in the market (Steps One and Two). These steps 
combined to generate IMI's market share over the past six years. (See Id. at 9-1 1.) 
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I. As a check on these four steps, Whitelaw also calculated IMI's 
market share using only the BCBS data - without considering the scan volumes produced by IMI 
itself. (See Id. at 10-1 1.) To do this, Whitelaw simply divided the IMI claims within the BCBS 
data by the total number of claims within the BCBS data. (See Id.) Due to certain anomalies in 
the BCBS data as to St. Luke's 2003 and 2005 claims (See Id. at 11, Table 4), Whitelaw offered 
two different adjustments as to the St. Luke's data in order to triangulate MI'S market share. 
(See Id., Table 5.) Regardless of the adjustment, IMI's percentage of the market increased from 
the low 20's in 2002 to the mid-40's or above by 2006. (See Id.) Importantly, neither Blue 
Cross, Blue Shield, nor St. Luke's could offer any explanation for the anomalies present within 
BCBS's data as to St. Luke's. 
7. Whitelaw's market share analysis compared the number of relevant procedures 
performed at IMI against the rest of the market during 2001-2006. (See Whitelaw Aff. at 7 3.) 
Whitelaw's analysis revealed that IMI's market share steadily increased over time and will likely 
continue to increase. (See Id.) 
8. MI'S increases in price simuitaneously track IMI's increases in market share over 
time. (See Whitelaw Aff. at 7 4) These factors combine to suggest that IMI maintains monopoly 
power in the relevant market. (See Id.) 
9. A "barriers to entry" analysis and "capacity" analysis are typically the concern 
when dealing with a prospective merger. (See Whitelaw Aff. at 7 5.) In other words, for an ex 
ante evaluation of a proposed merger, investigating the prospects for sustained entry into a 
market may prove useful. (See Id.) However, an ex ante analysis is not germane to the instant 
action. (See Id.) In this case, the parties and the Court have an expost description of the 
relevant market, including MI'S increasing market share and its persistently higher prices for six 
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years. (See Id.) Whatever net entry occurred during these six years and whatever excess 
capacity that may have existed during this time did not deter or counteract the competitive effect 
of concern. (See Id.) Said another way, whatever entry took place, it clearly failed to offer 
enough market discipline to eliminate MI'S combination of increasing share and higher prices. 
(See Id.) As noted in FTC reports that address this topic, entry must be timely and of sufficient 
magnitude and duration to have an impact on alleged anticompetitive behavior. (See Id.) 
Whatever entry took place in this market did not meet these criteria. (See Id.); see also 
Whitelaw's Rebuttal Rpt. at 38, attached as Ex. " B  to Gordon Aff. at 7 3.) 
10. In this case, a forward-looking entry analysis is not necessary or appropriate when 
actual, historical information is available for both SARMC's and MIUA's experts to analyze. 
(See Whitelaw Aff. at 7 6.) That analysis - consisting of both a market share analysis and a harm 
to competition analysis - necessarily incorporates the data of all entrants into the market and any 
excess capacity over the course of the relevant time period (2001-2006). (See Id.) Moreover, 
that analysis revealed that, in fact, entrants into the market and any excess capacity was not of 
sufficient magnitude or duration to counteract IMI's monopoly power. (See Id.) Specifically, 
despite these entries and the excess capacities that may exist in the market, IMI increased both its 
market share and pricing during that same time. (See Id.) An estimation of what may have 
prospectively happened through a "baniers to entry" and "capacity" analysis is no substitute for 
examining and analyzing what actually did happen. (See Id.); see also Whitelaw's Rebuttal Rpt. 
at 38, attached as Ex. " B  to Gordon Aff. at 7 3.) 
11. SARMC's own expert, Gregory Vistnes ("Vistnes"), acknowledges that 
Whitelaw's pricing analysis is appropriate to an opinion regarding harm to competition: 
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Q: Now, do you disagree with Dr. Whitelaw's direction in this analysis in that 
seeking to determine whether IMI is paid more would be relevant to an 
opinion regarding any competitive impact? 
A: If one could properly determine whether or not IMI was paid more, if one 
could properly control for all the determinants of price other than potential 
anticompetitive conduct, and if one could link the presumed higher prices 
to the anticompetitive conduct and make sense of the full richness of the 
information, then it could be informative. 
(See Vistnes Depo. At 78:12-24, attached as Ex. "C" to Gordon Aff. at 7 4.) Therefore, Vistnes 
agrees that a pricing analysis is informative toward determining harm to competition; however, 
he questions the conclusions reached by Whitelaw: 
Q: Okay. So I take it then that you don't disagree with Dr. Whitelaw's 
intention to analyze pricing as part of an overall evaluation o competition 
in the market? 
A: I disagree with how Dr. Whitelaw conducted his pricing analysis. I 
disagree with the context in which that analysis was done. Do I disagree 
with the notion that a pricing analysis could be informative if done 
properly, that's a lot of ifs, hut if it could be done properly and was 
properly linked, it could be informative. 
(See Id. at 79:l-12.) 
12. SARMC has stipulated that the product market is the market for M N  technical 
services. (See Memo at 8, h. 6; see also Vistnes Depo. at 43:12-21, attached as Ex. "C" to 
Gordon Aff. at 1 4.) With this definition in mind, neither SARMC nor its expert understands 
what the market doesldoes not provide, having performed no market analysis on any other MRI 
provider in the area: 
Q: My question was simpler. It was since you were evaluating the quality of 
the radiology groups and technical component providers, what did you do 
to evaluate, for example, the quality of care and the quality of technical 
component service at Boise Orthopedic? 
A: There was no specific analysis to try to evaluate the quality of care, 
certainly no quantitative analysis in part because of the difficulty of 
evaluating quantitatively. 
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(See Vistnes Depo. at 66:15-24, attached as Ex. "C" to Gordon Aff. at 1/ 4.) 
13. SARMC offers no insight as to how any alleged differentiating factors are dealt 
with in order to get an accurate comparison. In fact, their expert stated simply at his deposition: 
"[slitting here today, I'm not sure that I can off the top of my head think such an approach and I 
have not given a lot of [thought] as to how it could be done." (See Vistnes Depo. at 93:17-94:2, 
attached as Ex. "C" to Gordon Aff. at n 4.) Moreover, SARMC's implication that IMI's 
radiology group is a differentiating factor is based solely upon limited, hand-picked doctor 
interviews conducted at the behest of SARMC's counsel. (See Id. at 62:ll-18.) Finally, in 
suggesting that IMI's radiology group ("GSR") accounts for the higher prices enjoyed by IMI, 
SARMC and Vistnes fail to consider that, up until early 2005, GSR provided the radiology 
services to both IMI and MIUA. (See Whitelaw's Rebuttal Rpt. at 30-32, attached as Ex. "B" to 
Gordon Aff. at n 3.) As such, differences between IMI and MRIA in the amounts received for 
similar services should not reflect differences in the quality of the professional services (the 
radiologists) because there should not have been any differences in the quality of the radiology 
services provided to MRIA and IMI. (See Id.) 
14. Both IMI and MRZA are covered by all of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
insurance plans. (See Whitelaw's Rebuttal Rpt. at 9, attached as Ex. " B  to Gordon Aff. at n 3.) 
Therefore, there is no reason to expect that a choice in insurance plans affect the choice of MRI 
provider. (See Id. at 9-14.) Moreover, given the similarities in services (both from a technical 
and professional standpoint through 2004), there is no reason to expect that M I  should have 
attracted a disproportionate share of patients requiring more complex procedures. (See Id.) That 
is, during this time, referring physicians had no incentive to systematically send patients needing 
more complicated procedures to IMI instead of MRIA. (See Id.) Yet, Whitelaw is able to 
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conclude that individuals from the same refemng physician, requesting the same set of services 
between IMI and MRIA, are paying higher amounts for those services from IMI. (See Id. at 14- 
23.) Stated differently, this "differentiating factor," even when considered, still reveals the price 
differentiation that contributed to Whitelaw's opinions regarding harm to competition. (See Id.) 
If SARMC's theory was correct, this would not be the case. 
15. SARMCIThird-Party Defendants created uncertainty among refemng physicians 
and MRI Center employees by disparaging MRI Center's services through confusing and 
misleading reports to the referring physician community. (See Reinhardt Aff. in Supp. of Memo 
in Supp. of Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages at 7 43 -Filed Under Seal.) 
16. SARMCIThird-Party Defendants provided disparate levels of services as between 
IMI and MRICI when GSR operated as the radiologists for both imaging entities. (See Reinhardt 
Aff. in Supp. of Memo in Supp. of Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages at 7 42 -Filed 
Under Seal.) 
17. SARMCIThird-Party Defendants threatened to terminate MRI Center's access to 
SARMC's PACStWS system, potentially jeopardizing the ability of MRICI to store and transmit 
its electronic images to the referring physician community. (See Reinhardt Aff. in Supp. of 
Memo in Supp. of Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages at 77 9 9 43 - Filed Under Seal 
18. SARMCIThird-Party Defendants brought a mobile magnet from IMI onto the 
SARMC campus for the purpose of competing directly against MRICI. (See Reinhardt Aff. in 
Supp. of Memo in Supp. of Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages at 7 39 -Filed Under 
Seal.) 
19. IMI received higher prices for comparable goods and services, relative to other 
sellers in the identified product and geographic market. (See Whitelaw Rpt. at 13-14, attached as 
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Ex. "A" to Gordon Aff. at 7 2; see also Whitelaw Rebuttal Rpt. at 3-23, attached as Ex. " B  to 
Gordon Aff. at 7 3.) 
20. SARMCIThird-Party Defendants directed hospital inpatient and outpatients to an 
imaging center, IMI, in which the SARMC had an interest in violation of STARK laws. (See 
Reinhardt Aff. in Supp. of Memo in Supp. of Mot. to Amend to Seek Punitive Damages at 7 39 - 
Filed Under Seal; see also Cindy Schamp Depo 10119/06 at 190-193, attached as Ex. " D  to 
Gordon Aff. at 7 5.) 
21. SARMC's and Third-Party Defendants' anticompetitive conduct, taken together, 
likely contributed to the growth of IMI's market share, thus affecting its growing monopoly 
power. (See Whitelaw Rpt. at 12, attached as Ex. "A" to Gordon Aff. at 7 2.) 
22. Bruce Budge ("Budge") calculated damages for categories of claims, including: 
(1) unfair business practices, including breach of fiduciary duties; (2) business interference; (3) 
violation of the non-compete provisions in the partnership agreement; and (4) wrongful 
dissociation. (See Budge Rpt. at 2, attached as Ex. "E" to Gordon Aff. at 7 6.) 
23. Budge calculated MRIA's lost profits over different time periods through a 
number of alternate analyses, taking into account SARMC-campus scans, IMI downtown scans, 
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Meridian Referrals 
(See Budge Rpt. at 8, attached as Ex. "E" to Gordon Aff. at 7 6.) Budge goes on to graphically 
illustrate the practical effect of SARMC's and MI'S conduct through a comparison of MRIA's 
and IMI scan volume: 
(See Id. at 13.) Finally, Budge contrasts MRICI's actual and but-for scan volumes for the period 
before and after SARMC's and IMI's anticompetitive conduct (1999-2006): 
Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume 
14,000 
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(See Id. at 17.) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., 




Case No. CV OC 04082191) 
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SARMC'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
SPOLIATION CL.4IF4 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of MRI 
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRI 
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, 
CounterClaimants, 
v. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., 
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
CounterDefendants. 
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Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
MRI Associates, LLP ("MRW"), by and through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci 
Shoemaker P.A., hereby opposes SARMC's motion to dismiss MRIA's spoliation claim. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Court has already rejected SARMC's motion to dismiss MRIA's spoliation claim. 
This Court should stand by its earlier ruling. SARMC has presented no new facts or evidence 
that would justify reconsideration. SARMC's motion also denies (without any support 
whatsoever) that it spoliated evidence. However, the facts before the Court indicate that SARMC 
intentionally destroyed evidence long after this lawsuit was filed. SARMC's motion to dismiss 
should be denied. 
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. SARMC was aware as early as October 2001 that litigation between SARMC and 
MRIA was likely. The Shattuck Hammond report assesses SARMC's options, including 
withdrawal from M U .  (See Affidavit of Daniel J. Gordon in Support of MRIA's Opposition to 
SARMC's Motion to Dismiss Spoliation Claim, Exhibit A,) The Shattuck Hammond report 
states: "SARMC has referred to [withdrawal] as their 'scorched earth scenario.' Givens Pursley 
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believes that there would likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and that 
there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility ..." (Id.) 
2. SARMC delivered to MRIA its Notice of Withdrawal from the partnership on 
February 24,2004. (See id. at Exhibit B.) The Notice of Withdrawal itself indicates that SARMC 
was aware that imminent litigation with MRTA was likely. Discussing the value of SARMC's 
partnership interest, the Notice of Withdrawal states that SARMC will have "120 days within 
which to commence an action to determine the buyout price or accept" the amount tendered by 
MRIA. (Id.) 
3. Furthermore, on or about March 4,2004, M N A  offered to permit SARMC to 
purchase MRIA through a letter to SARMC President and CEO Sandra Bruce. (See id. at Exhibit 
C.) This offer letter stated: "We are concerned that the withdrawal of [SARMC] from MRIA 
could lead to litigation." (Id.) 
4. Likewise, on March 23,2004, MRIA sent its formal response to SARMC's 
Notice of Withdrawal. (See id. at Exhibit D.) This letter outlines in detail MRIA's claims against 
SARMC, including claims for wrongll withdrawal and breach of fiduciary duties. This letter 
clearly indicates that litigation was imminent. (Id.) 
5. SARMC filed its complaint in this matter on October 18,2004. 
6. SARMC had no written policy regarding the preservation of non-medical records 
(e.g., general business documents), including email. (See id. at Exhibit E, 58-59.) 
7. SARMC's practice was to delete emaii saved on its system every ninety (90) 
days. SARMC's email was backed up on tapes, but the tapes were recycled (e.g., copied over 
with new data). (See id. at 51,66-67.) 
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8. SARMC inexplicably waited until approximately September 2005--over eighteen 
months after its wrongll withdrawal from MRIA and nearly one year after filing its complaint- 
to change its practice of deleting email and recycling the backup tapes. (See id. at 66-67,72-73.) 
9. SARMC continues to delete email after 90 days; however, starting in 
approximately September 2005, SARMC bought additional back-up tapes and has stopped 
recycling its back-up tapes. (See id. at 72-73.) 
10. SARMC acknowledged that nothing stopped it from preserving email and other 
electronic documents before September 2005. (See id. at 74-75.) 
11. SARMC acknowledged that it could have preserved email in ways other than 
archiving email on its system or saving email to tapes. (See id. at 81-84.) 
12. SARMC failed to preserve email-including email relevant to this case-prior to 
September 2005 because "[SARMC] didn't want to." (See id. at 75.) 
13. Approximately one year prior to November 1,2005, SARMC apparently 
instructed its employees to retain documents related to MRIA; prior to that date, SARMC failed 
to issue to its employees instructions regarding retention of documents related to MRIA. (See id. 
at 79-81.) However, as the preceding facts indicate, SARMC deleted & email saved on its 
system until September 2005. 
14. Leslie Kelley Hall, SARMC's CIO, represented SARMC in a 30(b)(6) deposition 
conducted on November 1,2005. (See id.) Ms. Hall testified that she was personally aware of the 
litigation between SARMC and MRIA approximately one year prior to November 1,2005. (See 
id. at 84-85.) 
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15. Although many SARMC employees acknowledge that they used SARMC's email 
system to regularly communicate regarding issues such as those matters relevant to this litigation 
SARMC has produced only a handful of emails in discovery. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. SARMC's Motion to Reconsider Should Be Denied 
1. Motion to Reconsider Standard 
"A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may he made 
at any time before the entry of final judgnient." IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B). "The decision to grant or deny 
a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." Jordan v. 
Beeh, 135 Idaho 586,592,21 P.3d 908,914 (2001). 
"A party filing a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B) carries the burden of 
bringing to the trial court's attention ... new facts." Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa 
Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202,205,879 P.2d 1135,1138 (1994); see also Coeur d'Alene 
Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812,823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990) 
(quoting J.I. Case Company v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223,229,280 P.2d 1070,1073 (1955)) ("A 
rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or additional facts, and a 
more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact."). 
2. The Court Has Already Denied SARMC's Motion to Dismiss 
SARMC has presented no new facts to the Court. Likewise, SARMC has not raised any 
new legal authorities not already considered by this court'. This Court ruled in its Memorandum 
Decision of March 7,2006: 
It appears that the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized spoliation of 
evidence as a common law tort, although the Supreme Court has called 
' The Court considered the legitimacy of MRIA's spoliation claim in response to SARMC's 
futility argument in opposition to MRIA's amendment efforts. 
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spoliation both an "intentional tort" and a "rule of evidence." Compare 
Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip. Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578, 582, 51 P.3d 392,396 
(2002) and Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 178, 923 
P.2d 416, 423 (1996), with Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812,979 
P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999). Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
the Idaho Supreme Court explained the cause of action as "intentional 
conduct that unreasonably interferes with a party's prospective cause of 
action" by willfully destroying or concealing evidence. Yoakum, 129 
Idaho at 178, 923 P.2d at 423. The Ricketts court further held that the tort 
of intentional spoliation of evidence "requires a state of mind that shows a 
plan or premeditation." 137 Idaho at 582,51 P.3d 396. 
The proposed amended Counterclaim for spoliation of evidence states 
"SARMC has knowingly and intentionally destroyed information, or 
knowingly and intentionally allowed information to be destroyed, which is 
relevant to this litigation." Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A, T[ 159. 
Because MRIA has alleged intentional destruction of evidence relevant to 
this litigation, the Court will find that, under Ricketts and Yoakum, the 
proposed amendment does state a valid claim for relief under Idaho law. 
Id. at 9-10. This ruling remains sound. SARMC's motion to dismiss only urges the Court to 
adopt a slightly different reading of cases this Court has already construed. SARMC's motion 
should be denied. 
B. MRIA Is Entitled to Prove Its Spoliation Claim to the Trier of Fact 
SARMC's motion to dismiss should be rejected even if the Court revisits SARMC's 
motion without reference to the motion to reconsider standard. 
1. Motion to Dismiss Standard 
"[Elvery reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Idaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215,217, 
506 P.2d 112, 114 (1973). A court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss only "when it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which 
would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400,405, 353 P.2d 782, 
787 (1960); Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941,946,821 P.2d 996, 1001 
(Ct.App.1991). "It need not appear that the plaintiff can obtain the particular relief prayed for, as 
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long as the court can ascertain that some relief may be granted." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 
535,536,835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Idaho App. 1992) (citing WRIGHT&MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 1357, at 339 (1990)). "[Als a practical matter, a dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which the plaintiff includes 
allegations showing on the face of the complaint that there is some insurmountable bar to relief." 
Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, 3 1357, at 344-45.) 
2. MRIA's Spoliation Claim Is Properlv Before the Court 
SARMC has failed to demonstrate that MRIA's spoliation claim is subject to dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6). None of the cases SARMC cites expressly rejects spoliation of evidence as 
a distinct cause of action. None of these cases indicates even the slightest hostility on the part of 
Idaho courts toward the tort of evidence spoliation. Of course, none of the cases SARMC cites 
expressly ruled that a claim for spoliation of evidence should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Furthermore, as this Court's earlier ruling acknowledges, Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996), ruled that spoliation is its own intentional tort. Yoakurn 
ruled: 
The guidelines offered by the authors of the Restatement and the cases which 
have defined the intentional spoliation of evidence cause of action provide a 
kamework for another cause of action based uoon intentional conduct that 
unreasonably interferes with a party's prospective cause of action. The tort of 
intentional spoliation of evidence has been alternatively identified by courts as the 
'intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. 
Id. at 178,423. Yoakum provided the preceding discussion "for guidance in future litigation ... on 
a possible cause of action for conduct more egregious than that presented here." Id. Moreover, in 
support of this discussion, Yoakum cited Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986), an 
important early case acknowledging the spoliation of evidence tort. 
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Yoakum also observed the spoliation of evidence tort is "'closely analogous' to ... 
intentional interference with a prospective business advantage, a tort which has been recognized 
in [Idaho]."Zd. (citing Idaho First NationalBank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,284-87, 
824 P.2d 841,859-62 (1991)). Of course, the same analogy was drawn in Smith v. Superior, 151 
Cal.App.3d 491,198 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984), the first case that recognized the spoliation of 
evidence tort. 
Consistent with Yoakum, Cook v. State, Dept. of Transp., 133 Idaho 288,985 P.2d 1150 
(1999), also indicated the Idaho Supreme Court's apparent approval of the spoliation of evidence 
tort. Cook concluded that the plaintiffs "claim for spoliation was a "claim" as defined by the 
[Idaho Tort Claims Act], which triggered the Act's filing deadline and written demand 
requirement. Id. at 298, 1160. Clearly, Cook did not treat spoliation as a mere evidentiary 
doctrine that a plaintiff could raise by motion at trial. On the contrary, Cook ruled that spoliation 
is a distinct claim that must be raised through a procedural vehicle such as a complaint or a 
written demand under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. See id. 
Likewise, Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equipment, Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578,51 P.3d 392 
(2002), discussed the particular contours of the spoliation of evidence tort. Ricketts observed that 
"[tlhe concept of spoliation requires a state of mind that shows a plan or premeditation that is not 
shown in this case," and that therefore, "[ilt was not error to deny the ijury] instructions on 
spoliation." Id. at 582,396. 
Notwithstanding these authorities, SARMC insists that MRIA's spoliation claim should 
be dismissed on the basis that the Idaho Supreme Court has not "expressly" adopted spoliation of 
evidence as a distinct tort. Of course, SARMC places great emphasis on cases that refer to 
spoliation as an evidentiary doctrine. See Courtney v. Big 0 Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 87 P.3d 
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930 (2003); Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807,979 P.2d 1165 (1999). However, Courtney and 
Bromley did not address--expressly or otherwise-whether spoliation of evidence constitutes a 
viable tort claim in Idaho. The plaintiffs in both cases only invoked the evidentiary spoliation 
doctrine. Thus, Courtney acknowledged: "[wle are only dealing here with instructing the jury as 
to the evidentiary significance of a party's conduct in losing or destroying evidence." Id. at 824, 
933. 
Courtney and Bromley do not indicate that MRIA's spoliation should be dismissed. The 
existence of a spoliation tort in Idaho law does not eliminate or alter the older evidentiary 
doctrine that addresses the same subject. MRIA's spoliation claim is viable, and SARMC's 
motion should be dismissed. 
3. SARMC Intentionally Destroyed Relevant Evidence 
The facts before the court indicate that SARMC engaged in extensive intentional 
spoliation of evidence. SARMC was aware of the possibility of litigation between SARMC and 
MRIA as early as October 2001, when the Shattuck Harnmond report repeated the opinion that 
withdrawal would likely lead to litigation. (See Factual Background, T[ 1 .) Thus, SARMC knew 
or should have known that litigation between SARMC and MRIA was imminent when it served 
its notice of withdrawal on MRIA on February 4,2004. (Id. at T[ 2.) SARMC's Notice of 
Withdrawal itself acknowledged that litigation is imminent. (Id.) Correspondence between 
SARMC and MRlA regarding SARMC's wrongful withdrawal also clearly establishes that 
SARMC knew or should have known that litigation with MRIA was imminent. (Id. at ll/ 3-4.) Of 
course, the complaint in this matter was filed on October 18,2004. (Id. at T[ 5.) And SARMC 
CIO Leslie Kelley Hall was personally aware of this lawsuit approximately one year prior to 
November 1,2005. (Id. at 1/ 14.) 
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Due to its knowledge that litigation was imminent, SARMC had a duty to preserve 
evidence, including email related to MRIA. However SARMC failed to preserve email until 
approximately September 2005, eighteen months after its wrongfil withdrawal and nearly one 
year after filing its complaint. (Id. at 77 6-9.) SARMC has no legitimate explanation for this 
failure; the only explanation SARMC offered was that it ''didn't want to" preserve email prior to 
approximately September 2005. (Id. at 73 10-12.) 
These facts illustrate the seriousness of evidence spoliation. MRIA has been deprived of 
access to a significant source of evidence. SARMC's email may have contained evidence that 
was helpful or even essential to proving MRIA's claims. However, by destroying this evidence, 
SARMC has ensured that MRIA will never know its contents. MRIA is entitled to prove its 
spoliation claim to the trier of fact. This Court should deny SARMC's motion to dismiss. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Court has already denied SARMC's motion to dismiss, and it should reaffirm its 
prior ruling. Furthermore, contrary to SARMC's assertions, substantial evidence indicates that 
SARMC intentionally destroyed relevant evidence. For all of the foregoing reasons, SARMC's 
motion to dismiss MRIA's spoliation of evidence claim must be dismissed. 
DATED this i t  day of June, 2007. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Thomas A. Banducci 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV 
Daniel J. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SARMC'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
DISSOCIATION 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of MRI 
Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, and MRI 
Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., 
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
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1 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 1 
partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), by 
and through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s ("SARMC") 
Motion in Limine Re: Dissociation (the "Motion"). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SARMC remains unwilling to accept the ruling that its dissociation from MRIA was 
wrongful under Idaho law. Since this Court's order granting MRIA summary judgment, 
SARMC has filed a motion for reconsideration, a request to this Court for a permissive 
interlocutory appeal, an application directly to the Idaho Supreme Court seeking an interlocutory 
appeal notwithstanding this Court's denial of the request, and now a motion in limine seeking to 
preclude the jury from leaming that SARMC withdrew wrongfully from MRIA even though the 
jury is responsible for calculating any damages caused by the wrongful withdrawal. 
The phrase "wrongful withdrawal" is not an inflammatory term coined by MRIA for 
purposes of inciting the jury. The phrase "wrongful withdrawal" has been used by the Idaho 
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Legislature, the Idaho Supreme Court, Id&o district courts in general, this Court in particular 
and in model jury instructions when describing a withdrawal from a partnership that breaches the 
partnership agreement. 
The jury is tasked with awarding damages to MRIA caused by the wrongful withdrawal 
of SARMC. The relevant statute requiring the jury to calculate damages states that "[a] partner 
who wrongfully dissociates is liable to the partnership and to the other partners for damages 
caused by the dissociation." LC. 5 53-3-602(c) (emphasis added). If the jury is not instructed 
SARMC has already been found to have wrongfully dissociated from MRIA, the jury cannot 
fulfill its role under LC. § 53-3-602(c) of calculating damages resulting from the wrongful 
conduct. 
SARMC also must accept that its wrongful withdrawal was unlawful andlor illegal in that 
it violated Idaho law requiring partners to abide by the specific terms in their partnership 
agreements. To leave a jury with the impression that the conduct of SARMC somehow was not 
illegal or unlawful would be untrue, misleading, and grossly prejudicial to MFUA in its attempt 
to recover damages caused by SARMC's wrongful withdrawal. 
Finally, it is clear SARMC seeks to confuse the jury regarding the impropriety of its 
wrongful withdrawal by making misleading statements in its briefing such as: "the words 
'wrong' or 'wrongfully' when referring to the dissociation could lead the jury to believe SADC 
did something more than exercising its statutory right to leave apartnership after engaging in 
negotiations over a protracted period of time in an attempt to resolve the matter." SARMC's 
Memorandum at 5 (emphasis added). SARMC had no "statutory right" to leave MRIA. This 
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SARMCfS MOTION IN LIMINE RE: DISSOCIATION - Page 3 
(209696 doc) 
01.665 
type of misstatement of the law by SARMC cannot be allowed to guide the jury in its 
deliberations 
U. ARGUMENT 
A. TDAHO LAW DEEMS THE ACT OF WITHDRAWING FROM A 
PARTNERSHH' IN BREACH OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT TO BE A 
"WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL" 
SARMC suggests MRIA has used the phrase "wrongful withdrawal" in order to prejudice 
the jury. This is untrue. The phrase "wrongful withdrawal" is a defined term under Idaho law 
used by the Idaho Legislature and the Idaho courts in defining the act of withdrawing from a 
partnership in violation of the partnership agreement. Any prejudice to SARMC from the jury 
hearing the phrase "wrongful withdravval," therefore, would result not from the language itself, 
but fiom the underlying actions of SARMC constituting a wrongful withdrawal under Idaho law. 
In its July 24, 2006 Memorandum Decision, this Court stated correctly the law in Idaho 
that "a partner's dissociation will be deemed wrotzgful if I )  the dissociation breaches an express 
term of the partnership agreement . . . ." July 24,2006 Memorandum Decision at 7, citing Idaho 
Code 5 53-3-103(b)(6), -602 (emphasis added). This Court then concluded that because 
SARMC withdrew from MRIA in violation of the MRIA Partnership Agreement, "the Court will 
find that SADC's dissociation from MRIA was wrongful as a matter of jaw." Id, at 13 
(emphasis added). 
This Court's use of the word "wrongful" was not inflammatory or unsupported. Rather, 
this Court's use of the word "wrongful" mirrors the applicable Idaho statutes governing 
partnerships. See, e.g., I.C. § 53-3-602(c) ("A partner who wrongful& dissociates is liable to the 
partnership and to the other partners for damages caused by the dissociation." (emphasis added)); 
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LC. $ 53-3-602(b) (stating that dissociation is "wrongful" under Idaho law if it "is in breach of 
an express provision of the partnership agreement"). Indeed, SARMC concedes in its briefing 
that the phrase "wrongful dissociation" comes from RUPA and is both "technically and legally 
accurate.. .." SARMC Memo, at 5. 
B. THE JURY MUST BE INFORMED THE WITHDRAWAL WAS "WRONGFUL" 
IN ORDER TO CALCULATE DAMAGES AUTHORIZED BY I.C. $53-3-602. 
MRLA has the right under Idaho Code $53-3-602(c) to have a jury calculate damages 
caused by SARMC's wrongful dissociation. Idaho Code $ 53-3-602(c) states that "[a] partner 
who wrongfully dissociates is liable to the partnership and to the other partners for damages 
caused by the dissociation." LC. 9 53-3-602(c) (emphasis added). In order to instruct the jury 
properly regarding its role under LC. 5 53-3-602(c), therefore, the jury must understand that the 
underlying liability-that is, wrongful dissociation-has already been determined by this Court. 
C. SARMC MISSTATES THE LAW AND THIS COURT'S PRIOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ORDER IN SEEKING TO AVOID HAVING THE JURY LEARN 
OF SARMC'S WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL 
SARMC seeks to preclude the jury from knowing SARMC withdrew wrongfully from 
MRLA by misstating the applicable law and rehashing the same argument it made unsuccessfully 
in opposing MRIA's summary judgment on wrongful dissociation. Specifically, SARMC argues 
it somehow had the right under RUPA to withdraw from MRIA regardless of what the MRIA 
Partnership Agreement says: 
[Tlhe words 'wrong' or 'wrongfully' when referring to the 
dissociation could lead the jury to believe SADC did something 
more than exercising its statutory right to leave a partnership after 
engaging in negotiations over a protractedperiod of time in an 
attempt to resolve the matter. 
SARMC's Memorandum at 5 (emphasis added). 
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This argument by SARMC is contrary to both Idaho law and the prior holding of this 
Court. RUPA states expressly that "relations among the partners and between the partners and 
the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement." LC. 5 53-3-103.' Because SARMC 
withdrew fiom MRIA in violation of Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement, SARMC did not 
(as it seeks to instruct the jury) have the "statutory right" to leave MRIA. SARMC's 
Memorandum at 5. 
SARMC has already filed its motion for reconsideration and has already attempted 
unsuccessfully to obtain an interlocutory appeal. SARMC cannot now avoid the consequences 
of its wrongful withdrawal by seeking to have this Court inform the jury SARMC had the 
"statutory right" to withdraw from MRIA and that the withdrawal was not "wrongful" under 
RUPA. 
D. THE PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SARMC'S WITHDRAWAL. ARE 
IRRELEVANT GIVEN THE COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO MRIA ON WRONGFUL DISSOCIATION AND THIS COURT'S DENIAL OF 
MRIA'S MOTION TO SEEK PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
SARMC indicates in its briefing it does not want the jury to know that SARMC's 
withdrawal was "wrongful" under RUPA or "unlawful" because SARMC wants to be able to 
argue that its wrongful withdrawal was somehow appropriate or justified due to the actions of 
MRIA. These justifications are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 702. 
' As explained by this Court, "where an express provision of the partnership agreement applies to 
a given situation, the parties are bound to the terms of the partnership agreement, If there is no 
provision of the partnership agreement that applies to a given situation, the RUPA provisions act 
as default rules, filing in the gaps left by the lack of agreed upon provisions." July 24,2006 
Memorandum Decision. at 7. 
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MRIA has already filed briefing regarding its objection to the admissibility of any 
evidence purportedly justifying the wrongful withdrawal by SARMC. See MRIA's Motion in 
Lirnine Re: SARMC's Beliefs about Legality of Withdrawal from MRIA. Rather than repeat 
those arguments at length here, MRIA incorporates that briefing in full herein. Simply put, the 
reasons for SARMC's withdrawal have no bearing on this case. The issue of liability for 
wrongful withdrawal has already been resolved. Because MRIA was not permitted to seek 
punitive damages, evidence of the motives or purported justifications for the wrongful 
withdrawal by SARMC's have no bearing on liability or damages. Accordingly, the attempt by 
SARMC to preclude MRIA from using the word "wrongful" because it might interfere with 
SARMC's ability to convince a jury the wrongful withdrawal was appropriate, should not be 
allowed by this Court. 
E. THE WORDS "UNLAWFUL" AND "ILLEGAL" ARE BOTH ACCURATE 
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE WITHDRAWAL BY SARMC FROM MRIA 
SARMC attempts to W e r  disguise its actions by precluding MRIA from using the 
words "unlawful" or "illegal" to describe SARMC's wronghl withdrawal from MRIA in 
violation of the MRIA Partnership Agreement and RUPA. The withdrawal by SARMC was not 
lawful or legal. This Court has already recognized that "relations among the partners and 
between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement." LC. 3 53- 
3-103. Here, the MRIA Partnership Agreement unambiguously restricts the ability of a party to 
withdraw to four reasons. The withdrawal by SARMC from MRIA was not for any of the four 
reasons expressly stated in the MRIA Partnership Agreement. Allowing a jury to believe a 
violation of I.C. § 53-3-103 or the breach of express terms of a partnership agreement is legal or 
lawful would be erroneous and prejudicial. Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate for MRIA to 
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inform the jury that the withdrawal by SARMC was unlawful and illegal given that it violated 
both LC. 5 53-3-103 and Section 6.1 of the Partnership Agreement. 
F. THE PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION BY SARMC IS MISLEADING AND 
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL 
SARMC attempts to confuse the distinction between the "right" and the "power of a 
partner to dissociate. The proposed jury instruction by SARMC informs the jury incorrectly that 
even though the dissociation by SARMC breached the MRIA Partnership Agreement, the 
dissociation was not wrongful, unlawful or otherwise contrary to any law. See SARMC's 
Memorandum, Ex. A, p.1. "Withdrawal fiom MRI Associates, LLP was not 'unlawful' or 
contraxy to any law.. .." SARMC's Memorandum, Ex. A, p. 1. This proposed jury instruction 
misstates the applicable law, would unnecessarily confuse the jury and would undeniably 
prejudice MRIA. 
First, instructing the jury regarding the "power" of a partner to dissociate would serve no 
purpose in this litigation. There is no dispute SARMC had thebower to leave MRIA in violation 
of the MRIA Partnership Agreement. Indeed, SARMC has left MRIA and has become a full 
partner in IMI. MRIA does not seek to reinstate SARMC to its former position as a partner in 
MRIA. There is, therefore, nothing for the jury to consider or to decide regarding the power of a 
partner to dissociate. 
Secondly, instructing the jury regarding the "power" of a partner to dissociate would 
confuse the jury regarding the "right" of a partner to dissociate. The proposed jury instruction by 
SARMC clearly attempts to blur the distinction between the "power" and the "right" of a partner 
to dissociate. Although SARMC proposes an instruction informing the jury SARMC had the 
power to dissociate from MRIA, SARMC includes no language differentiating between the 
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power and the right of SARMC to dissociate, or the finding of this Court that SARMC did not 
have the right to dissociate. Any instruction addressing the power of a partner to dissociate 
would need to include a lengthy and clear discussion of the difference between the power and the 
right to dissociate, as well as an explanation that even a partner with the power to dissociate is 
liable for damages caused to the partnership resulting from the dissociation when the partner 
(like SARMC) did not have the right to dissociate. 
Third, the proposed jury instruction by SARMC fails to include the statutory language 
from the Revised Uniform Partnership Act that the jury must consider in awarding damages. 
Idaho Code Section 53-3-602(c) states "[a] partner who wrongfully dissociates is liable to the 
partnership and to the other partners for damages caused by the dissociation." LC. 5 53-3- 
602(c). The jury must be instructed of this statutory right belonging to MRIA before the jury is 
asked to calculate damages in this matter. 
As an alternative to SARMC's proposed jury instruction, MRIA proposes the following 
jury instruction, (attached as Exhibit A hereto), to be read to the jury before the presentation of 
evidence: 
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. became a partner in 
MRI Associates, LLP, or "the MRIA Partnership", in 1986. In 
connection with its role as a Partner in the MRIA vartnershiv. Saint 
Alphonsus signed a partnership contract restrictin;: the ability of 
Saint Alphonsus to leave that partnership unless specific events 
identified in the partnership contract occurred. 0; April 1,2004, 
SARMC left the MRIA partnership without any of the specific 
events listed in the MRIA partnership contract having occurred. 
This Court has already heard arguments before you were 
selected to serve on the jury from Saint Alphonsus and the 
remaining partners in the MRIA partnership about whether Saint 
Alphonsus had the right to leave the MRIA partnership in April 
2004. Saint Alphonsus argued that it had the right to leave the 
MRIA partnership in April 2004 regardless of what was stated in 
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the MRIA partnership contract. The remaining partners in the 
MRIA partnership disagreed with Saint Alphonsus and argued the 
decision by Saint Alphonsus to leave the MRIA partnership in 
April 2004 violated the MRIA partnership contract. After 
considering the arguments from both sides, I have already ruled in 
against Saint Alphonsus and favor of the remaining partners in the 
MRIA partnership by concluding that Saint Alphonsus did violate 
the MRIA partnership contract when it left that partnership in April 
2004. 
The legal phrase used to describe the actions of a partner who 
leaves the partnership in violation of the partnership agreement is 
"wrongful dissociation." You are instructed, therefore, that Saint 
Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from the h4R.U Partnership on 
April 1,2004. 
Idaho law states that "[a] partner who wrongfully dissociates is 
liable to the partnership and to the other partners for damages 
caused by the dissociation." LC. 5 53-3-602(c). Because I have 
already determined Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from 
the MRIA partnership, you will be responsible for determining the 
amount of damages the MRIA partnership suffered due to the 
wrongful dissociation by Saint Alphonsus. At the conclusion of 
the presentation of evidence at this trial, I will fixther instruct to 
you regarding the proper matters you may consider in determining 
those damages. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully requests that SARMC's Motion be 
denied in its entirety and that the proposed jury instruction by SARMC be replaced with the 
proposed jury instruction from MRIA. 
v DATED this \ day of June, 2007. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
~ a n i e i  J. Gordon. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. - 
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. became a partner in MRI Associates, LLP, or "the 
MRIA Partnership", in 1986. In connection with its role as a partner in the MRIA partnership, 
Saint Alphonsus signed a partnership contract restricting the ability of Saint Alphonsus to leave 
that partnership unless specific events identified in the partnership contract occurred. On April 
1,2004, SARMC left the MRIA partnership without any of the specific events listed in the 
MRIA partnership contract having occurred. 
This Court has already heard arguments before you were selected to serve on the jury 
from Saint Alphonsus and the remaining partners in the MRIA partnership about whether Saint 
Alphonsus had the right to leave the MRIA partnership in April 2004. Saint Alphonsus argued 
that it had the right to leave the MRIA partnership in April 2004 regardless of what was stated in 
the MRIA partnership contract. The remaining partners in the MRIA partnership disagreed with 
Saint Alphonsus and argued the decision by Saint Alphonsus to leave the MRIA partnership in 
April 2004 violated the MRIA partnership contract. After considering the arguments from both 
sides, I have already ruled in against Saint Alphonsus and favor of the remaining partners in the 
MRIA partnership by concluding that Saint Alphonsus did violate the MRIA partnership contract 
when it left that partnership in April 2004. 
The legal phrase used to describe the actions of a partner who leaves the partnership in 
violation of the partnership agreement is "wronghl dissociation." You are instructed, therefore, 
that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from the MRIA Partnership on April 1,2004. 
Idaho law states that "[a] partner who wrongfully dissociates is liable to the partnership 
and to the other partners for damages caused by the dissociation." I.C. fi 53-3-602(c). Because I 
have already determined Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated from the MRIA partnership, 
you will be responsible for determining the amount of damages the MRIA partnership suffered 
due to the wrongful dissociation by Saint Alphonsus. At the conciusion of the presentation of 
evidence at this trial, I will further instruct to you regarding the proper matters you may consider 
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INTERMOUNTALN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant!Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), by 
and through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s ("SARMC") 
Motion in Limine Re: Lease and Partnership Term (the "Motion"). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SARMC's Motion is an unfhitful second attempt to have the Court rule on its Motion for 
Partiai Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term ("Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"). The 
Court has already held that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was improper. Yet, 
SARMC is now attempting to mask its prior summary judgment motion as a motion in limine. 
SARMC is doing this without attempting to provide a separate legal basis for its Motion (as 
opposed to having the Court apply the summary judgment standard again). Such an attempt is 
wholly inappropriate. 
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By filing its Motion, SARMC is asking the Court to preclude the admission of 
admissible, relevant evidence.' The evidence which SARMC is attempting to have excluded is 
relevant to two issues which should be submitted to the jury: (1) whether SARMC wrongfully 
dissociated by withdrawing before the end of the partnership term date: and (2) the duration of 
damages sustained by the Partnership. Because this evidence is necessary to establish these two 
purposes, granting SARMC's Motion would unfairly prejudice MRIA. As such, SARMC's 
Motion should be denied. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. SARMC'S MOTION IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
1. SARMC has Failed to Provide any Authority or Standard to Support Its 
Motion and MREA is, Therefore, Prejudiced. 
. . 
There are several problems with SARMC's Motion. First, SARMC has failed to provide 
which evidentiary standard it is using for its Motion. While Idaho courts have not enumerated 
the standard for a motion in limine, it is clear that motions in limine are tools used to challenge 
the admissibility of evidence. See Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599,605,83 P.3d 773,779 (Idaho 
2003) ("A motion in limine seeks an advance ruling on the admissibility of evidence."); State v. 
Wallmuller, 125 Idaho 196, 198,868 P.2d 524,526 (Ct. App. 1994) (A motion in limine "is a 
request for a protective order against prejudicial questions and statements . . . the purpose of such 
' SARMC has failed to provide any authority or argument contrary to this assertion. At no time 
does SARMC argue that the evidence is of questionable admissibility or that its admission would 
prejudice SARMC. 
MRIA contends that SARMC's withdrawal from MRIA was wrongful in two respects: (1) 
because the withdrawal violated the terms of Article 6 of the Partnership Agreement, and (2) 
because withdrawal occurred before the end of the partnership term. 
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motion being to avoid injection into trial matters which are irrelevant, inadmissible and 
prejudicial"); see also 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial 8 99 (2007) ("The motion [in limine] should be used, 
if at all, as a rifle and not as a shotgun, with counsel pointing out the objectionable material and 
showing why the material is inadmissible and prejudicial."); 21 FPP § 5037.10 (2007) (a motion 
in limine is a motion "to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually 
~ffered").~ As such, a party bringing a motion in limine is required to apply Idaho rules and case 
law to challenge the admissibility of evidence because the evidence is either irrelevant or 
prejudicial. 
SARMC fails to make any such argument or to provide any such authority to support its 
motion in limine. Instead, SARMC's briefing only states that its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment should be treated as a motion in limine. It does this without providing any arguments 
as to why the evidence at issue is inadmissible. Consequently, SARMC has not met its burden 
and its Motion should be denied. 
Additionally, because SARMC's Motion does not provide any legal basis or explanation 
as to why the evidence at issue is inadmissible, MRM cannot properly respond. As a result, 
MRIA will be unfairly prejudiced if the Motion is granted. Further, Rule 7(b)(l), Idaho Rules 
Additionally, upon review of Idaho law, a commentator explained that: 
The motion in limine is potentially usehl in two situations: where a party 
anticipates that an opponent will offer evidence of questionable admissibility, and 
the mere mention of the evidence during the course of the offer may produce 
prejudice; and where evidence central to the action is of questionable 
admissibility, and the parties will benefit in their preparation and presentation of 
the case from an advance ruling on admissibility. 
D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook, Sec. 3.2, p. 31. In the current action, SARMC 
has failed to explain how the evidence at issue is of questionable admissibility. 
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Civil Procedure, states that all motions "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor 
including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought." As SARMC's Motion does not state the legal basis for its 
Motion, SARMC's Motion does not comply with this Rule. Consequently, SARMC's Motion 
should be denied. 
2. The Subject of SARMC's Motion is Improper. 
SARMC has not argued that the evidence regarding the lease term or partnership term is 
irrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial. In fact, SARMC's briefing does not even reference any 
rule of evidence. Instead, SARMC is relying upon its prior briefing in its Memorandum and 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term 
("Memorandum and Reply Memorandum"). As this hriefrng does not contain any allegation that 
the evidence is irrelevant, inadmissible, or prejudicial, SARMC is, in effect, asking the court to 
weigh the evidence and rule on its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as a matter of law. As 
the Court has already held, the topic at issue in the Memorandum and Reply Memorandum is an 
inappropriate summary judgment topic4 See Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Tenn. Because the Court already refused to rule on the 
current issue at the summary judgment stage, SARMC is now trying to lead the Court into ruling 
on its summary judgment motion by masking it as a motion in limine. As explained below, this 
is an improper use of a motion in limine. 
4 Even if it weren't inappropriate, the deadline for filing a motion for summary judgment passed 
prior to the time this Motion was filed. 
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"Motions in limine are not to be used as a sweeping means of testing issues of law. And 
deficiencies in pleadings or evidence are not appropriately resolved by a motion in lirnine." 75 
Am.Jur.2d 5 99. As such, "trial courts are cautioned not to allow motions in limine to be used as 
unwritten and unnoticed motions for summary judgment." Id. In its briefing, SARMC is 
addressing whether there is sufficient evidence to support a factual assertion; it is not addressing 
whether such evidence is admissible or relevant. See Memorandum and Reply Memorandum. 
Consequently, SARMC's Motion is inappropriate and should be denied. 
3. SARMC's Briefing Does Not Contain Any Arguments Re: Partnership Term 
In its Motion, SARMC asks the Court to find, among other things, "that the Partnership 
Agreements for MRI Center and MRI Mobile do not have any express or implied term." 
However, absolutely none of its briefing addresses whether such evidence is admissible. As 
such, it is not entitled to a favorable ruling on this issue. 
B. THE EVIDENCE AT ISSUE IS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE. 
Additionally, through its Motion, SARMC is asking the Court to refuse the introduction 
of relevant, admissible evidence. Particularly, SARMC asks the court for an order "establishing 
the Lease Agreement expires on October 31,2015, and that the Partnership Agreements for MRI 
Center and MRI Mobile do not have any express or implied term, and precluding MRI 
Associates, LLP ("MRU") &om offering any evidence or argument to the contrary at trial." 
Such a request is improper as this evidence is both relevant and admissible. 75 Am.Jur.2d 5 99 
("It is clearly improper for the court to allow a motion in limine which limits or refuses the 
introduction of relevant admissible evidence"). 
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First, the significance of whether the Partnership had a definite term is twofold: (1) if it 
was for a term, then SARMC wrongfully dissociated by withdrawing before the end of the term 
date, and (2) the duration of the Partnership may have some impact on the damages claimed in 
connection with SARMC's wrongful dissociation. Additionally, whether the lease was for a 
term is also directly relevant to the above purposes. This is because, as the evidence establishes, 
the term of the Partnership is evidenced by, among other things, the terms of (a) the Lease, and 
(b) the limited partnerships in which MRIA was the sole general partner (namely, MRI Center 
and MRI Mobile). See Affidavit of G.Rey Reinhardt in Support of Opposition to Partial Motion 
for Summary Judgment re: Lease Term dated February 13,2007 ("Reinhardt Mf.") 7 2 and Ex. 
A. 
Establishing whether the partnership or the lease were for a term is a question of fact that 
is properly left for the jury to detem~ine.~ State v. Autheman, 47 Idaho 328,274 P. 805, 
807 (1929) ("It is a general rule, of course, that questions of law are for determination by the 
judge, while questions of fact are for the jury"). Such a finding will require the fact finder to 
weigh the evidence which SARMC wants to preclude. McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568,572, 
149 P.3d 843, 847 (2006) ("Weighing the evidence, including the credibility of witnesses, is 
within the province of the trier of fact-the jury). Precluding such evidence would unfairly 
prejudice MRIA as it would prevent MRIA from establishing central parts of its case, namely 
whether SARMC wrongfully dissociated by withdrawing prior to the termination of the 
partnership and to what extent or for what time frame MRlA was damaged by SARMC's 
For a review of MRIA's arguments establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether the lease term was extended, please see MRIA's briefing in its Opposition to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Lease Term filed February 13,2007. 
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withdrawal. This is contrary to the purposes of a motion in lirnine. 75 Am.Jur.2d § 99 ("before 
granting a motion in limine, courts must be certain that such action will not unduly restrict the 
opposing party's presentation of its case"). As such, SARMC's motion in limine should be 
denied. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully requests that SARMC's Motion be 
denied in its entirety. 
DATED this 4% day of June, 2007, 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
G. Rey Reinhardt, N 
Daniel J. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, on its own behalf, and on behalf of MRI 
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Mobile Limited, an Idaho Limited Partnership, 
Counterclaimants, 1 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., 
an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
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J 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited liability I 
partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), by 
and through its counsel of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker, P.A., hereby submits this 
Memorandum in Opposition to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc.'s ("SARMC") 
Motion in Limine Re: Purchase Price Damage Theory (the "Motion"). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As a partner in MRIA, SARMC could not compete against MRIA. However, SARMC 
wrongfully withdrew from the M U .  Therefore, SARMC's subsequent competition with 
MRIA (which could not have occurred but for its withdrawal) is also wrongful in that it violates 
the Partnership Agreement's non-competition provision. Allowing SARMC to withdraw from 
MRIA, compete with MRIA, and not account for the Partnership Agreement's non-compete 
provision, damages MRIA while rewarding SARMC for its wrongful withdrawal. 
The value of this lost right - the right to prevent competition among partners - is 
appropriately identified by the fair market value of a transaction that rightfully accomplished 
what SARMC has, to date, secured wrongfully. That transaction, according to SARMC's 
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consultant, Shattuck Hammond, is represented by the fair market value of MRICI. According to 
Shattuck Hammond, as of 2001, the fair market value of MRICI was $34.7 million. MRIA has 
adopted this figure as an appropriate measure of damages flowing from SARMC's wrongful 
withdrawal in that it corresponds with a lawful transaction that represented the value of MRIA's 
non-compete provision. 
SARMC's conclusions to the contrary are unsupported by any expert testimony that 
questions either Shattuck Hammond's analysis or the ability to incorporate that analysis into 
MRIA's damages theories. MRLA, on the other hand, has offered expert reports, expert 
depositions, and expert affidavits in support of this position. SARMC, therefore, has not shown 
that MlUA's dissociation damages, and its accompanying methodology, are inappropriate or, for 
that matter, that the analyses accompanying such opinions would be useless to a jury. For these 
reasons, SARMC's Motion should be denied. 
11. BACKGROUND 
MRIA's partners, including SARMC, entered into a Partnership Agreement which 
included terms that they would not compete with each other while partners. The "non-compete" 
aspect of the Partnership Agreement had significant value to the partners. It was, in essence, a 
primary objective of hRLA's partnership mission since it promoted collaboration among 
Treasure Valley Hospitals. At the same time, it prevented a partner from "breaking away" from 
the Partnership and establishing imaging centers that would compete with imaging facilities of 
the partner hospitals within the restrictive areas. The only way a partner could avoid this 
restriction was to obtain unanimous consent from all MRIA partners. 
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Of these five options, Shattuck Hammond recommended the first option - acquiring 
100% of MRICI. (See Id. at 38.) Under this option, MRLA would be dissolved and SARMC 
would acquire all GP and LP interests in MRICI for $34.7 million (minus SARMC's $7.4 
million share) - a fair market value for MRICI based on Shattuck Hammond's discounted cash 
flow analysis of MRICI's operations. (See Id. at 23,26, & 28.)' 
Had SARMC followed the recommendations of Shattuck H m o n d  and paid to dissolve 
MRIA and purchase MRICI for its fair market value as suggested in the first option, there would 
be no litigation. SARMC would have done what business partners do all the time - compensate 
their existing partners for their fair market value shares in the business and move in other 
strategic directions.' 
Here, however, SARMC wanted something for nothing. Rather than buy out its partners 
for an amount that fairly represented the value of MRICI and the waiver of the non-compete 
restriction, SARMC withdrew from the Partnership which, according to SARMC, entitled it to 
' Shattuck Hammond found MRICI to be a well-performing entity even when considering that IMI had 
already been a competitor in that market. The discounted cash flow analysis performed by Shattuck Hammond 
evaluates the valne of MRICI based on anticipated perfomnce through 2006. As such, Shamck Hammond's 2001 
valuation considers projected perfomnce and value of MRICI at the time of withdrawal. 
MRIA's expert, Charles Wilhoite, explained this concept on an altogether different matter at his recent 
deposition: 
Q: So is it your opinion that the damages incurred as a result of the acts - assuming that they 
all occurred - is $27.3 million plus $8.5 million? 
A: Based on the historical performance, yes. This is just another way to look at the damage. 
As I testified this morning, I was retained to estimate the hospital's non-ownershiv 
interest in a very similarly situated imagine business, and the hosnital ultimatelv   aid the 
fair market valne to buv its wav out of that relationshiv, and that's hasicallv what this 
revresents had SARMC ourchased those interests for $27.3 million. 
(See 4/2/07 Wilhoite Depo. at 147:14-148:3, attached as Ex. "B" to Gordon Aff. at 7 3 (Emphasis added)). 
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compete with MRIA. Thus, SARMC attempted to avoid paying anything to its partners for 
control of its campus MRI operations and for the right to compete with 
Since SARMC's withdrawal from the MRLA Partnership was wrongful, its competition 
with MRIA (which could not have occurred but for the withdrawal) is also a breach of the MRIA 
Partnership Agreement, specifically the non-compete clause. To view this any other way is to 
reward SARMC for its wrongful withdrawal by permitting SARMC to do something it could not 
otherwise have done as a lawfully, behaving partner within the MRLA Partnership. In other 
words, allowing SARMC to circumvent the non-compete clause by wrongfully withdrawing 
would allow SARMC to benefit from its breach. 
Under these circumstances, perhaps the best way to measure damages for wrongful 
withdrawal is to consider the lost benefit of W ' s  bargain, i.e., the damages associated with 
the loss of the right to enforce the non-compete provision within the Partnership Agreement 
which would have prevented SARMC from competing with MRIA in the restricted areas. The 
fair market value of a transaction that rightfully accomplishes what SARMC has accomplished 
wronclfully is an appropriate way of measuring this damage. MRIA's expert, Charles Wilhoite 
("Wilhoite") agrees, incorporating Shattuck Hammond's valuation analysis in his expert report: 
As presented on page 23 in the Shattuck Hamrnond Partners, LLC, Presentation 
of Strategic Options of MRIA Ownership for St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, dated November 6,2001, the total value MRIC - $34.7 million, less value 
attributable to SARMC's ownership interest of $7.4 million, or $27.3 million - 
represents a reasonable estimate of the then-value of what SARMC would have to 
pay to avoid its obligations as a partner in MRIA. Additionally, based on 
information provided by Bruce P. Budge, estimated damages to the then-value of 
3 Since withdrawal, SARMC has accomplished its objectives. SARMC has partnered with GSR to open 
imaging centers in the restricted areas and has opened a campus MRl facility. Neither of these activities were 
permitted under the MRIA Partnership Agreement. 
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MRIA total approximately $8.5 million based on losses incurred during the 1999 
through 2001 period. 
(See Wilhoite Rpt. at 11, h. 5, attached as Ex. "C" to Gordon Aff. at 14.) This opinion was 
reiterated in MRIA's discovery responses: 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, ANSWER: For the items and amounts of 
damages alleged by MRIA, see the expert reports of Bruce B. Budge, Charles A. 
Wilhoite, and W. Ed Whitelaw and the depositions of those experts. Without 
limiting the types or amounts of damages described in the expert reports, the 
damages sustained by MRIA as a result of the wrongful dissociation by SARMC 
from the MRIA Partnership are described in footnote 5 of the Expert Opinion of 
Charles A. Wilhoite, dated March 12, 2007. As explained in greater detail in 
footnote 5 of the Wilhoite Expert Report, and without limiting the measure of 
damages stated therein, the damages for wrongful dissociation are the amounts 
SARMC would have had to pay MRIA in order to lawfully release itself from its 
contractual obligations to MRIA - that is, $35.8 million. 
THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: . . . Wrongful Dissociation Damages. 
Since late 1999, SARMC investigated ways to participate fully with IMI in its 
MRI and non-MRI operations. However, due to the non-compete provision in the 
MRIA Partnership Agreement, SARMC knew it would breach the MRIA 
Partnership Agreement if it participated in the MRI business of IMI. 
Accordingly, SARMC investigated various options for getting out from under the 
terms of the MRIA non-compete. One approach was to purchase enough shares 
in MRIA so that it could control voting on MRIA business decisions. Once 
SARMC had voting control of MRIA, it could circumvent the non-compete and 
consolidate MRIA's fixed magnet business (MRICI) with IMI's MRI operation. 
Another approach was to withdraw from MRIA and join with IMI to compete 
against MRIA. By early 2000, SARMC knew that the withdrawal approach was 
unlawful, and through 2000 and 2001 explored ways to purchase enough of 
MRIA to vote around the MFUA non-compete. This effort culminated in 2001 
with a report from Shattuck Hammond which recommended that the non-compete 
could be effectively circumvented if MRICI was purchased from MRIA for $27 
million. 
SARMC was unwilling to pay the fair market value of MRICI (as recommended 
by its consultant) and so chose the unlawful alternative - withdrawal - as an 
attempt to achieve its intended strategy of getting out of its obligations to MRIA. 
MRIA contends that, had SARMC behaved lawfully in executing its strategy to 
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extricate itself from MRIA's agreement, it would have been required to pay fair 
market value for MRICI as recommended by its consultant. 
Accordingly, damages for wrongfbl dissociation are calculated based on Shattuck 
Hammond's recommendation for a fair market value purchase of MRICI, plus an 
additional sum representing the decrease in fair market value to MRICI which 
occurred prior to the Shattuck Hammond valuation, as a result of SARMC's 
breaches of fiduciary duty (occurring since late 1999). (See Report of Charles 
Wilhoite and deposition of Charles Wilhoite). 
(See Second and Third Supp. Interrog. Resp. No. 7, attached as Ex. "D" to Gordon Aff. at 7 5.) 
This opinion was also relayed during Wilhoite's deposition. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. MRIA is Entitled to the Benefit of Its Bargain; SARMC is Not Entitled to Benefit 
from its Breach 
Simply put, SARMC dissociated from the MRIA Partnership so that it could free itself 
from the Partnership Agreement's non-compete provision, join with IMI, and compete with MRI 
providers in the restricted areas, including MRIA. In doing so, SARMC took away a valuable 
right to MRIA - the non-compete provision - by claiming that it now had the right to join with a 
competitor and compete directly with MRIA. This previous restriction was an asset to MRIA 
that SARMC should have accounted for by either (1) not wronghlly withdrawing and not 
competing with MRIA, or (2) paying to dissolve MRIA and purchase MRICI for fair market 
value. Yet, SARMC withdrew and competed against MRIA. SARMC also ignored Shattuck 
Hammond's recommendation and paid nothing after withdrawing. 
SARMC is entitled to the benefit of the bargain with its partner SARMC. As evidenced 
by the Shattuck Hammond valuation and accompanying strategic options regarding SARMC's 
potential ownership interest in MRTA, the benefit of that bargain is represented by the price of a 
legitimate, lawful withdrawal in order to compete with MRIA in the provision of MRI-related 
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services in the restricted areas. This is reflected in Shattuck Hamrnond's first option, amounting 
to the calculated value of MRICI - $27.3 million. By both wrongfully dissociating and not 
paying anything to dissolve W p u r c h a s e  MRICI, SARMC improperly has attempted to 
benefit from its breach of the Partnership Agreement. 
By not purchasing MRICI and, instead, wrongfully dissociating from and later 
competing with MRLA, MRLA lost goodwill, its competitive position in the market, and the 
continuity of business relationships with its customers. (See Wilhoite Aff. at 7 2.) While a lost 
profits analysis attempts to capture these consequences, an alternate measure of damages relating 
to SARMC's wrongful dissociation resides in the fair market value of MRICI; specifically, the 
fair market value of a transaction that rightfully accomplishes what SARMC has accomplished 
wrongfully is an appropriate way of measuring this type of damage. (See Id.) The value of 
MRICI, then, represents the value of the non-compete provision that SARMC attempted to avoid 
upon wrongfully withdrawing from MRIA. (See Id.) In other words, SARMC could not have 
competed with MRZA unless it rightfully dissociated (which, as a matter of law, it did not) or 
dissolved MRLA and purchased MRICI. SARMC did neither; MRICI's value, therefore, is 
directly correlated with SARMC's dissociation. See e.g., WSP, Znc. v. Wyoming Steel 
Fabricators and Erectors, Inc., 2007 WL 1366350 (Wyo. 2007) (recognizing, in addition to lost 
profits, that measure of damages for breach of non-compete can be represented by value of 
expectation interest in performance of non-compete covenant). 
4 This should be distinguished from a contractual right to force SARMC to buy MRICI. Contrary to 
SARMC's Motion, MRIA is not suggesting that SARMC had a contractual obligation to purchase MRICI. (See 
Memo at 6-7.) Rather, MRIA simply makes the argument that SARMC cannot wrongfully dissociate and, as a 
result, benefit from its breach in avoiding the non-compete provision. Instead, if SARMC rightfully dissociated 
from the MRIA Partnership, it needed to account for the Partnership Agreement's non-compete provision by, for 
example, dissolving MRIA, purchasing MRICI, and thereby avoid the non-compete provision. 
MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SARMC'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: PURCHASE PRICE DAMAGE THEORY - Page 9 
(209701_2.doe) 
02694 
Here, Wilhoite alternatively measured MRIA's damages associated with SARMC's 
wrongful dissociation by adopting as his own the valuation that Shattuck Hammond performed 
as to MRICI. (See Wilhoite Rpt. at 11, fn. 5, attached as Ex. "C" to Gordon Aff. at 7 4.)' In 
addition to his report, this was made clear during his deposition: 
Q: Earlier I asked you if you had broken down the damage analysis by claim, 
and I believe you responded that you had not; is that correct? 
A: Not by specific claim; however, dissociation, as I referenced in the 
footnote, could be viewed as a manner of buying your way out of a 
partnership. 
Q: So, from your perspective, any opinions you have regarding damages 
related to dissociation are contained in Footnote 5? 
A: And it's not even my calculation; it's basically a fact that comes out of 
Shattuck Harnrnond's analysis. 
Q: So you are testifying to a fact that's not an opinion of yours? 
A: Well, I'll adopt it as an opinion that a reasonable representation of the cost 
that SARMC could have incurred to get out of the partnership is 
represented by the fair market value opinion presented by Shattuck 
Hammond with regard to the other partners' interests as of the end of '01. 
(See Wilhoite Depo. at 1544-25, attached as Ex. " B  to Gordon Aff. at 7 3.) However, other 
than this brief dialogue, SARMC's counsel did not explore the specifics of Wilhoite's opinion as 
to this theory of dissociation damages. 
SARMC's conduct with respect to ignoring MRIA's claimed dissociation damages 
continued into Budge's deposition, until brought to everyone's attention by MRIA's counsel: 
' In addition to the footnote outlining the value of MMCI and Wilhoite's opinion that it represented the 
"reasonable estimate of the then-value of what SARMC would have to pay to avoid its obligations as a partner in 
MRIA," Wilhoite states in no uncertain terms that, based upon his review of, and familiarity with, relevant valuation 
standards, "the conclusions presented by Shattuck Hammond in the Analysis are relevant and reliable based on 
compliance with existing standards." (See Wilhoite Rpt. at 11, attached as Ex. "C" to Gordon Aff. at 7 4.) 
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I don't know exactly what is going on here. It is striking me as odd. In the 
deposition on Monday with Charles Wilhoite, there seemed to be some sort of a 
skipping of this dissociation damages. It came back, and we discussed the 
footnote. I noticed there was no follow up to the questions or the response that 
was given by Mr. Budge here about dissociation damages . . .. I want you to be on 
notice that this is something that they will testify to. It was not a matter for 
calculation by Mr. Budge, as he testified a few moments ago. But I don't want a 
surprise to be expressed to the iudge or a claim of ambush or some other artifice. 
So I'm putting vou on notice that that's part of our case. I want to be sure that 
you have adeauate time to cover that. 
(See Budge Depo. at 80:16-81:16, attached as Ex. " E  to Gordon Aff. at 7 6 (Emphasis added)). 
SAFWC was given ample time to ask any and all questions of MRIA's damages experts to flesh 
out any ambiguities or purported flaws in the expert analyses. Yet, SAFWC's "vantage of 
ignorance," identified by their persistent avoidance of MRIA's dissociation damages theories, 
cannot operate as a mechanism for striking those theories. As the Court already recognized, 
MRL4's experts "have provided a complete statement of their opinions." (See 6/5/07 Mem. 
Decision at 6 & 7.) MRIA is now entitled to offer these opinions to the trier of fact for its 
consideration. 
B. SARMC's Waiting Until After November 2001 to Withdraw Does Not Render 
Shattuck Hammond's Fair Market Value for MRICI Inaccurate 
The discounted cash flow analysis performed by Shattuck H m o n d  as of 2001 is also 
instructive as to the value of MRICI in 2004. (See Wilhoite Aff. at 7 3.) That is, the $34.7 
million valuation in 2001 already takes into account the primary competitors in the market - IMI 
and MRIA - while considering these entities' performance histories, projected growth, and, 
therefore, the realistic values and operational cash flows over time. Moreover, the 2001 
valuation is an indicator of future valuations in that it manages the harmful acts by SARMC/IMI 
between 2001 and 2004, thus assisting in the approximation of a 2004 MRI landscape with no 
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unlawful, radical changes. (See Id.) In other words, Shattuck Hammond's discounted cash flow 
analysis regarding a 2001 valuation of MRICI is either conservatively low when compared to 
2004 (taking into account the intervening harmful acts)6 or, at the very least, remained unaffected 
in 2004. (See ~d.)' 
C. SARMC's Motion is a Motion to Reconsider in Disguise 
Despite the Court already acknowledging that MRIA's experts "have provided a 
complete statement of their opinions" (See 6/5/07 Mem. Decision at 6 & 7) and that any 
contentions disputing MRIA's experts' findings are "more appropriately addressed during cross- 
examination and undoubtedly by the testimony of the [parties'] experts" (See Id. at 9), SARMC 
attempts to question Wilhoite's findings by arguing that the 2001 Shattuck Hammond valuation 
is speculative. (See Memo at 7.) SARMC, however, offers no authority for arguing that 
Wilhoite's adoption of Shattuck Hammond's analysis is speculative andlor will not assist a jury 
in estimating the damages claimed in the case. 
According to Wilhoite, "Shattnck Hammond's value opinion is based largely on the discounted cash flow 
analysis. Accordingly, the harmful acts committed by SARMC/IMI between 2001 and 2004 (which MRIA alleges 
took place) sewed to depress the financial performance of MRICI in the intervening periods -thereby exerting a 
detrimental impact on MRICI's expected future operating results - and improperly depressing the valuation of 
MRICI as of 2004 (since it would be based on depressed historical and prospective operating results that are 
attributed to the harmful acts of SARMC/IMI)." (See Wilhoite Aff. at 1 3.) 
7 Apparently, SARMC originally agreed to pursue Shattuck Hammond's recommendation, as 
documentation subsequent to November 2001 indicates that Shattnck Hammond was retained to accomplish a 
transaction with MRIA that would achieve the objective outlined within the Report's fust option. However, 
SARMC delayed the pursuit of this option until ultimately dissociating from the MRIA Partnership in 2004. A 
number of theories exist as to why SARMC delayed any recommended transaction. For example, by waiting until 
2003, SARMC believed that it had leveraged its position as to MRIA with the running of a five-year non-compete 
provision following the purchase of new equipment (which would not have expired as of November 2001) such that 
SARMC only had to contend with a trailing one-year non-compete following any withdrawal. (See 9130103 CEO 
Rpt., attached as Ex. "F" to Gordon Aff. at 7 7.; see also 3/8/06 Depo. of Sandra Bruce at 283:25-300, attached as 
Ex. " G  to Gordon Aff. at 1 8.) Alternatively, SARMCIGSR just wanted to drive MRIA into the ground following 
2001 in the hopes of buying MRICI on the cheap. (See 6/5/07 Depo. of Diane Newton at 75: 13-19, attached as Ex. 
" H  to Gordon Aff. at 1 8 ("[Tlhere may have been that sentiment on the part of some of the radiologists &.gy& 
diminish the worth of MRI Center of Idaho in order to lower the selling price . . .." (Emphasis added))). 
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In addition to the absence of any authority within its briefing, SARMC's expert, Dennis 
Reinstein ("Reinstein"), had nothing to say about the validity of the Shattuck Hammond report, 
its 2001 valuation of MRICI, or MRIA's experts' use of that valuation to calculate M u ' s  
damages. Although admittedly hired to evaluate and criticize Wilhoite's report with respect to 
his damages opinions, Reinstein does not even address Wilhoite's opinion regarding dissociation 
damages. At his deposition, Reinstein testified: 
Q: Is it fair to say that when you were originally hired in this case that you 
were retained to evaluate the damage analyses that would be put forward 
by MRIA in this case? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. And this [Wilhoite's purchase price damage theory] is one of those 
damage analyses, correct? 
A: It appears to be, yes. 
Q: All right. And yet you provide no rebuttal to that position correct? 
A: I'm not planning on rebutting it. 
Q: Okay. Did you ever discuss with any of the attorneys fiom either LMI or 
Saint Alphonsus ways in which this measurement of dissociation damages 
could be attacked? 
A: No, 
Q: You have no opinion on that, I take it? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Is it fair to say that when you were retained, one of your charges was to 
attain vulnerabilities in your opinion of Wilhoite and Budge? 
A: That would be one way to put it, I guess. 
Q: When you did your work, you . . . evaluated the Shattuck Hammond report, 
correct? 
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A: We looked at it. 
Q: Did you ever perform any sort of analysis to determine whether or not the 
conclusions and valuations reached by Shattuck H m o n d  were 
appropriate? 
A. Well, as I say, we looked at the report. We did some general analysis, but 
it was our understanding that others were going to deal with that issue. 
And so we didn't pursue any formal opinion. 
Q: Do you know who is challenging the Shattuck Hammond report? 
A: Idon't. 
(See 6/4/07 Depo. of Dennis Reinstein at 69:3-74:11, attached as Ex. "I" to Gordon Aff. at f j  9.) 
Reinstein's testimony reveals that he is not capable of describing iErnow Shattuck Hammond's 
2001 valuation of MRICI is instructive toward understanding MRIA's dissociation damages or 
whether it can be helpful to a trier of fact. Instead, it is SARMC's attorneys who summarily 
conclude that the opinions reached by Wilhoite in discussing dissociation damages are 
speculative and will not assist the trier of fact. These critiques, even if admissible (coming from 
non-experts), go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See e.g., State v. Hopkins, 
113 Idaho 679, 747 P.2d 88 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (if testimony is competent and relevant, it 
may be admissible; weight given to testimony is left to trier of fact). 
The role of the jury should not be supplanted based upon an attorney's objection to 
relevant information speaking to the value of an involved party during the time that SARMC was 
a partner in MRIA, but, at the same time, engaged in conduct that violated the MRIA Partnership 
Agreement. Such information is relevant and should be considered by the jury. The extent to 
which this information is ~ersuasive is, again, up to the trier of fact - not SARMC or the Court. 




The calculations of Budge and Wilhoite are essential to the jury's understanding and 
determination of the damages flowing from the wrongful acts of SARMC and IMI. This 
includes the 2001 valuation of MRICI performed by SARMC's consultant, Shattuck Hammond. 
This valuation correlates with SARMC's dissociation and provides an instructive basis for the 
damages resulting therefrom. For these, and those reasons stated above, MRIA respectfully 
requests that SARMC's Motion be denied in its entirety. 
DATED this 1% day of June, 2007. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
G. Rey Reinhardt, N 
Daniel J. Gordon 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. I 
Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") respond 
to MRI Associates, LLP's ("MRIA") Motion in Limine re: SARMC's Reliance of Advice of 
Counsel as follows: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
MRIA seeks to preclude Saint Alphonsus from submitting any evidence that it factored in 
the advice of counsel in making its decision to withdraw from MRIA. MRIA asserts Saint 
Alphonsus failed to raise this issue as an affirmative defense and that any such evidence is not 
relevant and violates Rule 403. The Court should reject both of these arguments. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Saint Alphonsus Is Not Asserting the "Advise of Counsel" as an Affirmative 
Defense. 
Saint Alphonsus does not assert advice of counsel as an affirmative defense that bars 
MRIA's recovery. For example, Saint Alphonsus does not intend to introduce evidence of the 
advice Saint Alphonsus' legal counsel gave regarding Saint Alphonsus right to dissociate. Such 
evidence simply would not be a defense to the claim that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully 
dissociated. Saint Alphonsus either had the right or it did not. Counsel's advise that Saint 
Alphonsus did have such right would not be admissible to excuse Saint Alphonsus from the 
Court's ruling. 
It should be noted, however, that separate from counsel's advise, Saint Alphonsus' belief 
regarding its rights is material given MRIA's apparent contention that whether Saint Alphonsus 
"knowingly" breach its contract is relevant to its breach of fiduciary duty and covenant of good 
faith claims. If MRIA is allowed to contend that Saint Alphonsus knowingly breached the 
Articles of Partnership, then MRIA cannot prevent Saint Alphonsus from presenting evidence 
that Saint Alphonsus did not know it did not have the right to dissociate. As testified by Ms. 
Bruce in her deposition: 
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Q. (BY MR. BANDUCCI) You say in this document that 
"We now have a strong leveraging position given our option under the 
agreement to withdraw from the venture." 
What did you mean? 
A. I'm not sure what I mean by "option." 
Q. Well, it's your word, so tell me what you meant by your 
statement generally. 
A. Given our understanding of the agreement. 
Q. Okay. And what was your understanding of the 
agreement? 
A. My understanding was that I had the right to withdraw. 
Q. And based on what? 
MR. GJORDING: And that's where my admonition comes in. 
If- 
THE WI'l3ESS: Based on my conversations with legal 
counsel. 
MR. GJORDING: And so don't answer that part of it. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. BANDUCCI) All right. Let me make sure 
that this is clear on the record. 
Are you taking the position that your understanding of your 
right to withdraw was based on advice of counsel? 
A. It was based on my reading the agreement and the advice of 
counsel. 
Q. Okay. All right. So let's talk about what it is that you read 
in the agreement that caused you to believe that you had the right to 
withdraw. And you're referring - 
A. I'm afraid the answer I'm going to give is information that 
I've gleaned from legal counsel. 
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(Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Support of Motion in Limine re: Beliefs About Legality of 
Withdrawal from MRIA at Exhibit A). Saint Alphonsus' counsel instructed Ms. Bruce not to 
answer any questions that would reveal information protected by the attorney client/privilege. 
Id. MRIA then sought to compel Ms. Bruce to answer this line of questions and Saint Alphonsus 
sought a protective order. The Court granted Saint Alphonsus' motion for a protective order 
preventing MRIA from inquiring into the legal analysis of counsel. See Memorandum Decision 
on Defendant/Counterclaimant7s Motion to Compel, Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for 
Protective Order, dated April 17,2006, at p. 12. 
Simply stated, Saint Alphonsus is not seeking to assert it was entitled to dissociate 
because it relied upon advice of counsel (as would be the case if advice of counsel was asserted 
as an affirmative defense). Instead, Ms. Bruce has simply explained she cannot separate her 
understanding of the Partnership Agreement and the existence of Saint Alphonsus' right to 
withdrawal from legal counsel's advice on these issues. The Court has already found Saint 
Alphonsus properly asserted the attomeylclient privilege on these issues. Memorandum 
Decision, dated April 17, 2006, at pp. 10-14. If this case were just about whether Saint 
Alphonsus had the right to withdraw, the present issue would not even be before the Court. 
Because, however, MRIA has raised claims for breach of iiduciary duty (as well as other claims) 
and has attempted to put Saint Alphonsus' pre-dissociation motives at issue, Saint Alphonsus is 
entitled to put on evidence consistent with its prior discovery responses of its pre-dissociation 
knowledge and intent, too and including, Ms. Bruce's statement the she believed she had the 
right to withdraw. 
Saint Alphonsus continues to assert privilege on its legal counsel's interpretation of the 
Partnership Agreement and its understanding of its legal right to withdraw from MRIA. Saint 
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Alphonsus is, however, entitled to state its belief, so long as Saint Alphonsus does disclose its 
attorney's advise in doing so. On the other hand, if MRIA opens the door by asking questions 
suggesting Saint Alphonsus' counsel advised that Saint Alphonsus did not have the right, then 
Saint Alphonsus would be entitled to respond to such evidence. 
Evidence that Saint Alphonsus Relied on the Advice of Counsel in Developing its 
Understanding of the Partnership Agreement and its Legal. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests the Court deny 
MRIA's Motion in Limine seeking to preclude it from submitting any evidence that it relied 
upon the advice of counsel in making its decision to withdraw from MRIA. While Saint 
Alphonsus does not assert advise of counsel as a defense to its actions and does not intend to 
assert its legal counsel's advise as evidence, MRIA may open the door to such evidence based on 
its questioning or submission of evidence to which Saint Alphonsus should be entitled to 
respond. 
DATED this &ay of June 2007. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Patrick J. Miller I / /  
Attorneys for saint\lphonsus 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, ) 
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REPORT OF DISCOVERY MASTER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FIFTH SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, P. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
St. Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc., and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. 
(collectively SARMC) moved the Discovery Master (DM) for an order requiring MRI 
Associates, LLP (MRIA) to provide complete responses to: 
1. Interrogatory Nos. 10-24 (the "contention" interrogatories); 
2. Interrogatory Nos. 26-28; and 
3. Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29. 
MRIA resisted SARMC's motion with respect to all responses sought. 
The parties submitted briefs and affidavits in support of their respective positions. The 
matter was heard on a time-shortened basis pursuant to agreement at the DM'S offices. Counsel 
for SARMC and MRIA presented argument. Counsel for Third-Party Defendants appeared but 
did not argue. 
BACKGROUND 
SARMC's motion, as indicated above, addresses three issues: the first two issues deal 
with responses to interrogatories. MRIA asserts that it is not required to answer Interrogatory 
Nos. 10-24 on the basis that the parties had reached an agreement not to answer "contention" 
interrogatories. It also asserts that it is not required to answer Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 on the 
basis that SARMC has exceeded the 40-interrogatory limit allowed under Rule 33(a), Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, MRIA believes that it should not be required to respond to 
Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29, on the grounds that the responses, if any, would be 
irrelevant since SARMC has not asserted a claim against MRIA for spoliation of evidence. 
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SARMC argues that, although there had been an agreement not to pose "contention" 
interrogatories, that agreement had been waived by MRIA's conduct and that SARMC had 
already answered similar "contention" interrogatories from MRIA based on its belief that MRIA 
had waived the agreement. SARMC denies that it has exceeded the 40-interrogatory limit and 
instead contends that it has only submitted a total of 32 interrogatories, counting sub-parts. 
SARMC, in Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29, had asked MRIA questions regarding its 
records-retention policy. SARMC asserts that such questions are permitted under Rule 26(b), 
I.R.C.P., since they may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
The DM made an oral finding at the hearing that he would grant SARMC's motion with 
respect to the "contention" interrogatories and that he would order MRIA to respond to those 
requests. 
The DM also told the parties at the hearing that he would compel MRIA to respond to 
Requests for Admission Nos. 24 through 29 relating to the records-retention policies of MRIA. 
The DM reserved his ruling on the issue of whether SARMC has exceeded the 40- 
interrogatory limit. 
FINDINGS 
1. "CONTENTION" INTERROGATORIES. Although both parties agree that at a 
meet and confer meeting in December of 2006, they had reached an agreement that instead of 
requiring the parties to respond to the so-called "contention" interrogatories, the parties would 
simply produce all documents and identify all witnesses that support their respective claims and 
defenses in the matter. However, apparently there was a misunderstanding between and among 
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the parties relating to that agreement, such that SARMC came to believe that the agreement had 
been waived by MRIA. MRIA's counsel, at hearing, admitted that they had mistakenly sent out 
"contention" interrogatories to SARMC. Whatever the reason for the confusion, SARMC did 
respond to MRIA's "contention" interrogatories after setting forth its objections. 
The DM is persuaded that the parties should be treated exactly equally with 
respect to "contention" interrogatories. The DM does not assign blame to either side over the 
issue and the misunderstanding that resulted, but does believe that the parties should be placed on 
the same footing concerning these kinds of interrogatories. Accordingly, the DM orders that 
MRlA must answer Interrogatory Nos. 10-24. Such a ruling places the parties in parity and 
serves the interests of justice. 
2. RECORDS-RETENTION REQUESTS. SARMC has requested in Requests for 
Admission Nos. 24-29 that MRIA provide it with information regarding its records-retention 
policy, if any. MRIA refuses to do so on the basis of relevance since it points out that SARMC 
does not have a claim against MRIA for spoliation of evidence. MRIA seems to make the 
argument that any inquiries to it about its document-retention policy is per se irrelevant since 
SARMC has not asserted a claim for spoliation. 
Under the broad latitude permitted under Rule 26(b), I.R.C.P., the parties to 
litigation may pose questions, the answers to which would perhaps be irrelevant under 
evidentiary standards applicable to trial evidence. If the answers sought could be reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the questions and answers thereto are 
allowed. Using this standard, the DM believes and therefore finds that it is possible that 
a 
information relating to MRIA's written document-retention policy, if any, could lead to the 
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discovery of admissible evidence. Accordingly, the DM finds and orders that the Requests for 
Admission Nos. 24-29 must be answered by MRIA. 
3. THE 40-INTERROGATORY RULE UNDER RULE 33(a), I.R.C.P. MRIA has 
refused to answer Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 propounded by SARMC on the grounds that SARMC 
has exceeded the limit of 40 interrogatories allowed under Rule 33(a), I.R.C.P. MRIA asserts, 
through counsel that, according to its count, SARMC has exceeded 60 interrogatories when the 
subparts contained within the interrogatories are taken into account. SARMC contends that even 
with a liberal application of the subpart rule, it is still comfortably under the 40-interrogatories 
limit. 
Counsel for SARMC argued that courts, in considering this issue in the past, have 
adopted what he termed as a "common sense" rule. If an interrogatory contains within it discrete 
subparts seeking different categories of information, each subpart should be counted. However, 
an interrogatory may still be only seeking one basic fact, which could include subparts (for 
example, names, addresses, telephone numbers). 
The DM has now reviewed the interrogatories cited by MRIA as containing in excess of 
the 40-interrogatory rule: 
According to the DM'S count, SARMC had, including subparts, propounded 38 
interrogatories to MRIA in their First through Fourth sets of interrogatories. The Fifth set of 
interrogatories includes Interrogatories 10-24 which are the "contention" interrogatories referred 
to above and which the DM has found that MRIA must answer in order to bring it into parity 
with SARMC. Those "contention" interrogatories, when subparts are counted, actually contain 
an additional 29 interrogatories. Accordingly, the DM will not order MRIA to answer any 
REPORT OF DISCOVERY MASTER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FIFTH SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND FOURTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, P. 5 
further interrogatories beyond those required in responding to the "contention" interrogatories 
Nos. 10-24. SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatories 26-28 is denied. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the DM finds as follows: 
1. SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 10-24, the 
"contention" interrogatories is granted; 
2. SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 24-29 is 
granted; 
3. SARMC's Motion to Compel Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 26-28 is denied. 
DATED this -t/3L. ?P ay of June, 2007. 
Discovery Master V 
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. I 
Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") respond 
to MRI Associates, LLP's ("MRIA") Motion in Limine re: SARMC's Beliefs About Legality of 
Withdrawal from MRIA as follows: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a Motion in Limine corollary to its Motion in Limine re: Advice of Counsel, MRIA 
seeks to preclude Saint Alphonsus from submitting any evidence it believed it had regarding the 
legal right to withdraw from MRIA. MRIA asserts such evidence is not relevant and that Saint 
Alphonsus should be precluded from presenting such evidence because it did not allow MRIA's 
counsel to inquire into the issue at depositions or through other discovery. The Court should 
reject MRIA's arguments because Saint Alphonsus' belief that it had the right to withdraw from 
MRIA is relevant in light of MRIA's breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing claims. Evidence of such belief rebuts MRIA's assertion Saint 
Alphonsus somehow acted in bad faith and breached its fiduciary duties to MRIA, as well as the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Further, MRIA mischaracterizes Saint Alphonsus' 
position on this issue, as well as Ms. Bruce's deposition testimony. 
In the current Motion in Limine, MRIA seeks to leverage Saint Alphonsus' proper 
assertion of the attorneylclient privilege into a basis for precluding testimony at trial. The Court 
should reject MRIA's arguments and deny the Motion in Limine. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Saint Alphonsus' Belief that It Had the Legal Right to Withdraw Is Relevant. 
As Saint Alphonsus has repeatedly pointed out in response to MRIA's Motions in 
Limine, MRIA has asserted counterclaims that call Saint Alphonsus' actions leading up to 
dissociation into question. Saint Alphonsus must be allowed to explain its actions given the 
counterclaims against it. Saint Alphonsus' is not seeking to introduce evidence of the advice its 
counsel gave, but it should be entitled to introduce evidence that it held the belief it had the right 
to withdraw. This evidence is necessary to provide the proper context for Saint Alphonsus' 
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actions. MRIA should not be allowed to broaden the issues in this litigation by asserting 
numerous counterclaims on one hand, and then arguing Saint Alphonsus cannot present evidence 
that serves to rebut those claims on the other. 
B. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37 Does Not Bar Admission of Evidence Establishing 
Saint Alphonsus Believed It Had the Right to Withdraw. 
Sandra Bruce, Saint Alphonsus' CEO, testified at her deposition that her understanding of 
the MRIA Partnership Agreement was based upon her own reading of it and the advice of 
counsel. Ms. Bruce further testified she believed Saint Alphonsus had the legal right to 
dissociate. Deposition of Sandra Bruce, p.286 1. 18 - p. 287 1. 5 (Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller 
("Miller Affidavit") at Exhibit A). 
When MRIA's counsel pressed Ms. Bruce for her understanding of the legal basis for the 
right to withdraw, Ms. Bruce testified her belief was based upon advice from her legal counsel 
who directed her not to answer further questions on the topic based on the attomeylclient 
privilege. Specifically, Ms. Bruce testified: 
Q. (BY MR. BANDUCCI) All right. Let me make sure that this is clear 
on the record. Are you taking the position that your understanding of your right 
to withdraw was based on advice of counsel? 
A. It was based on my reading the agreement and the advice of counsel. 
Q. Okay. All right. So let's talk about what it is that you read in the 
agreement that caused you to believe that you had the right to withdraw. And 
you're referring - 
A. l'm afraid the answer I'm going to give is information that I've 
gleaned from legal counsel. 
(Deposition of Sandra Bruce, p. 287 11.13-25 (Miller Affidavit at Exhibit A).) 
Saint Alphonsus' counsel instructed Ms. Bruce not to answer any questions that would 
reveal information protected by the attorneylclient privilege. Id. MRIA then sought to compel 
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Ms. Bruce to answer this line of questions, and Saint Alphonsus sought a protective order. The 
Court ruled in favor of Saint Alphonsus. See Memorandum Decision on 
DefendantsICounterclaimants' Motion to Compel, Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for 
Protective Order ("Memorandum Decision"), dated April 17,2006, p. 12. 
Saint Alphonsus' position is simple. Ms. Bruce believed Saint Alphonsus had the right to 
withdraw, and she testified to this at her deposition. She should be allowed to testify consistent 
with her deposition at trial. When pressed by MRIA's counsel at her deposition, Ms. Bruce 
simply explained she could not separate her understanding of the Partnership Agreement and the 
existence of Saint Alphonsus' right to withdrawal from legal counsel's advice on these issues. 
The Court has already found Saint Alphonsus properly asserted the attorneylclient privilege on 
these issues. Memorandum Decision, pp. 10-14. At trial, if MRIA puts on evidence of, or 
inquires into, the business reasons or facts and circumstances for Saint Alphonsus' withdrawal, 
Saint Alphonsus must be allowed to respond with the information it disclosed in discovery. 
Moreover, if MRIA opens the door at trial and seeks to imply that Saint Alphonsus' counsel told 
it that it did not have the right to withdraw, Saint Alphonsus must be allowed to rebut this. 
Saint Alphonsus is therefore entitled to inform the jury of its belief it had the right to 
dissociate consistent with Ms. Bruce's deposition. Saint Alphonsus continues to assert privilege 
on the issues of interpreting the MRLA Partnership Agreement and its counsel's advice regarding 
its legal right to withdraw from MRIA. Saint Alphonsus does not intend to offer any testimony 
on the issue beyond the testimony Ms. Bruce offered at her deposition, unless MRIA opens the 
door on this issue. If a witness offers testimony at trial beyond that offered at Ms. Bruce's 
deposition on these issues, then MRlA can object and the Court can rule on the issue then. 
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C. Evidence Saint Alphonsus Believed it Had the Legal Right to Withdraw is Relevant 
and Does Not Violate Rule 403. 
Ms. Bruce's testimony is relevant to show Saint Alphonsus did not breach any fiduciary 
duty or act in bad faith in withdrawing. MRIA has asserted numerous counterclaims that bring 
Saint Alphonsus' conduct prior to dissociation into issue. In light of these claims, Saint 
Alphonsus is entitled to explain its actions leading up to dissociation. This is not improper 
testimony, and it will not waste time, mislead or confuse the jury or improperly prejudice MRIA. 
It is relevant evidence the jury needs to have to understand the parties' actions leading up to this 
lawsuit and to determine the factual issues in dispute. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests the Court deny 
MRIA's Motion in Limine seeking to preclude it from submitting any evidence Saint Alphonsus 
believed it had the right to dissociate from MRIA. 
DATED this L & d a y  of June 2007. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Saint Alphonsus 
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ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. I 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Motion in Limine, MRIA seeks a legal ruling from the Court regarding the 
meaning of Idaho Code section 53-3-404(e). MRIA petitions the Court to determine the precise 
legal meaning of this Section that provides, "[a] partner does not violate a duty or obligation 
under this act or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers 
the partner's own interest." MRIA fears Saint Alphonsus may rely on this Idaho Code Section to 
explain its votes against MRIA's expansion and to defend against MRIA's breach of fiduciary 
duty claims. Put simply, MRIA fears the power of this Section and asks the Court to vitiate the 
plain words of the Statute. This is a legal issue on which the Court will instruct the jury at the 
proper time and is not a proper matter for a motion in Iimine. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. MRIA Raises a Legal Question Properly Addressed in the Court's J3inal 
Instructions to the Jury. 
MRIA has alleged Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duties and failed to act 
consistent with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Both of these claims are factual 
intensive questions within the province of the finder of fact; in this case, the jury. The jury, of 
course, will be guided by the Court's instructions on the law. The law of fiduciary duty 
regarding partnerships in Idaho is codified in Idaho Code 3 53-3-404. At trial, the Court will 
advise the jury on the legal scope of duties one partner owes to another, to and including the 
impact of Idaho Code 3 53-3-404. The parties will not be submitting evidence to the jury on the 
meaning of this code section. The Motion in Limine, therefore, is not the proper procedural 
vehicle to address the legal scope of duties as defined in § 53-3-404 and its subparts. 
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By seeking a Motion in Limine excluding any evidence of Saint Alphonsus' interests or 
explanation for why Saint Alphonsus did what it did, MRIA essentially seeks summary judgment 
on its fiduciary duty claim. Once again, because of the factual intensive nature of MRIA's 
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and claims of the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, full factual exploration of these issues is necessary. MRIA essentially tries to turn this 
Motion in Limine into a motion for summary judgment, which motion not only comes too late, 
but also fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding such claims. 
B. The Plain Language of Section 53-3-404(e) Allowed Saint Alphonsus to Pursue Its 
Own Self Interest. 
Under Section 53-3-404(e), a partner may legitimately pursue self-interest and not solely 
the interest of the partnership and the other partners. In determining the meaning of this 
Section, it is important to note that the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the 
starting point of any statutory interpretation is the literal word of the statute. In determining 
meaning of the statute, the court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms used. 
Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence. 
D & M Country Estate Homeowners Ass h v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 165, 59 P.3d 965, 970 
(2002) (internal citations omitted). Saint Alphonsus submits that Idaho Code § 53-3-404(e) 
clearly states that unlike a trustee, a partner in a partnership may act in the partner's own interest 
and not solely for the benefit of the partnership. 
MRIA appears to contend in this case that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duty by 
voting against growth initiatives for MRI Mobile. In essence, MRIA argues Saint Alphonsus 
should have acquiesced to the majority opinions of the MRIA partners. In fact, the issue is moot 
in light of the fact Saint Alphonsus only had two of ten votes on the Board of Partners and could 
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not block expansion. Nevertheless, in light of the fact MRIA contends Saint Alphonsus breached 
its fiduciary duty by voting its interest, the right under Idaho Code 3 53-3-404(e) for Saint 
Alphonsus to act in its own interest is important. This code section recognizes that a partner may 
not always have the exact same interest as the partnership and does not need to subjugate that 
interest to the interest of the other partners. 
C. Section 53-3-404(e) Recognizes That A Partner Need Not Harm Itself in Order to 
Benefit the Partnership. 
In a general partnership of lawyers, there may be occasions where the interests of the firm 
as a whole differ from one of the partners. For example, frequently a law firm has the 
opportunity to bring in an additional lawyer who has expertise in a particular area of law. While 
bringing in an additional lawyer with expertise may benefit the firm as a whole, it may adversely 
impact the practice of a current partner of the law firm who practices in the same area of law as 
the potential new lawyer. Section 53-3-404(e) allows that partner to vote in favor of the 
partner's own interest rather than in favor of the partnership's interest as a whole. 
Section 404(e) recognizes a partner does not have to suffer harm or give up rights just 
because the majority of the partnership wants that partner to do so. Section 404(e) recognizes 
Saint Alphonsus had the right to try to protect its relationship with a valued resource (i.e., the 
relationship with Gem State Radiology) rather than to threaten GSR with its contract unless GSR 
gave in to MRIA's demands on the terms on which GSR could join MRIA and that MRIA would 
take control of the MRI component of the downtown imaging center. Likewise, Section 404(e) 
recognizes Saint Alphonsus had the right to vote against the expansion of MRI Mobile. This is 
particularly true when Saint Alphonsus had only two of ten votes on the Board of Partners of 
MRIA. 
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D. The Enea v. Superior Court Case Involved Much Different Facts and is 
Distinguishable. 
MRIA cites the California Court of Appeals case of Enea v. Superior Court, 132 
~ a l . ~ ~ ~ . 4 "  1559, 1566, 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 518 (Cal. App. 6" Dist. 2005). Enea is obviously 
not controlling law in Idaho and this Court must examine Section 404(b) and reach its own 
conclusions about the proper interpretation of that Section. As explained below, the Sixth 
District California Court of Appeals took a narrow view of Section 404(e). Nevertheless, the 
Enea case is distinguishable from the present case. In the Enea case, a partner who had control 
of the partnership assets tried to excuse his self dealing by claiming he was entitled to pursue his 
self interest. Clearly, the intent of Section 404(e) was not intended to excuse use of partnership 
property for a controlling partner's own benefit at less than fair market value. 
In addition to the fact that the Enea case is factually distinguishable from the present 
circumstances, and if the Court sees fit to look beyond the plain words of the statute, the Court 
should also note that the scope of Section 404(e) has been debated. The fact is, Section 404(e) 
did modify the common law duties of a partner in a partnership. See Hillman, Vestal, and 
Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Section 404, (Westlaw 2006 ed.) ("Potentially, 
one of the most powerf'ul changes in partnership law under RUPA is embodied in Section 404(e) 
. There are two very different interpretations of the provision, one rather narrow and the other 
quite broad."). Hillman, et al., go on to discuss the possibly conflicting interpretations of RUPA 
Section 404(e). Under the narrow interpretation, Section 404(e) is "essentially an evidentiary 
rule which could he paraphrased as 'the fact that a partner directly personally benefits from the 
partner's conduct in the partnership context does not, without more, establish a violation of the 
partner's duties or obligations under RUPA or the partnership agreement.' " Id. 
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Hillman et al., go on to posit that under the broad interpretation, "Section 404(e) means 
that partners are free to pursue their short-term, individual self-interest . . . subject only to the 
specific restrictions contained in the Section 404(b) duty of loyalty-in effect that the pursuit of 
self-interest cannot be a violation of the non-fiduciary obligation of good faith and fair dealing." 
Id. Hillman, et al., conclude that an examination of the Section's historical context and 
development "seem to favor the broader reading." Id. 
Although the full extent of Section 404(e) may be open to debate, it is clear that that 
Section does not mandate that a partner put the partnership's interests above that partner's 
interests where to do so would harm that partner's interests unrelated to the partnership. Clearly, 
a partner cannot take partnership property without compensation to the partnership and justify it 
consistent with the partner's own self interest. On the other hand, the partner is not obligated to 
suffer harm simply to advantage the partnership. Simply put, a partner is entitled to express that 
partner's views and vote its partnership share consistent with its own interest. When entrusted 
with partnership property, however, the partner cannot justify using that property to that 
partner's own benefit under the theory the partnership allows the partner to act in its own 
interest. 
111. CONCLUSION 
The scope of instructions of the law on fiduciary duty will be a significant topic of 
discussion at a later stage in this litigation. The proper interpretation of Section 404(e) is not, 
however, a matter affecting the evidence that can be admitted in this case. For this reason, and 
the other reasons expressed in this Response, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests that the 
Court deny MRIA's Motion in Limine Re: SARMC Promotion of Its Own Best Interests as a 
Defense to its Fiduciary Duty Breaches. 
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DATED this &day of June 2007. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Saint Alphonsus 
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Thomas A. Banducci 
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EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW 
McKLVEEN & JONES 
11 11 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile (208) 344-8542 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1800 
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Facsimile (208) 336-0448 
Jack S. Gjording 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
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Attorneys for Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem 
State Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSFIED CARE, ) 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, ) 





MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, 1 
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INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, ) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; ) 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho ) 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING ) 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho ) 
limited liability partnership, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendants. 1 
COME NOW Third Party Defendants Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this Response to 
MRIA's Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Civil 
Conspiracy Cause of Action. MRM makes a valiant attempt to resuscitate this cause of action, 
but there is simply no life left in this claim. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Even at this late date and at this advanced stage of the proceedings, MRIA does not appear 
to be able to state clearly to the Court what bad acts and what conspiracy it is alleging. On the 
one hand, it points to the execution of the Operating Agreement for IMI between SARMC and 
GSR, which has an effective date of July 1,2001. Apparently recognizing that any claims against 
Third Party Defendants arising &om that action are barred by the statute of limitations, MRIA 
then changes its focus and asserts that the relevant action was the opening of the Meridian IMI 
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IMI facility in June of 2002. But it has to admit that this act was done in furtherance of the 
allegedly wrongful agreement contained in the July 2001 Operating Agreement, so the statute of 
limitations still applies. 
One of the few facts that MRIA does have correct is that as early as 1999 SARMC and 
GSR were discussing a joint venture in IMI. MRIA knew all about this fact as its agent, David 
Giles, M.D., was the initiator and leader of the discussions in GSR at the same time as he was a 
primary member of Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., the partner of MRIA. 
Third Party Defendants would refer the Court to its discussion of Dr. Giles' knowledge 
about and leadership in GSR's efforts to join with the hospital in IMI, which is contained in Third 
Party Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
"Interference with Existing Contractual Relationship" Claim at pp. 3-15 and the accompanying 
Affidavit of Warren E. Jones containing copies of the documents evidencing Dr. Giles' leading 
role. 
What MRIA also fails to remind the Court in this factual discussion is that MRIA was also 
involved in these discussions to try to form a joint venture. Most importantly, what MRIA fails 
to mention in this discussion is that the joint venture between SARMC and GSR involved only 
the non-MRI side of MI ,  so no "conflict of interest" arose. 
The Operating Agreement of MI ,  Exhibit G to the Reinhardt Affidavit, is absolutely clear 
on this point that Saint Alphonsus was not a partner in the MRI side. Page 1 of the Operating 
Agreement states: 
The company owns and operates both the MRI and non-MRI 
medical imaging business at 927 Myrtle Street, Boise, Idaho, and 
receives the technical component from the medical imaging. The 
physicians of ICR provide the medical services for the company's 
operations and receive the professional component from the 
medical imaging. The company maintains separate financial 
statements for each operation. Certain administrative, lease and 
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other expenses are allocated between the two operations as 
provided in Section 12.8, 13.3 and 13.4. Diversified Care 
[SARMC] is acquiring a 50 percent interest in the non-MRI 
operation of the company under this agreement. This agreement, 
which sets forth the terms and conditions of the ownership, 
operation and management of the non-MRI portion of the 
company's operations, does not apply to ICR's ownership, 
operation and management of the MRI operation. Profits, losses 
and distributions from the non-MRI operation are allocated equally 
between ICR and Diversified Care, and for the MRI operation 
entirely to ICR. ICR will continue to own a 100 percent interest in 
the MRI operation of the company until Diversified Care acquires 
a 50 percent interest in the MRI operations provided in Section 
7.3.2. If and when Diversified Care acquires a 50 percent interest 
in the MRI operation, this agreement will apply to the ownership 
operation and management and non-MRI operations of the 
company. 
Thus, there is no question that SARMC was not involved in the MRI side as part of this operating 
agreement and thus there can be no wrongful conduct. 
Just as Dr. Giles had previously participated in the non-MRI side of IMI in order not to 
violate his non-compete with MRIA and not to violate any of his fiduciary duties to MRIA, so too 
was SARMC only involved in the same non-MRI portion of IMI Giles was involved in. Thus, 
Third Party Defendants could hardly be accused of engaging in a civil conspiracy to commit a 
wrongful act by joint venturing with SARMC in the non-MRI portion of IMI when, by definition, 
SARMC was excluded from any conflict of interest by not being allowed to participate in the 
MRI side. If Dr. Giles was committing no wrongful act, SARMC could hardly be considered to 
commit a wrongfhl act for doing the same thing. 
11. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. MRIA's Claims Are Barred By the Statute of Limitations. 
MRIA appears to acknowledge that there is a four year statute of limitations applicable to 
its claim. Third Party Defendants were not even brought into this case until March 7, 2006, 
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which is the first time that a civil conspiracy cause of action was pled. There can be no "relation 
back" to any earlier date as Third Party Defendants were not even part of the lawsuit until March 
of 2006. Thus, any actions prior to March 7, 2002 simply cannot be a basis for its claim and 
MRIA specifically has admitted that SARMC and Third Party Defendants entered into the 
Operating Agreement and the agreement to open the Meridian Center by July 1, 2001. Thus, 
MRIA's cause of action is time barred. 
The Court should also remember that Dr. Giles is the one who pushed GSR to expand into 
Meridian and indeed had helped to locate and purchase the specific Meridian property. See Jones 
Affidavit, Exhibits 23 and 24. 
B. MRIA Has Not Proven Damages. 
One of the required elements in a civil conspiracy cause of action is proof that damages 
were caused by the alleged conspiracy. MRIA was obligated to point to evidence in the record to 
establish aprima facie case of civil conspiracy, including the damages element. As the Court will 
note, MRIA did not even respond to the point. MRIA thus has failed to come forward on an 
essential element of its claim and summary judgment must be granted. 
The reason MRIA did not come forward with any proof is because it has no proof that any 
specific damages were caused by this alleged civil conspiracy. Nowhere in its expert reports is 
there any discussion of the amount of damages allegedly caused by this civil conspiracy, nor any 
discussion of the issue of causation. 
C. There is No Valid Claim For Civil Consviracv Here. 
Despite the smoke and mirrors MRIA has been utilizing for the past year, the Court has 
recognized the factual inadequacies and conceptual failures of the MRIA case. This claim of civil 
conspiracy has even less substance than most of MRIA's other claims which the Court has 
dismissed or MRIA has recently abandoned. There is simply no proof of any ameement between 
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GSR and SARMC to accomplish an unlawful objective or accomplish an objective in an unlawful 
manner. Saint Alphonsus' participation in the joint venture was specifically limited to eliminate 
any potentially unlawful aspects by precluding SARMC from participating in the MRI portion of 
the imaging center just as Dr. Giles had previously done. Certainly, GSR could not know, 
especially based on its experience with Dr. Giles, that allowing a member of MRL4 to participate 
only in the non-MRI side of the imaging center could be considered unlawful. As Dr. Giles' 
participation was not a conspiracy to allow him to breach his contractual and fiduciary duties to 
MRlA, how can it be argued by MRIA that somehow SARMC doing the same thing - 
participating only in the non-MRI side - was wrong. There is absolutely no proof that Third Party 
Defendants had any knowledge of or understanding that the Operating Agreement or the opening 
of the Meridian center was an illegal act. Indeed, in fact it was not. 
111. CONCLUSION 
MRIA's claim is barred by the statute of limitations and by the fact that it has not come 
forward with any proof regarding damages, which is an essential element of itsprima facie case. 
More importantly, it has not come forward with any evidence of a plan or agreement to commit 
illegal acts, as is required by the Idaho Supreme Court. See Mannos vs. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 
935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007); McPheters vs. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317,321 
(2003). Even if MRlA were not estopped by the knowledge and actions of its agent, Dr. Giles, 
from raising this claim, the claim is not supported by any facts in the record. 
Dated this m a y  of June, 2007 
By: 
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THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MRLA'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
PAGE 8 
/ 
[ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 388-1300 
David W. Lloyd 
Saetrum Law Offices 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
/' 
[ 4 US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-0448 
Warren E. Jones 
Neil D. McFeeley 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW, 
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liability partnership, 
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INTERMOUNTAlN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COME NOW Third Party Defendants, Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this Memorandum in 
Opposition to M u ' s  Motion in Limine Re Investments by Members of DMR. 
MRIA asks the Court to prevent SARMC from introducing relevant evidence regarding the 
investments by and financial status of members of DMR. Not only is such information relevant, it 
is critical for the jury to hear and understand. 
Doctors' Magnetic Resonance, Inc. (DMR) is one of the partners of MRIA. The member 
physicians are critical players in the MRIA saga. They are the ones who pushed Saint Alphonsus to 
fiind an MRI center, who convinced SARMC to exclude other physician investors and who profited 
enormously from the distributions and management fees from the venture. They will be critical 
witnesses both for MRIA and for Third Party Defendants. 
It is essential, therefore, that the jury know the entire story. It is essential that the jury know 
about the economic realities that shape those physicians' decision-making. It is essential that the 
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jury understand the entire picture in order to judge the credibility of those physicians. It is essential 
that the jury know that those physicians not only make huge profits from MRI Center, and this may 
be their dominant motive, in contradiction to their expressed statements that their actions were 
motivated by considerations of patient care in the Treasure Valley. 
MRIA has attempted to argue throughout this case that the radiologists of GSR opened IMI 
solely for financial reasons. MRIA asserts that the radiologists were frustrated that they were 
precluded from the profits arising from the technical side and therefore induced SARMC to breach 
its agumentt with MRIA to start IMI. Certainly, Third Party Defendants have the right to make the 
reciprocal agreement that the DMR members were not motivated by patient care considerations but 
instead are mostly retired physicians whose economic well being is dependent largely upon the 
success of MRIA. 
The jury is entitled to hear both sides and know that the DMR members have large financial 
stakes in this litigation and those stakes may be the motive for the allegations they are making 
against Third Party Defendants. The jury should be allowed to weigh all this evidence. 
This evidence of the DMR physicians' investments and financial status is therefore highly 
relevant to their credibility on the witness stand. Indeed, it would be unfair and prejudicial to 
prevent Third Party Defendants from eliciting testimony about the physicians' financial situation on 
cross-examination. 
Third Party Defendants respectfully request the Court to deny MRIA's Motion in Limine. 
Dated this -ay of June, 2007 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADNG, W o w ,  
MCKLVEEN & JONES, C m .  
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COME NOW the Third Party Defendants Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this Response to MRIA's 
Opposition to SARMC and Third Party Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment Re Antitrust 
Claims. 
MRIA is correct that Third Party Defendants and presumably SARMC have made efforts to 
move for summary judgment on every unsupported claim against them. This strategy includes 
moving for summary judgment on the antitrust claims which simply do not survive examination. 
Rather than pointing out the errors in MRIA's Opposition Brief and discussing the legal 
problems with MRIA's case, Third Party Defendants will rely on the responsive briefing by 
SARMC. Third Party Defendants will, however, once again note that there is significantly more 
competition in the Boise MRI market today than ever before. This is particularly true as compared 
to the 15 years that MRIA had a large share of the market until Third Party Defendants opened IMI 
to provide some real competition. It is unfortunate perhaps for MRIA and the multimillionaire 
members of DMR that they have had to face competition for the first time since MRI Center was 
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opened in 1985, but that is how the free market works. Simply because competition is effective and 
one competitor loses business does not implicate the antitrust laws. IMI, too, has had to face the 
increasing competition in the MRI market, especially from in-house scanning from orthopedic 
surgeons, neurosurgeons and neurologists with magnets in their offices. 
Third Party Defendants would also like to re-emphasize the fact that MRIA simply has not 
set out its alleged antitrust damages. Nowhere have its experts estimated any particular amount as 
the alleged damages arising from the claimed antitrust violations. This failure permeates MRIA's 
entire Third Party Complaint but it is critical in its antitrust claim because there is no guidance for 
the jury as to what damages can be considered antitrust damages. 
Based on the arguments advanced in its earlier briefing in support of its motion for summary 
judgment as well as on the arguments set out by SARMC, Third Party Defendants respectfully 
request the Court to grant summary judgment dismissing the antitrust claims. 
Dated this =day of June, 2007 
By: 
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M U  ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COME NOW Third Party Defendants Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this reply to MRIA's 
Opposition to Third Party Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the "interference 
with existing contractual relationship" claim. Third Party Defendants assert that MRIA has not 
come forward with any evidence that an issue of material fact remains to be determined. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The "Statement of Facts" in MRIA's brief should be retitled "Statement of Facts Which 
MRIA Would Like to See." There are, if not misrepresentations as to the record, statements of 
conjecture that are claimed to be facts. For example, MRIA states that as early as September 2001 
Third Party Defendants informed Shattuck Hammond of its desire that SARMC withdraw fiom 
MRIA. There is absolutely no evidence in the record for this statement. Third Party Defendants 
never informed anyone, including Shattuck Hammond, of any such purported desire and there is 
nothing in the record to support that statement. 
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Third Party Defendants were not "frustrated" because SARMC was still a partner in MRIA; 
Dr. Gobel may have been frustrated individually because SARMC still had not made a decision 
whether it was going to become a Eull partner in IMI. His frustration was over the non-resolution of 
the issue: See Exhibit K to Reinhardt Affidavit; Deposition testimony of Dr. Gobel: 
"It was over the hstration that our partner in non-MRI services 
had still not relieved itself of its non-compete to become a partner 
in our MRI services. . . . And we discussed - did not act on, but 
discussed options on how to resolve that conflict. 
Question: How to motivate the hospital? 
Answer: How to motivate the hospital." 
The Court will recall that all of the parties, including MRIA, had been engaged in discussions over 
several years on that very topic: how to make some arrangement whereby the hospital could 
participate in the MRI services of the imaging center. While GSR may have discussed various 
options, there is, contrary to the assertion of MRIA, absolutely no evidence or even suggestion that 
GSR informed SARMC of its discussion, much less of any threat that GSR might no longer do the 
hospital reads for the center. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence that any discussion within 
the Group ever contemplated breaching the hospital's Professional Services Agreement. 
MRIA has absolutely no evidence that SARMC ever "received that threat from the Third 
Party Defendant," (Brief at 4) as no such threat was ever made. It is important for the Court to 
review the entire discussion counsel for MRIA had with Dr. Gobel in his deposition regarding this 
topic. Dr. Gobel did state that GSR wished to have SARMC's situation resolved: either it should 
make some arrangements with MRIA to allow it to become a full partner in IMI including the MRI 
side, or the parties would go in a different direction. He never stated that the Group ever discussed 
stopping reading the images at MRI Center, and certainly did not state that GSR threatened to 
breach its Professional Services Agreement with the hospital. (See deposition, page 99, lines 6 
through 11.) Dr. Gobel specifically refuted any suggestion that GSR encouraged or motivated or 
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threatened SARMC to withdraw from the MRIA partnership, and MRIA's own counsel's words 
reinforce that: 
QUESTION: Do you understand what precipitated the hospital's 
decision to withdraw from the MRI partnership? . . . 
THE WITNESS: I don't. 
QUESTION: Okay. Did you ever have any discussions with 
anybody either at the hospital or in the radiology group where that 
topic was discussed? 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION: When you learned that the hospital had withdrawn 
from MRIA, were you surprised? 
ANSWER: It was news to me. So in that sense, it was a surprise, 
yes. 
QUESTION: Okay. But we talked before the break that actually 
there were some discussions that had occurred among the 
radiologists as to how the hospital might be motivated to get out of 
this non-compete, right? 
ANSWER: There was the hope of our group all along that the 
hospital would be able to participate in MRI services at IMI. That 
was nothing new. But in no wav did we trv and manipulate or 
motivate them to - 
QUESTION: And I'm not suaeestin~ that. I'm not sueaestine that. 
ANSWER: To remove themselves from some - from their other 
area of conflict. 
Gobel Deposition, Exhibit K to Reinhardt Affidavit, at page 110, line 19 through page 11 1 line 18. 
(Emphasis added) 
MRI counsel in the deposition reiterated that he was not suggesting that GSR attempted to 
manipulate or motivate the withdrawal, yet in its brief that is exactly what MRIA is now attempting 
to do despite the very clear record to the contrary. 
There is not one iota of evidence that even suggests that GSR contemplated breaching the 
hospital's Professional Services Agreement, much less that it ever communicated any such threat to 
SARMC. 
If all MRIA has to oppose summary judgment is unsupported assertions, inadmissible 
representations and misrepresented testimony as compared to the sworn testimony and evidence of 
record provided by the Third Party Defendants in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, then 
it is clear that MRIA has not borne its burden of coming forward with any evidence that would 
create an issue of fact. 
11. DAMAGES HAVE NOT BEEN PROVEN 
The Court should consider this conundrum. On the one hand, MRIA asserts that its 
damages calculation representing dissociation damages is valid even though its value is based on a 
valuation from November 6,2001 and includes damages from 1999 through 2001 for prior alleged 
wrongdoing. On the other hand, recognizing that the statute of limitations precludes it from making 
any claim for causes of action occurring prior to the withdrawal by SARMC in 2004, MRIA now 
states that that action is the basis for its claim against Third Party Defendants on the intentional 
interference cause of action. If the central action is the dissociation by SARMC, then any damages 
calculation based on valuation from November 2001 (or prior) simply is invalid and unhelpful. 
Therefore, MRIA's expert reports are worthless at least in defining damages allegedly arising from 
this cause of action and thus the essential element of proof of damages is lacking. 
There is another conundrum from which MRIA cannot extricate itself. That is the fact that 
its emphasis in its briefing is that the alleged threat (which was never even contemplated or 
certainly communicated) from Third Party Defendants to stop reading hospital images at the Center 
was of concern to SARMC (which has admitted it never received or heard of such a threat) because 
it would have the effect of "dramatically reducing [the Center's] profitability and value." Thus, 
MRIA is acknowledging that if GSR no longer performed the reads at the Center, the value of the 
Center would "dramatically" be reduced in value. This proves that the value of MRI Center is 
dependent upon the participation of GSR for the reading of the scans and thus any damages 
calculation performed by MRIA's experts should have taken this into account and should have 
taken into account the fact that MRIA itself terminated the services of GSR. MRIA cannot at one 
time assert that these (imaginary) threats by GSR to stop reading caused SARMC to dissociate 
because of its fear that the value of the Center would drop precipitously, yet ignore in its damages 
calculation the very fact that GSR was no longer reading images at the Center because it had been 
terminated by MRL4. The entire damages calculation - especially the lost profits argument - is 
invalid because it does not recognize the very fact that the value of the expected profits from the 
Center were strongly dependent upon the continued presence of GSR and its ability to draw in 
referring physicians. Once again, MRIA cannot have it both ways. 
111. THERE IS NO PROOF OF THE ELEMENTS OF WRONGFUL 
INTERFERENCE. 
MRIA, recognizing that any claims accruing before March 7, 2002 are barred under the 
limitations established in Idaho Code 5 5-224, has now narrowed its cause of action to the single 
question whether MI intentionally interfered with MRIA's Articles of Partnership by causing 
SARMC to wrongfully dissociate from MRIA on April 1,2004. 
The issue before the Court in this Motion for Summary Judgment is whether MRIA has 
come forward with admissible evidence that Third Party Defendants interfered with MRIA's 
Articles of Partnership and caused SARMC to wronghlly dissociate from MRIA, and whether 
MRIA has come forward with any evidence establishing damages resulting from the breach. No 
such evidence has been produced. 
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MRIA has produced absolutely no evidence that anything Third Party Defendants did 
"caused" SARMC to wrongfully dissociate. Indeed, the evidence produced by MRIA points to the 
opposition conclusion. Nowhere is there even a scintilla of evidence that SARMC decided to 
dissociate because of any action taken by Third Party Defendants. Nowhere is there any evidence 
that any "threat" by Third Party Defendants was made or was communicated to SARMC or that 
SARMC dissociated because of any threat. SARMC still had an enforceable contract with GSR to 
read hospital patient images. The testimony from the SARMC decisionmakers, which was cited in 
Third Party Defendants' opening brief, is to the contrary: they do not even recall discussing the 
issue of dissociation with Third Party Defendants before the decision to dissociate was made. 
MRIA points to documents from Shattuck Hammond Partners (Exhibits D and J to Affidavit 
of G. Rey Reinhardt). Exhibit J is a November 6, 2001 Strategic Options Assessment of MRI 
ownership interests which defines Saint Alphonsus' objectives: 
SARMC believes it is a strategic imperative to partner with its 
affiliated radiology group, Gem State Radiology (GSR), in pursuing 
outpatient and diagnostic imaging opportunities in SARMC's 
service area. 
The Partnership Agreement governing MRI Associates, GP 
( M U )  prohibits SARMC from having an investment in other MRI 
facilities. Saint Alphonsus desires to obtain control of the two 
magnets on its campus, which are operated by an affiliate of MRIA, 
MRI Center of Idaho, LP (MRICI). 
Upon obtaining control, Saint Alphonsus would like to 
merge the MRI operations on its campus with Intermountain Medical 
Imaging (MI), an outpatient imaging center formed by a joint 
venture between GSR and SARMC. Saint Alphonsus would like to 
continue to pursue additional imaging center opportunities within its 
service area through MI .  
In the Shattuck Hammond Partners Report of October 30, 2003 entitled "Overview of the 
Restructuring of MRIA Limited Partnership and the Simultaneous Merger of MRICI and IMI", 
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(Exhibit D to Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt), the same strategic rationale is presented. The report 
notes that Saint Alphonsus still believes that it is a "strategic imperative to partner with its affiliated 
radiology group, Gem State Radiology" in pursuing outpatient diagnostic imaging opportunities in 
the hospital service area and that while SARMC has been able to structure a joint venture in the 
imaging partnership with GSR, "the Partnership Agreement governing MRI Associates GP prohibits 
SARMC from having an investment in any competitive MRI facilities, which greatly restricts 
SARMC's ability to participate in IMI as a full partner." Id. at SARMC 06778. Furthermore, the 
report notes the objectives of Saint Alphonsus include gaining control of the campus magnets in 
order to merge the MRI operation with IMI to allow pursuit of additional imaging opportunities. (Id 
06782). It continues: 
SARMC believes this structure is required to align its interests 
with those of GSR. 
Continuing in a highly strained partnership which absorbs 
enormous senior resources in which SARMC does not have any 
controls, with a group of retired, adversarial clinicians has become 
unmanageable. 
Id. 
Those reports clearly express the reasons Saint Alphonsus dissociated from MRIA and its 
"retired, adversarial clinicians" in DMR: to advance its own interests in patient care. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate Saint Alphonsus acted due to any threat, pressure or interference 
by Third Party Defendants. Third Party Defendants did not cause this decision or even contribute 
to this decision and there is no proof to the contrary. 
The only provision in the Shattuck Hammond reports that MRIA points to is the comment 
that GSR has allegedly stated that "if a solution to the current MRICI dilemma cannot be found, it 
may no longer do the reads at the Center, dramatically reducing its profitability and value." Even if 
there were a basis for this unattributed statement, there is absolutely no time specified when GSR 
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"may" no longer do the reads at the Center for hospital patients and no indication it was 
communicated as a threat to SARMC or that SARMC acted because of it. GSR did have a 
Professional Services Contract with Saint Alphonsus to read scans fiom hospital patients, hut that 
contract was not for perpetuity. There was never any threat by GSR that it would breach that 
Professional Services Contract. There is also no evidence that GSR ever communicated to Saint 
Alphonsus that it might no longer do reads at the Center for hospital patients during the term of the 
Professional Services Contract. 
The only other evidence to which MRl points as evidence that Third Party Defendants 
somehow caused the dissociation is the testimony of Joseph Gobel, M.D. (Exhibit K to Affidavit of 
G. Rey Reinhardt). When the Court reads that deposition, specifically pages 95 through 100, it will 
note that Dr. Gobel did say that GSR discussed in a Group meeting various options regarding 
resolving the hospital's non-compete, hut all parties to this case discussed that issue. Dr. Gobel 
never suggested this discussion went beyond the Group itself, that GSR was prepared to breach its 
Professional Services Contract, or that GSR even wanted the hospital to dissociate from MRIA. 
There is thus absolutely no proof or suggestion that Third Party Defendants somehow "caused" the 
dissociation. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that it was Saint Alphonsus' dissatisfaction 
with DMR and MRIA and Saint Alphonsus' desire to proceed in a different direction &om the 
direction of MRIA and its retired adversarial clinicians that led the hospital to dissociate. 
The Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank vs. Bliss Vallq Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 
266, 284, 824 P.2d 841, 859 (1991), as well as more recently in Thirsty's, LLC vs. Tolerico, 143 
Idaho 48, 137 P.3d 435 (2006), has stated that the party alleging tortious interference has to show it 
was the intentional interference by the third party which caused the breach, not just dissatisfaction 
by the breaching party. Otherwise, any time a party to a contract breaches that contract in order to 
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pursue what it perceives to be a more profitable venture, the new venture would be liable for a 
claim for tortious interference. This is not the law in Idaho. 
MRIA also did not come forward with any evidence of what damages it had allegedly 
suffered as a result of the alleged intentional interference. As discussed in Third Party Defendants' 
opening brief and in other submissions to the Court, MRIA's damages experts have not even 
attempted to break down the overall claim of damages among the various causes of action. MRIA 
appears to be relying on the damages calculations of Messrs. Budge and Wilhoite despite the fact 
that the Court has dismissed certain claims and MRIA has voluntarily dismissed a great number of 
others. Thus, MRIA is still relying on the total amount of damages its experts found resulting from 
the combined "wrongdoing" asserted in each of the causes of action even though now the majority 
of those causes of action have been excised from the case. 
Indeed, MRIA's own brief, at 10-11, which cites its Opposition to Third Party Defendants' 
Motion to Exclude Experts, specifically notes that since 1999 SARMC had 
investigated ways to participate fully with IMI in its MRI and non- 
MIU operations [and] investigated various options for getting out 
from under the terms of the MRIA non-compete. One approach . . 
. was to withdraw from MRIA and join IMI to compete against 
MRIA. . . . SARMC was unwilling to pay the fair market value of 
MRICI . . . , and so chose the unlawful alternative - withdrawal - 
as an attempt to achieve its intended strategy of getting out of its 
obligations to MRIA and combining with MRI operations of IMI. 
If MRIA admits Saint Alphonsus since late 1999 had been considering withdrawal and chose on its 
own to withdraw because it was unwilling to pay the fair market value of MRI Center, how can 
MRIA now in good faith come before this Court to argue that it was Third Party Defendants who 
"caused" this dissociation? 
MRIA's claim is also barred by the doctrine of quasi estoppel, and MRIA's attempt to deny 
this fact is unavailing. MRIA cannot deny that David Giles, M.D., was its agent and on the MRIA 
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Board at the same time that he was encouraging and leading GSR in its decision to open an imaging 
center and involve Saint Alphonsus in that center. See the discussion and documents cited by Third 
Party Defendants in their opening memorandum and the Affidavit of Warren E. Jones submitted in 
support showing Dr. Giles' primary role in the creation of IMI and its relationship with the hospital. 
M I U  does not and cannot deny that it was Dr. Giles who recommended that Saint Alphonsus be a 
"silent partner" in the joint venture, that he led the effort to create IMI, that he was involved in 
finding and purchasing the real property for IMI and that he drafted the letter of intent regarding the 
IMI-Saint Alphonsus partnership in which the hospital was to be "as silent a partner" as possible. 
See Jones Affidavit, Exhibit 28. Dr. Giles and his MRIA partners should not now profit by 
complaining of the joint venture Dr. Giles encouraged the radiologists and Saint Alphonsus to 
create. 
111. CONCLUSION 
MRIA has not brought forward evidence to defeat Third Party Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on this claim. First of all, it has not shown intentional interference by any 
Third Party Defendant. Nowhere has it shown that the Third Party Defendants did anything to 
interfere with the existing contractual relationship defined in MRIA's Articles of Partnership. 
There is absolutely no evidence that GSR threatened to violate the Professional Services Contract or 
that any such alleged threat was communicated to Saint Alphonsus. MRIA has not come forward 
with any evidence that anything that Third Party Defendants did or did not do in any way "caused" 
SARMC to breach its contract with M U .  There is not one shred of evidence that any of the 
SARMC decisionmakers even considered any discussion, wish or "threat" from any Third Party 
Defendant in their decision to proceed with dissociation. The evidence is to the contrary: it shows 
that Saint Alphonsus had been dissatisfied with the retired, adversarial clinicians in DMR who had 
their own agenda and controlled MRIA. Third Party Defendants did not cause the dissociation; 
4 J 
DMR and MRIA caused Saint Alphonsus to be highly dissatisfied with the arrangement. That 
dissatisfaction went back many years before and could not be resolved despite the attempts of 
SARMC and Third Party Defendants to reach a reasonable agreement with MRIA and DMR. 
MRIA has not shown another required element of an intentional interference claim, that of 
damages arising from the conduct. Finally, it would be inequitable to allow MRIA to proceed with 
this cause of action in light of the knowledge and actions of its agent, David Giles, M.D. 
For these reasons, Third Party Defendants respectfully request the Court to dismiss the 
Fourteenth Claim for Relief. 
Dated this -ay of June, 2007 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, ) 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 1 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COME NOW the Third Party Defendants, Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and respond to MRIA's Motion to 
Strike IMI's Joinder in SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Lack of Proof of 
Damages Causation. 
MRIA is correct that the Court ordered that the parties submit all summary judgment 
motions no later than May 22, 2007. SARMC filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Lack of Proof of Damages Causation timely. Third Party Defendants filed their Motion to join 
SARMC's motion on May 25,2007. 
The critical point is that Third Party Defendants did not file a new Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment but simply filed a Motion to join the motion filed timely by SARMC. Third 
Party Defendants could hardly be expected to file the motion simultaneously with SARMC's. Third 
Party Defendants, after receipt of SARMC's motion, recognized its similar position and moved to 
join. This does not violate the Court's Scheduling Order. 
Just as importantly, MRIA is in no way prejudiced by Third Party Defendants' filing of the 
motion on May 25. MRIA need not and does not even make a separate response. Moreover, MRIA 
has admitted that it is in no way prejudiced in its own briefing. In MRIA's Opposition to SARMC's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Damage Causation, as well as in MRIA's Opposition to 
IMI's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing MRIA's First Amended Third Party Complaint on 
the basis that no damages have been proven, MRIA has asserted basically that all of these motions 
are nothing more than a rehash of what has been argued previously. If these motions previously 
filed by MRIA or SARMC are duplicative, there is nothing new in SARMC's Joinder and there is 
no harm in allowing Third Party Defendants to join SARMC's motion. 
Third Party Defendants did not file a new motion after the Court's deadline but only filed 
Notice of Joinder in SARMC's timely filed motion. Moreover, MRIA is in no way prejudiced by 
the May 25, 2007, filing. Accordingly, Third Party Defendants respectfully request the Court to 
deny MRIA's Motion to Strike their Joinder in SARMC's motion. 
Dated this luy of June, 2007 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served on the following individual(s)/entity(ies), by the method indicated, 
and addressed as follows: 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, PA 
950 West Bannock, Suite 900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Patrick J. Miller 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 3 19-260 1 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC 
509 West Hays Street 
Post Office Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 388-1300 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-9177 
David W. Lloyd 
Saetrum Law Offices 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-0448 
Warren E. Jones 
Neil D. McPeeIey 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW, 
MCKLVEEN &JONES, CHTD 
1111 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
ISB No. 1193 
ISB No. 3564 
Attorneys for Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem 
State Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, ) 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, ) 






MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, ) 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, 1 
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INTERMOUNTACN MEDICAL IMAGING, ) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 1 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho ) 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING ) 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho ) 
limited liability partnership, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendants. 1 
COME NOW the Third Party Defendants, Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and respond to MRIA's Opposition to 
SARMC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Damage Causation. 
The current Motion is different from both the motions to exclude MRIA's expert witnesses 
under IRCP 26 and IRE 702, as well as Third Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
dismissing MRIA's First Amended Third Party Complaint on the basis that no damages have been 
proven. Each of the motions has its own independent basis in support. Third Party Defendants find 
it humorous that MRLA is complaining to this Court about the "onslaught of motions" raised by the 
various parties. Third Party Defendants would remind the Court that it was MRLA who brought in 
these Third Party Defendants in order to gain access to more pockets from which to extort damages. 
Third Party Defendants would also remind the Court of the developments a year ago when Third 
Party Defendants, brought in a year aRer the case had been filed, were deluged by an onslaught of 
discovery demands and other motions before Third Party Defendants had even had a chance to 
(il 




analyze the issues in the case. Third Party Defendants would suggest the Court should have no 
sympathy for MRIA's complaints now that the shoe is on the other foot. 
The essential fact critical to the present motion is that a plaintiff does have an obligation to 
prove causation of the damages alleged and MRIA has not done that. It has created a huge damages 
number in the hope that it can get that number before the jury and get the jury to award even 10 
percent of that number. Not only has MRIA failed to allocate the portion of the damages allegedly 
due to any specific cause of action, it has also failed to prove that any of the Third Party 
Defendants' actions actually caused damages. 
Nowhere has SARMC or Third Party Defendants argued that all of MRIA's losses were 
exclusively caused by the termination of Gem State Radiology by MRIA in January 2005. Instead, 
SARMC and Third Party Defendants have pointed to what has already been recognized by this 
Court, that Third Party Defendants had an absolute right to open IMI in 1999 in direct competition 
with MRI Center. They have also pointed to what the Court has noted as well: There are multiple 
MRI providers in the market which are taking MRIA's expected scans. Physicians who previously 
referred their patients to MRI Center are now referring their patients to their own in-house scanners. 
Competition is increasing, not just for MRI Center but for IMI as well. Yet MRIA's damage 
calculations do not take this into consideration and instead assume MRI Center's lost scans were 
caused by IMI. 
As is clear from the evidence cited in earlier briefings, the major cause of lost scans to the 
Center was MRIA's own doing: it terminated GSR from reading outpatient scans at the Center in 
January 2005. Numerous referring physicians who recognized the quality of the GSR radiologists 
naturally followed the GSR physicians. Indeed, the Shattuck Hamrnond reports which MRIA relied 
upon for so much of its argument in different circumstances, specifically recognized this fact. 
Those reports state that if GSR no longer does the reads for the MRI Center, this would 





"dramatically [reduce] its profitability and value." (See October 30, 2003 Overview of the 
Restructuring of MRIA Limited Partnership, Exhibit D to Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support 
of MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants in the 
Interference with Existing Contractual Relationship Claim at page 2.). MRIA relies on this analysis 
when it suits its purpose, but ignores that analysis in its response to the current motion. If MRI 
Center's value and profitability derived from the fact that GSR radiologists were doing the reading, 
then its termination of the GSR radiologists must have had a substantial impact. Its experts do not 
take that fact into consideration when calculating damages and thus fail to comply with the 
requirement of establishing causation. 
Thus, it is not just "affidavits from a handful of referring physicians that testified that they 
refer patients to IMI because they like the radiologists reading for IMI," (MRIA's Opposition at 
p.2), but the Shattuck Hammond reports MRIA gives so much credence to in other contexts as well 
as other evidence of record that support the fact that a large part of the loss of scans was caused by 
MRIA's own actions in terminating GSR. The bulk of the remainder of the loss of scans before 
2005 were caused by competition that the Court has found was proper. 
MRIA also misrepresents to the Court other important facts. It attempts to suggest to the 
Court that U.S. Bank's financing for IMI was "contingent" upon the hospital's participation. This is 
completely inaccurate. IMI received financing without partnering with the hospital or any 
contribution from the hospital. Instead, the bank relied on the personal guarantees of the various 
radiologists - including the guarantee of David Giles, who as the Court knows was at the same time 
a member of D M . .  See Affidavit of Warren E. Jones. MRIA's argument on this point is based on 
"evidence" that MRIA well knows is invalid andlor misleading. It first points to a typographical 
error in GSR Minutes which should readjnancing is "not" contingent upon hospital participation 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO MRIA'S OPPOSITION TO SARMC'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY RE DAMAGE 
CAUSATION 
PAGE 4 
in IMI as has been pointed out in depositions and by the fact that financing went through without 
the hospital. 
MRIA also makes a major point that SARMC provided IT support to M I .  What MRIA fails 
to acknowledge is that M I  paid for the IT support just as it would have paid any other third party 
vendor. There is no evidence that IMI received any better deal from SARMC than it would have 
from any other commercial vendor. 
Pattie Harneck, who worked for the SARMC IT Department and who is quoted by MRIA in 
.. 
its brief, was deposed recently. She specifically testified that IMI was a customer of SARMC, as 
was MRI Center, and they were treated the same as far as pricing or other IT services. (Harneck 
deposition, Exhibit A to Reinhardt Affidavit, pp. 80-81.) She specifically stated that IMI was given 
no preferential treatment over MRI Center and that IMI was charged for its use of the PACS 
system. Id. Leslie Kelly Hall, the Chief Information Officer of SARMC, also testified that she was 
unaware of any benefit IMI obtained by hiring SARMC to provide IT support as compared to any 
other vendor of IT services other than some slight "hospital knowledge" which was not actually 
useful to IMI. (Kelly Hall Deposition at p. 143-144, Exhibit D to Reinhardt Affidavit). 
MRIA also fails to mention that during the bulk of a great majority of the events mentioned, 
its own agent, David Giles, M.D., was participating in and indeed leading GSR in developing IMI 
and encouraging the participation of SARMC. It fails to mention that Dr. Giles' solution to his 
potential conflict of interest with MRIA was to participate financially only in the non-MRI side of 
M I ,  even though he was privy to any discussions about the MRI side as well. Again, this appears 
to be acceptable to MRIA when Dr. Giles does it but somehow takes on wrongful characteristics 
when SARMC participates in the non-MRI side. 
The law is clear that damages must be shown with reasonable certainty. The evidence must 
be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the realm of speculation. Fuller v. Wolters, 




119 Idaho 415, 422, 807 P.2d 633, 640 (1991); Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 
981, 987 (1996). While this does not require mathematical exactitude, it does require a link 
between the alleged action and the claimed damages: "The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not 
only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and 
causation must be proven with reasonable certainty." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Znc 143 
Idaho 733,152 P.3d 604,611 (2007). 
In the present case, MRIA's experts merely speculate as to what caused the reduction in 
scans. They do not analyze the effect of the entirely proper competition from IMI that the Court 
validated nor the effect of competition from other MRI sources. They do not analyze the effect of 
M u ' s  termination of GSR from reading scans. They do not even consider MRIA's own costs 
when considering and determining what profits were lost. Their damages experts specifically 
testified that they "assumed" the link between the claimed improper actions and the damages they 
calculated. Those experts stated in their depositions that they did not undertake the causation 
analysis. MRIA has not pointed to any other source for this element of proof. 
Third Party Defendants respectfully request the Court to grant SARMC's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the damage causation issue. 
Dated this -ay of June, 2007 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of June, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served on the following individual(s)/entity(ies), by the method indicated, 
and addressed as follows: 
/ 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, PA 
950 West Bannock, Suite 900 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC 
509 West Hays Street 
Post Office Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
[d  U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 319-2601 
/ 
[/I U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-9177 
Patrick J. Miller 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
/ 
[Pi U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 388-1300 
David W. Lloyd 
Saetrum Law Offices 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
I 
[q U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-0448 
Warren E. Jones 
Neil D. McFeeley 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW, 
MCKLVEEN &JONES, CHTD 
111 1 West Jefferson Street, Suite 530 
Post Office Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8535 
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542 
ISB No. 1193 
ISB No. 3564 
Attorneys for Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem 
State Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, ) 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, ) 






MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, ) 
) THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' 
Defendant. ) OBJECTION TO MRIA'S MOTION 
) IN LIMINE RE REFERRING 
) PHYSICIANS DESIGNATED BY 
) SARMCIGSR AS EXPERT WITNESSES 




SAINT ALPHONSUS DrVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 1 
COME NOW the Third Party Defendants Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this Memorandum in 
Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine re Referring Physicians. 
MRIA apparently is asking the Court to exclude from evidence at trial the expert opinions of 
the referring physicians and exclude any reference to the referring physicians designated by Third 
Party Defendants as expert witnesses. This motion is frivolous. 
Rather than calling hundreds of referring physicians from the Boise area, Third Party 
Defendants have designated a representative sample of physicians from different disciplines and 
specialties to testify as to not only their individual referral practices but the considerations that go 
into referrals for diagnostic testing and the reputation of GSR in the medical community. These 
insights are obviously "specialized knowledge" under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. Those insights 
also will assist the jurors to understand some of the critical issues in this case. Those physicians are 
obviously also qualified by their knowledge, experience, skill and training. Those five physicians 
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will clarify for the jury that much of the reason for the drop in scans at MRI Center was because 
MRIA terminated the services of GSR and many refemng physicians followed the radiologists. 
One of the key issues in this case is the cause for the lost scans and consequent lost profits 
experienced by MRI Center after the opening of MI .  On the one hand, MRIA contends that the 
lost scans was the result of unfair competition and antitrust violations whereas on the other hand 
Third Party Defendants contend that any lost scans was caused by natural competition and the 
termination of Gem State radiologists as the reading physicians for scans done at MRI Center. The 
five physicians from various disciplines will testify regarding reasons for their referral practices and 
what physicians in their particular specialties generally consider in deciding where to send patients 
for MRI's. They will testify that the overriding consideration is the quality of the radiologists and 
the working relationship between radiologists and the referring physician. That testimony goes to 
the very heart of the issue regarding causation for the lost scans claimed by MRI Center to be due to 
unfair or unlawful competition. 
This is not information that a lay person would have. It is, rather, dependent upon the 
specialized knowledge possessed by these refemng physicians and it will certainly help the jury 
understand the evidence and determine a fact in issue. 
The testimony would not confuse or mislead the jury but would clarify one of the essential 
aspects of this case. Rather than having hundreds of physicians, Third Party Defendants have 
identified five diverse physicians who can speak to the topic. It is interesting that MRIA has not 
been able to identify any physician who will testify to the contrary. Not one physician has been 
designated by MRIA to present conflicting evidence as to why referrals to the Center dropped off. 
MRIA's argument really goes to the weight of the testimony. MRIA will have a chance to 
cross-examine the expert referring physicians to find out if they are really "cherry picked friends of 
the SARGIGSR radiologists" or rather neutral professionals whose interest in patient care lead them 
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to seek the best possible radiologists to interpret the diagnostic test results. MRLA can cross 
examine these expert physicians to see if they can speak to referral patterns by any other physicians. 
The testimony of these five physicians will not take a great amount of time but they will bring in 
perspectives from different specializations and can inform the jury as to what considerations go into 
the decision to refer patients. An "expert" is required to present this testimony and MRIA's Motion 
in Limine is not well-founded. 
Third Party Defendants respecthlly request the Court to deny MRIA's Motion in Limine 
Dated this &day of June, 2007 
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EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW, 
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. 




MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, ) 
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INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, ) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 1 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho ) 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING ) 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho ) 
limited liability partnership, 1 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
COME NOW the Third Party Defendants Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this Objection to MRIA's 
Motion in Limine Re Admissibility of Shattuck Hammond Memorandum. Further, it is been stated 
in this Objection and in Third Party Defendants' Motion to Strike Exhibits D and J of Affidavit of 
G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA's Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by 
Third Party Defendants on the "interference with existing contractual relationship" claim, Third 
Party Defendants respectfully request the Court to deny MRIA's Motion and find that the Shattuck 
Hammond Memoranda are inadmissible. 
MIUA argues that the Shattuck Hammond Memoranda is not protected by the attomeylclient 
privilege and should not be excluded as hearsay because it constitutes a business record. Third 
Party Defendants will allow SARMC to speak to those points. MIUA has failed to focus on the 
most important reality: Shattuck Hammond Memoranda are inadmissible because they contain 
hearsay within hearsay. It does not matter if those Memoranda constitute business records and 
therefore pass over the preliminary hearsay hurdle. They are inadmissible because the statements 
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statements within those memoranda, at least as they apply to Third Party Defendants, are hearsay 
statements without attribution and without support. Nowhere in those reports is there even a 
suggestion that members of Third Party Defendants made any particular statements or even a 
representation that any Third Party Defendant spoke with the authors of the reports. There is 
absolutely nothing in any deposition or any other evidence of record that establishes a link between 
the comments by the Shattuck Hammond authors and any statements by any Third Party Defendant. 
As noted in Third Party Defendants' Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike 
Exhibits D and J of the Reinhardt Affidavit, the primary author of the reports admits in his 
deposition over and over that not only does he not remember where the statements regarding the 
Third Party Defendants arose from, but admitted that he did not even remember speaking to anyone 
at any of the Third Party Defendants. The admitted statements may actually just be an impression 
made by the author rather than a report of any statement made by Third Party Defendants. 
The Shattuck Hammond reports contain inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. They do not 
fall within any exception to the hearsay rule and must be stricken. 
Dated this day of June, 2007 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANTI FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
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THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY HIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS DISMISSING 
MRIA'S FIRST AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS THAT NO DAMAGES HAVE BEEN PROVEN CLAIM -PAGE 1 , 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COME NOW the Third-Party Defendants, Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC, Gem State 
Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chtd., and submit this Reply to MRIA's 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Third Party Defendants Dismissing M U ' S  
First Amended Third Party Complaint on the Basis that No Damages Have Been Proven. 
MRIA's briefbasically arguesthat Third Pariy Defendants' argument is the same as that 
advanced in Third Party Defendants' Motion to Strike the Expert Reports of MRIA's Experts under 
I.R.C.P. 26 andlor I.R.E. 702. MRIA misunderstands the thrust of the various motions. 
The previous motions were indeed directed at the expert reports for failing to conform with 
I.R.C.P. 26 or Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence. The present Motion for Summary Judgment, 
however, is legally distinct. 
In response to the previous motions, the Court noted that it considered the expert reports to be 
sufficient under Rule 26 and would allow Saint Alphonsus and Third Party Defendants to make 
whatever objections were appropriate on evidentiary grounds at trial. The present motion, however, 
does not deal with the reports in general but deals with the specific question whether any particular 
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remaining causes of action should be dismissed because there is no proof in the records - either in 
discovery responses, deposition testimony, or the expert reports - that MRIA can point to to defeat the 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that the damage element in each cause of action has not 
been proven. Under standards for summary judgment, once the advancing party has pointed out the 
deficiencies in the responding party's case, that responding party has the obligation of coming forward 
with more than a scintilla of evidence to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Third Party Defendants 
have come forward on each of the remaining causes of action against them and specifically, in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Basis that No Damages have been Proven, pointed out the gaps 
in MRIA's claims. It was MRIA's obligation on each remaining cause of action to come fonvard to 
point to evidence in the record establishing at least an issue of fact regarding proof of damages. 
MRIA cannot do that because, as discussed in Third Party Defendants' opening brief, the 
damage calculations by MRIA (contained in its experts reports) do not break down damages either by 
cause of action or even against the various parties. That is, the jury cannot know what damages were 
allegedly caused by Third Party Defendants on any specific cause of action as compared to damages 
allegedly caused overall by Third Party Defendants and Saint Alphonsus for all of the alleged wrong 
doing. The expert reports do not set out for the jury what damages it might consider to have been 
caused by, for example, Third Party Defendants because of their alleged anti-competitive conduct as 
compared to that caused by Saint Alphonsus for its wrongful dissociation. The expert reports do not 
provide any guidance to the jury, for example, as to what damages were allegedly caused by Third 
Party Defendants' alleged wrongful interference as compared to Saint Alphonsus' alleged spoliation of 
evidence. 
The bottom line is that MRIA has failed to provide adequate information on any damages 
against Third Party Defendants and thus has failed to come forward with even a scintilla of evidence to 
create a genuine issue of fact for trial on an essential element of each cause of action: damages. 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS DISMISSING 
MRIA'S FIRST AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS THAT NO DAMAGES HAVE BEEN PROVEN CLAIM -PAGE 3 
Accordingly, its Third Party Complaint must be dismissed for failure to respond to the summary 
judgment motion by Third Party Defendants. 
Dated this pday of June, 2007 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS DISMISSING 
&%RIA'S FIRST AMENDED THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS THAT NO DAMAGES HAVE BEEN PROVEN CLAIM -PAGE 4 
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. I 
Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") respond 
to MRI Associates, LLP's ("MRIA") Motion in Limine re: Justification for Withdrawal as 
follows: 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE. INC.. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC.'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: JUSTIFICATION FOR 
WITHDRAWAL - 2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
MRIA seeks to preclude Saint Alphonsus from submitting any evidence explaining the 
reasons it withdrew from MRIA because it asserts the reasons are either irrelevant or overly 
prejudicial to MRIA. As is the case in several of its Motions in Limine, MRIA fails to 
acknowledge it expanded this lawsuit much beyond a simple breach of contract or partnership 
equity case and made the parties' course of conduct leading up to withdrawal relevant. MRIA 
cannot argue that Saint Alphonsus knew its withdrawal was wrongful or that Saint Alphonsus 
had bad motives, while on the other hand arguing Saint Alphonsus should not he able to explain 
the reasons for its withdrawal. A complete explanation of the "story" behind the parties' dispute 
is necessary to understand the claims at issue and is especially critical to Saint Alphonsus to 
refute MRIA's breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claims. MRIA would rather the jury only hear its side of the story. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Saint Alphonsus' Reasons for Withdrawal Are Relevant. 
MRLA's limited interpretation of relevance should be rejected. If Saint Alphonsus is not 
allowed to expiain the reasons for its withdrawal, the jury will be left to speculate why Saint 
Alphonsus withdrew. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to have the jury hear the whole story and to 
understand the motivations of all parties before it reaches a decision in this case. By raising 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
against Saint Alphonsus, MRIA brought into question Saint Alphonsus' conduct while it was a 
partner in MRIA. MRIA in fact contends that Saint Alphonsus' dissociation was a breach of 
fiduciary duty to the limited partnership. See Second Amended Counterclaim at 7 88. To rebut 
and refute MRIA's claims in this regard, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to put on evidence 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC.'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: JUSTIFICATION FOR 
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explaining its conduct.' Only then can the jury weigh the evidence and determine whether or not 
Saint Alphonsus breached any duty. If Saint Alphonsus cannot explain why it had to dissociate, 
its defense of MRIA's numerous claims (including, without limitation, the fiduciary duty and 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing) will be severely and inappropriately handicapped. 
B. Saint Alphonsus' Reasons for Dissociation are Probative of Saint Alphonsus' 
Motivations While a Partner in MRIA and are Admissible Under Rule 403. 
MRIA Motion to exclude evidence of justification for withdrawal under Rule 403 is more 
prejudicial than probative and is confusing to the jury standards. These arguments should be 
rejected. As explained above, Saint Alphonsus' reasons for withdrawal are relevant to numerous 
claims and therefore are probative. MRIA complains of prejudice and confusion of issues 
because it does not want the jury to hear the multiple reasons Saint Alphonsus had to withdraw 
from MRIA. MRIA asserts this may influence the jury's damage award on the dissociation 
issue. MRIA is the party who expanded the case beyond a straightforward partnership 
dissolution case with its twenty (20) count Second Amended Counterclaim that specifically 
complain of conduct and seek damages for activities occurring before Saint Alphonsus 
dissociated. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to have the jury evaluate its pre-dissociation conduct in 
light of MRIA's claims. When seen in this context, Saint Alphonsus' reasons for withdrawal are 
not more prejudicial than probative and should be admitted into evidence. 
I In its Response to MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Attempts to Purchase MRIA andlor MRICI, Saint Alphonsus 
pointed out the very cases MRIA cites in an attempt to counter Saint Alphonsus' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on MRICI and MRIM's fiduciary duty claims actually support Saint Alphonsus' argument that a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim oftentimes raises a question of fact and that Saint Alphonsus must necessarily be able to put on 
evidence explaining its actions. See e.g. In re Estate ofFarr, 274 Kan. 51,72,49 P.3d 415,431 (2002); Matlock v. 
Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384 385 (Tenn. 1995); and Ruebsamen v. Maddock., 340 A.2d 31,35 (Me. 1975). 
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111. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests the Court deny 
MRIA's Motion in Limine seeking to establish the inadmissibility of Saint Alphonsus' 
justifications for dissociating from MRIA. 
DATED this &ay of June 2007. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
. f Z  9 m L  
Patrick J. Miller 
Attorneys for Saint Alphonsus 
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. 1 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. I 
Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") respond 
to MRI Associates, LLP's ("MRIA") Motion in Limine re: Refening Physicians Designated by 
SARGIGSR as Expert Witnesses as follows: 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC.3 RESPONSE TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: REFERRING PHYSICIANS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
MRIA seeks to preclude the five referring physicians identified as expert witnesses by 
Gem State Radiology ("GSR") and Saint Alphonsus from being expert witnesses at trial. MRIA 
argues the refemng physicians' testimony will not assist the jury. The Court should reject this 
argument because the five identified physicians can help the jury understand the thought process 
and factors a physician referring a patient for an MRI considers. This testimony bears directly 
on MRIA's assertion that all lost scans since 1999 or 2001 can be attributed to Saint Alphonsus' 
and GSR's actions. The referring physicians' testimony directly rebuts this assertion by MRIA 
and shows the jury what factors refemng physicians consider when referring a patient for an 
MRI and that GSR's and Saint Alphonsus' conduct did not necessarily cause the damages MRIA 
asserts, 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. The Referring Physicians' Testimony Will Assist the Jury in Understanding 
Referring Physicians' Thought Processes in Choosing an MRI Provider. 
MRIA does not argue the referring physicians are not qualified as expert witnesses. 
Rather, MRIA bases its attack on their testimony on its argument that such testimony will not 
help the jury. Saint Alphonsus agrees the admission of expert testimony is governed by Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 702 and that to be admissible, such testimony must "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." The referring physicians' testimony 
will, however, assist the jury in understanding what factors a referring physician considers in 
sending her patients to an MRI provider. 
The jury will most likely not be composed of doctors. Most lay people do not understand 
the distinction between the technical component of an MRI study and the professional 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC., AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC.'S RESPONSE TO MRIA'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: REFERRING PHYSICIANS 
DESIGNATED BY SARGIGSR AS EXPERT WITNESSES - 3 
S \CLIENTSU3AI765ISADC Raplmta  MLLmRefmuig Dm DOC 
01.793 
component and, more significantly, what weight a referring physician gives to who the 
respective provider of these services is when deciding where to send her patients for an MRI. 
For example, when a neurosurgeon sends a patient for an MRI of the brain, the patient likely 
only knows that she had to have the image acquired by the MRI scanner. She likely does not 
know that a highly-trained neuroradiologist will interpret that image and it is that 
neuroradiologist's interpretation that is critical to the neurosurgeon's diagnosis and treatment. 
This testimony refutes MRIA's assertion that all the scans it has lost since 1999 or 2001 are 
attributable to GSR's and Saint Alphonsus' alleged bad acts. 
Contrary to MRIA's argument, the referring physicians' testimony is not offered solely to 
"bolster the reputation of SARGIGSR," and "describe their own referring patterns." Rather, it is 
offered to assist the jury in understanding how a doctor thinks and what factors a physician 
considers in deciding where to send her patients for an MRI. Therefore, it is proper under 
Rule 702 and will assist the jury in understanding the evidence and determining a fact in issue in 
this trial. 
B. The Referring Physicians Wi Not Confuse or Mislead the Jury, and Their 
Testimony is Admissible Under Rule 403. 
Rather than confusing or misleading the jury, the referring physician's testimony will 
help the jury understand the complex issue of how a doctor decides where to send his patients for 
an MRI. The referring physicians are not offered to speak for the entire Boise medical 
community. They are offered, however, to provide the jury with insight into how a doctor thinks 
and the decision making process a doctor goes through. 
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Finally, the referring physicians are not offered to simply "praise" GSR. The fact they 
hold GSR in high regard is secondary to the primary testimony regarding the thought process of 
a doctor. Their testimony will not be a waste of time and will not confuse or mislead the jury. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests the Court deny 
MRIA's Motion in Limine and allow the referring physicians to testify at trial. 
DATED this l h a y  of June 2007. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P&dk J. Miller ' 
Attorneys for Saint Alphonsus 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, on its own behalf, and on 
behalf of MRI Limited, an Idaho Limited 
Partnership, and MRI Mobile Limited, an Idaho 
Limited Partnership, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, 
Counterdefendants. I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. I 
Counterdefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC"), and Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("SARMC") (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") respond 
to MRI Associates, LLP's ("MRIA") Motion in Limine re: Admissibility of Shattuck Hamrnond 
Memorandum as follows: 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
MRIA seeks to establish the admissibility of the September 15,2001, Shattuck Hammond 
Memorandum. As the Court is aware, Saint Alphonsus has filed its own Motion in Limine 
seeking to preclude admission of certain portions of the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum into 
evidence. Saint Alphonsus adopts and incorporates the arguments made in support of its Motion 
in Limine re: Shattuck Hammond Memorandum in opposition to MRIA's Motion. To 
summarize: 
(1) The Shattuck Hammond Memorandum does contain attomeylclient privileged 
material, and Saint Alphonsus properly sought to assert the privilege upon its 
discovery the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum contained attomeylclient 
privileged information. 
(2) The "scorched earth" language contained in the Memorandum is inadmissible 
hearsay because MRIA cannot establish the proper foundation to show the 
language is the statement of a party opponent or fits into any other exception or 
exclusion from the hearsay rule. 
(3) Admission of the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and its "scorched earW 
language into evidence would be more prejudicial than probative and, therefore, 
the Court should exercise its discretion and preclude it under Rule 403. 
MRIA has attempted to refute each of these arguments in its Motion in Limine. While the Court 
should reject MRIA's arguments, Saint Alphonsus will not rehash the substance of the arguments 
asserted in its Motion in Limine to preclude admission of the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum, 
but it must address several assertions made by MRIA in support of its Motion. 
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11. ARGUMENT 
A. Saint Alphonsus Met Its Burden to Show Privilege and Did Not Waive the 
AttorneyIClient Privilege. 
As an initial matter, MRIA's argument that Saint Alphonsus has not shown the 
Memorandum contains attorneylclient information should be rejected. Even a cursory review of 
the portions Saint Alphonsus seeks to exclude show the Memorandum contains information 
Givens Pursley LLP provided to Saint Alphonsus for the purposes of rendering legal advice. 
Further, this information was intended to be, and was kept, confidential. As Saint Alphonsus 
showed in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine re: Shattuck Hammond 
Memorandum and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike References to Privileged 
Documents, Shattuck Hammond Partners was a "representative of a lawyer" under 
Rule 502(a)(4), and Givens Pursley LLP and Saint Alphonsus were free to share confidential 
legal analysis with Shattuck Hammond Partners without fear of waiving the attomeylclient 
privilege. 
Saint Alphonsus did not waive the attorneylclient privilege by allowing Shattuck 
Harnmond Partners to produce documents at the deposition of Grant Chamberlain or at any time 
following that deposition. MRIA argues Saint Alphonsus did not timely raise its attorneylclient 
privilege objection. As Saint Alphonsus showed in its briefing in support of its Motion to Strike 
the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum and the Affidavits of Patrick J. Miller and Jack 
S. Gjording, as soon as Saint Alphonsus discovered the privileged nature of the material 
contained in the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum, it sent a letter to MRIA asserting the 
privilege and requesting MRIA return the Shattuck Hammond Memorandum. 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(S)(B) provides that when privileged material is 
inadvertently produced, the privilege need only be raised '"within a reasonable time." Under the 
circumstances and given the fact the parties and third parties had already produced tens of 
thousands of pages of documents in the litigation, it was not unreasonable that Saint Alphonsus 
did not immediately discover the privileged material buried within one of Shattuck Hammond 
Partners' working documents. Saint Alphonsus' counsel only had a brief opportunity to review 
the Shattuck Hammond Partners documents prior to their production at the Chamberlain 
deposition, so it is no surprise that the privileged nature of the Memorandum was not discovered 
prior to its production. There is no indication on the face of the document that it contains 
privileged material, rather it is only after reading through the entire document that the privileged 
nature of portions of it can be discovered. Further, Mr. Miller, on behalf of Saint Alphonsus, 
preserved his objection to discussion of, or any production of, any attorneylclient privileged 
material at the Chamberlain deposition. See MRIA's Memorandum in Support of Motion in 
Limine at pp. 5-6. 
MRIA makes much of the fact Saint Alphonsus' counsel did not object to the use of the 
Shattuck Harnmond Memorandum as an exhibit at the deposition of Dr. Neil Davey. MRIA's 
Memorandum in Support at pp. 10-1 1. The flaw with this argument is that Saint Alphonsus' 
counsel did not realize the Memorandum contained privileged material until he reviewed the 
document during and after the Davey deposition. Once counsel determined the document 
contained privileged material, Saint Alphonsus promptly requested its return. 
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B. MFUA Cannot Establish the Proper Foundation for Admission of the 'Scorched 
Earth" Language. 
The Shattuck Hammond Memorandum purports to attribute the "scorched earth scenario" 
language to someone at Saint Alphonsus, but the author of the document cannot establish that 
anyone at Saint Alphonsus actually used such a phrase. The Shattuck Hammond Memorandum 
is an internal Shattuck Hammond business record. The Memorandum itself is not, therefore, 
barred by the evidentiary rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence. The "scorched 
earth" language, however, is double hearsay and is not admissible unless it, too, falls within a 
hearsay exception or is excluded from the definition of hearsay. MRIA contends that the 
statement is an admission of the party upon it and is thereby accepted from the definition of 
hearsay under I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). That Rule provides that a statement is not hearsay if: 
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own 
statement, and in either an individual or representative capacity, or (B) a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or 
(C) a statement by a person authorized by a party to make a statement concerning 
the subject, or (D) a statement by a party's agent or servant concerning the matter 
within the scope of the agency or employment of the servant or agent, made 
during the existence of a relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a 
party during the course and in the fiutherance of the conspiracy. 
MRIA has not, however, established the evidentiary foundation necessary to obtain 
admission of this statement as a statement of a party opponent. To be admitted as the party's 
own statement, the required evidentiary foundation is evidence that the person actually made the 
statement. See Edward J. Inwinkelried, Evidentiaw Foundation, 6" Ed. (2005) at p. 420. MRIA 
cannot establish that anyone from Saint Alphonsus made this statement. 
The mere fact the language is in quotations does not mean those specific words were ever 
uttered by anyone at Saint Alphonsus. MRIA deposed one of the authors of the Shattuck 
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Hammond Memorandum, Mike Finnerty, on May 15,2007. At his deposition and in response to 
MRIA's inquiries regarding the "scorched earth" language, Mr. Finnerty testified as follows: 
Q. Now, do you have a recollection of this phrase, scorched-earth 
scenario? 
A. I don't. 
* * * 
Q. As one who is very likely an author of this document, can you 
interpret what the quotations around scorched-earth scenario intend? 
MR. GJORDING: Object to the form. Same objections. 
MR. McKEY: I'll join. 
THE WITNESS: I would believe that scorched-earth scenario was put in 
quotations because it's a colloquialism. 
BY MR. BANDUCCI: 
Q. Okay. Would that be the colloquialism of the authors? 
MR. GJORDING: Object to the form. 
THE WITNESS: It could be. 
(Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller in Opposition of MRIA's Motion in Limine re: Admissibility of 
Shattuck Hammond Memorandum at Exh. A.) 
Mr. Finnerty later testified in response to Mr. Gjording's questions about this language: 
Q. Okay. Do you - do you remember anyone saying that to you? 
A. I do not remember anyone saying that to me specifically. 
Q. So can I assume safely, Mr. Finnerty, that you're not suggesting 
here to this jury that you're quoting anyone from Saint Alphonsus? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. Okay. 
MR. BANDUCCI: Let him finish his answer. 
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THE WITNESS: Can you repeat that, please? I'm sorry. 
BY MR. GJORDING: 
Q. You're not quoting Saint Alphonsus when you - 
* * * 
Q. Did anyone from Saint Alphonsus ever say to you, Mr. Finnerty, 
that they wanted to run MRIA out of business? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anyone from Saint Alphonsus - 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Did anyone ever say to you, anyone from Saint Alphonsus ever say 
to you that they wanted to harm MRIA in any way? 
A. I don't recall anyone saying that. 
Id. at Exh. A, 
Given this testimony, MRIA cannot establish any foundation permitting admission of the 
language in question as an exception or exclusion from the hearsay rule. 
C. The Memorandum Has Little Probative Value of Saint Alphonsus' Intentions or the 
Risks Potentially Associated with Withdrawal. 
Mr. Finnerty's testimony establishes that he believed the words "scorched earth" scenario 
were intended as a colloquialism, not as a direct quotation from someone at Saint Alphonsus and 
that he does not remember anyone at Saint Alphonsus ever actually using that language. As 
discussed in Saint Alphonsus' Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine re: Shattuck 
Hammond Memorandum, the language itself is ambiguous and could mean many things. When 
this ambiguity is combined with Mr. Finnerty's testimony that he did not believe the quotations 
to mean he heard anyone at Saint Alphonsus use that language, the probative value, if any, of the 
Memorandum diminishes. The prejudicial nature of allowing MRIA to use the questioned 
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language at trial is obvious. When the probative value is weighed against the prejudice, it 
becomes clear the language is inadmissible at trial under Rule 403. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus respectfully requests the Court deny 
MRIA's Motion in Limine seeking to establish the admissibility of the Shattuck Hammond 
Memorandum and grant its Motion in Limine to exclude the Memorandum from evidence. 
DATED this *day of June 2007. 
GJORDNG & FOUSER, PLLC 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Patnck J. Miller h 
Attorneys for Saint Alphonsus 
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